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ABSTRACT 
 
Relational Pluralism in Boards of Directors: A Multidimensional View 
by 
Zhu Zhu 
 
Advisor: Weilei Shi 
 
A large body of literature has been devoted to explaining the influence of corporate boards on 
their firms’ financial performance, yet the findings paint a puzzling picture. My dissertation 
seeks to shed light on current research by paying nuanced attention to latent board characteristics 
and obtaining a more comprehensive understanding of the board-performance relationship. I 
adapt a relational pluralistic perspective of the board to empirically examine multiple facets of 
director ties, identities, power relations, and networks and their effect on firm performance. This 
relational view of the board extends the current understanding of director behavior by 
aggregating director relationships on multiple relational dimensions. I also modify the existing 
relational pluralism model to be used specifically for the board literature and examine the 
contingent nature of the model. I establish the construct validity of my multi-dimensional 
conceptualization of board relational pluralism using panel data on listed Chinese firms between 
2007 and 2010. I also establish predictive effect of relational pluralism on firms’ accounting and 
market performance. In addition, I demonstrate that board relational pluralism have differential 
effects on firm performance, using firm strategy as a contingency.  
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
“Who the directors are, what boards of directors do and how well they do it are 
important issues, not only for all shareholders, but for everyone dependent upon a 
vigorous economy for their well-being, which is to say, everyone.” (Leblanc & 
Gillies, 2005: 50–51) 
A large body of literature has been devoted to explaining the influence of corporate 
boards on their firms’ financial performance, yet the findings paint a puzzling picture and 
leaves much to be desired. Boards, which occupy the upper echelons of corporations, are 
mainly responsible for monitoring and advising management, in addition to helping firms 
with managing their resource dependence (Hillman & Dalziel, 2003), all of which lead to the 
idea that board of directors should influence firm performance, and effective boards should 
positively affect performance. Therefore, for the past few decades, research on boards and 
their influence on firm outcomes have been regarded as a key element in the corporate 
governance literature (Dalton, Daily, Ellstrand, & Johnson, 1998, Forbes & Milliken 1999; 
Hillman & Dalziel 2003; Johnson, Daily & Ellstrand 1996; McDonal, Khanna, & Westphal, 
2008; Pearce & Zahra 1992; Westphal, 1999; Westphal & Bednar, 2005; Westphal & Zajac, 
1995; 2013). As a foundation to the corporate governance literature, research on board of 
directors has been driven by academic and practical curiosities revolving several persisting 
themes. Commanding issues such as the inability of boards to execute their advisory 
function, the frequency with which they ignore their monitory role, and their association with 
high-profile corporate failures have contributed to the undying interest of scholars to 
continue studying directors. Furthermore, large investors do not always advocate for board 
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independence, which draw in researchers and mass media attention (Brickley, Coles, & 
Jarrell, 1997). However despite the impressive body of research that has focused on the 
relationship between corporate boards and firm performance, empirical results display a 
notable lack of consensus (Zajac & Westphal, 1996). 
Corporate governance is believed to play the role of safeguarding stakeholders’ rights 
and serve as a system by which business organizations are controlled and directed (Cadbury, 
1992). Although the literature has continuously placed importance on defining and 
developing good corporate governance practices and characteristics, there has not been a 
universally accepted interpretation on the role and performance effects of boards (Dalton & 
Dalton, 2011; Zahra, 1996). The lack of clarity persisted due to the interdisciplinary nature 
of theories that contributed to the development of the corporate governance literature. Main 
theories that have shaped the field include agency theory (Donaldson & Davis, 1991; 
Eisenhardt, 1989; Jensen, 1983), resource dependence theory (Hillman & Dalziel, 2003; 
Hillman, Withers, & Collins, 2009; Johnson, Ellstrand, & Daily, 1996; Pfeffer & Salancik, 
2003), transaction cost theory (Coase, 1937; Oviatt, 1988; Williamson, 1981), stewardship 
theory (Donaldson & Davis, 1991; Muth & Donaldson, 1998), stakeholder theory (Donaldson 
& Preston, 1995; Hart, 1995), classes hegemony theory (Bazerman & Schoorman, 1983; 
Zahra & Pearce, 1989), managerial hegemony theory (Clarke, 1998; Mace, 1971), and 
principal-principal agency theory (Dharwadkar, George, & Brandes, 2000; Renders & 
Gaeremynck, 2012; Young, Peng, & Ahlstrom, Bruton, & Jiang, 2008). Agency theory and 
resource dependence theory are by far the most extensively used theoretical perspectives. 
Agency theory emphasizes the importance of the monitoring and controlling role of boards 
(Dalton & Dalton, 2011; Daily, Dalton, & Cannella, 2003; Dalton, Daily, Ellstrand, & 
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Johnson, 1998; Eisenhardt, 1989; Jensen & Meckling, 1976), whereas resource dependence 
theory focuses on the importance of the advisory role (Daily et al., 2003; Zahra & Pearce, 
1989). Both theories propose that certain characteristics of boards can and should influence 
their ability to monitor and guide firm activities, and subsequently affect firm performance. 
Therefore, understanding the relationship between board characteristics and performance has 
become a critical research focus.  
However, to promote the debate about boards’ effect on firm performance, it is 
important to recognize that idiosyncratic aspects of each board makes it possible to observe 
differentiated performance implications across firms. So what makes a board truly unique 
and what makes a board effective? The dominant view in the existing literature states that 
effective boards and ineffective boards differ in their ability to control and advise 
management (Adams, Hermalin, & Weisbach, 2010; Post & Byron, 2015). An alternative 
perspective is that individuals, teams, and organizations derive their distinctiveness from 
relations with other entities (Shipilov, Gulati, Kilduff, Li, & Tsai, 2014). Using this 
relational perspective could reveal neglected or overlooked aspects (i.e. board power 
dynamics, hierarchy, incentive alignment, etc.) of how boards utilize social interactions and 
how they navigate through social systems that inevitably play a part in their effectiveness. 
Corporate boards and the organizations they represent, are complex adaptive systems that are 
embedded in heterogeneous networks consisting of many different kinds of nodes. By 
shifting towards a relational approach, scholars can obtain insights on new pathways for 
research in the governance literature (Gulati, Kilduff, Li, Shipilov, & Tsai, 2011; Kilduff, 
Crossland, Tsai, & Krackhardt, 2008; Shipilov et al., 2014). In addition, applying a relational 
perspective answers the call for expanding the applicability and relevance of agency theory 
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by examining the influence of the relational factors (social capital, networks, power 
relations, etc.) on the principal-agent interactions (Wiseman, Cuevas-Rodriguez, & Gomez-
Mejia, 2012). The addition of a relational lens could examine social contexts such as director 
social capital, power relations, and diversity of principals alongside traditional agency 
problems (Wiseman, Cuevas-Rodriguez, & Gomez-Mejia, 2012). Taking a relational 
perspective can help scholars with building comprehensive models of relational dynamics 
and their performance consequences, as well as enriching our understanding of the 
opportunities and constraints facing organizations and individuals (Shipilov et al., 2014). I 
propose that the corporate governance literature can greatly benefit from adopting a 
relational lens, which can supplement existing theoretical approaches. 
Gulati, Kilduff, Li, Shipilov, and Tsai (2010) introduced the concept of relational 
pluralism to examine the extent to which an individual, a team, or an organization derives its 
meaning and courses of action from relationships with other entities. Building upon the 
initial definitions, Shipilov and colleagues (2014) further develop the relational pluralism 
perspective to represent the coexistence of a broad array of different relationships and/or 
identities among the same set of actors. Relational pluralism is prevalent in the world around 
us, but very few studies have attempted to develop comprehensive models using relational 
pluralism due to the difficulty of obtaining the quantity and quality of data necessary 
(Shipilov et al., 2014). So far, answering the Gulati and colleagues’ (2010) call for research, 
six studies have examined relational pluralism empirically to develop theory and provide 
support for the efficacy of the model. Strategic alliances and lawsuits between companies in 
the biotechnology and pharmaceutical industries have been used to examine relational 
pluralism driven by multiple types of ties between firms and the firms’ multiple identities as 
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adversaries and collaborators (Sytch & Tatarynowicz, 2014). Relational pluralism has also 
been shown to arise from an organization’s internal and external influences to affect the 
adoption of new corporate social responsibility practices using data from 161 Fortune 500 
organizations (Rafaelli & Glynn, 2014). Relational pluralism in inter-organizational 
interactions has been used to examine the effect of executive departures, where multiple ties 
and identities are managed within organizations to prevent client losses (Rogan, 2014). 
Moreover, identities and affiliations of board members were shown to represent intra-
organizational origins of relational pluralism, which affects new ventures’ ability to build 
diverse alliance portfolios (Beckman, Schoonhoven, Rottner, & Kim, 2014). Firms’ network 
positions in different kinds of ties is another example of relational pluralism where the firms’ 
centrality in different networks affect their voting behaviors in standard-setting committees 
(Ranganathan & Rosenkopf, 2014). Lastly, relational pluralism provides a way to examine 
knowledge creation based on focal actors’ identities and relationships (Rodan, Fruin, & Xu, 
2014).  
This stream of new research has brought our attention closer to the realities in which 
organizations and individuals find themselves, but substantial gaps  regarding the antecedents, 
consequences, and validity of relational pluralism still exist in the literature, and significant 
work needs to be done on all levels (individual, groups/teams, firm) to add to our 
understanding of the relational pluralism framework. Corporate boards are the perfect 
research subjects in this emerging literature because boards can be conveniently examined as 
an instantiation of relational pluralism (Beckman et al., 2014). As soon as an outside director 
joins the board, the focal firm is connected to a larger network of organizations and is able to 
tap into the outside resources now made available by the outside director. In addition, board 
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members often come from unique backgrounds and each board can be viewed as a repository 
of multiple relationships with unique expertise and ideas (Shipilov et al., 2014). When 
directors with different observable and non-observable characteristics come together to make 
up a board, the subtleties of their interactions with each other could influence the board’s 
effectiveness and its degree of impact on firm outcomes at large. Directors’ behaviors are 
constantly affected by the multiple ties and identities they hold, which in turn, influence their 
ability to execute their control and advisory functions. By applying the relational pluralism 
perspective in corporate governance literature, latent dimensions of board member dynamics 
can be explored to obtain a more comprehensive understanding of the board-performance 
relationship.  
In this paper, to empirically examine the relational pluralism model in the corporate 
governance context, multiple facets of director characteristics, ties, identities, power 
relations, and interlocking directorate networks are observed and aggregated on the board 
level to represent their focal firms. Unlike prior studies that mainly emphasize on board 
structure and observable board characteristics, this paper extends the scope of the current 
literature by not only examining variables that have been well supported, but also 
supplementing current knowledge with latent relational dimensions illuminated by the 
relational pluralism framework. 
I propose that a firm’s board provides differential benefits/limitations to firm 
performance outcomes in terms of four dimensions (heterogeneity, multiplexity, 
connectedness, and skewedness). This paper modifies existing relational pluralism models to 
be applied specifically to the corporate governance literature by providing theoretical and 
empirical evidence in hopes of motivating and justifying a four-dimension model. In addition 
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to developing the four dimensional relational pluralism model, I draw upon existing theories 
to examine the performance implications of the model. One of the main reasons for 
developing a multidimensional view of board relational pluralism is to explore its effect on 
firm performance. Although there has been a call for research on the outcomes of relational 
pluralism (Gulati et al., 2010), no existing paper has tailored a relational pluralism model 
specifically for the corporate governance literature with a focus on predicting firm level 
performance. Therefore, in addition to establishing the multidimensional model of board 
relational pluralism and identifying key concepts for each dimension, I also examine the 
model’s consequences by focusing on the prediction of relationships between each of the 
four dimensions and firm performance.  
Furthermore, as noted by many some scholars (Dalton, Daily, Ellstrand, & Johnson, 
1998; Dalton, Johnson, & Ellstrand, 1999; Dawna, Rhoades, Rechner, & Sundaramurthy, 
2001; Larcker, So, & Wang, 2013; Westphal & Zajac, 2013), the board and firm performance 
relationship is inevitably affected by the firm’s strategic behavior, which dictates the 
governance choices of organizations, which could directly influence boards’ ability to affect 
firm performance. Applying the relational pluralism model to the board-performance 
literature necessarily leads to the consideration concerning the strategic contexts under which 
the firms operate. To demonstrate the contingent nature of board relational pluralism, I 
examine the relational pluralism dimensions and their differential effects on firm 
performance under different strategic contexts using the Miles and Snow (1978) Typology.  
What I hope to accomplish with this study is three-fold. First, I establish the construct 
validity of the board relational pluralism framework. I provide and justify a unifying 
framework that pieces together relevant dimensions of the board in accordance to the call for 
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interdisciplinary and integrative research, I tailor and redesign the original three dimensional 
model of relational pluralism to specifically fit the board context. Second, I provide 
theoretical and empirical evidence to show that a firm’s board affects firm performance 
outcomes in terms of the proposed relational pluralism dimensions. Finally, I demonstrate the 
contingent nature of board relational pluralism, and empirically examine relational pluralism 
dimensions’ differential effects on firm performance. 
 
CHAPTER II 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Board Characteristics and Firm Performance 
Main theories that have shaped the corporate governance literature include agency 
theory (Donaldson & Davis, 1991; Eisenhardt, 1989; Fama & Jensen, 1983), resource 
dependence theory (Hillman & Dalziel, 2003; Hillman et al., 2009; Johnson et al. , 1996; 
Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003), upper echelons theory (Carpenter, Geletkanycz, & Sanders, 2004; 
Hambrick, 2007; Hamrick & Mason, 1984), transaction cost theory (Coase, 1937; Oviatt, 
1988; Williamson, 1981), stewardship theory (Donaldson & Davis, 1991; Muth & 
Donaldson, 1998), stakeholder theory (Donaldson & Preston; Hart, 1995), classes hegemony 
theory (Bazerman & Schoorman, 1983; Zahra & Pearce, 1989), managerial hegemony theory 
(Clarke, 1998; Mace, 1971), and principal-principal agency theory (Dharwadkar et al., 2000; 
Renders & Gaeremynck, 2012; Young et al., 2008). Out of these well studied theories, 
agency theory, resource dependence theory, and upper echelons theory are undoubtedly the 
most prevalent theoretical perspectives used to explore boards’ performance implications. In 
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order to address the lack of clarity in the corporate governance literature regarding board-
performance linkage with the addition of a relational approach, I provide a brief review of 
agency theory, resource dependence theory, and upper echelons theory, and build an 
argument for supplementing them with a relational lens.  
 
Agency Perspective on Boards 
From the agency theory perspective, Boards are viewed as the most important internal 
corporate governance mechanism that remedying agency problems caused by the separation 
of ownership and control in public firms (Dalton & Dalton, 2011; Fama & Jensen, 1983). 
Since the main function of the board is to observe and reprimand managers presumed to 
make decisions that benefit themselves at the expense of shareholders as well as 
incentivizing managers to align their interests with those of shareholders’ , members of the 
board should be sufficiently independent in order to successfully carry out their role of 
criticizing management actions and policies (Johnson, Daily, & Ellstrand, 1996). Therefore, 
a board comprised of a greater proportion of independent directors benefits the firm by 
providing less biased advice and protects the board’s legitimacy in the investor community 
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Peng, 2004).  In addition, the board is expected to best perform 
its monitoring job when the chair of the board is someone other than the CEO due to 
concerns regarding the potential for management domination of the board (Conger & Lawler, 
2009; Fama & Jensen, 1983; Rechner & Dalton, 1991; Westphal & Zajac, 1995).  
Through the lens of agency theory, board independence and leadership structure have 
become the most extensively examined board characteristics in the board performance effects 
literature (Dalton et al., 1998). Despite a wide range of theory-driven rationales that suggest 
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a relationship between board composition (ratio of inside vs. outside directors), leadership 
structure (CEO duality) and firm performance, the literature has not yet shown consensus 
about the direction of the relationship. Dalton and colleague’s (1998) meta-analysis of 85 
empirical papers found no evidence of systematic governance structure and performance 
relationships. A more recent meta-analysis of 86 empirical papers on Asian firms yielded 
similar results where governance structure and composition have very weak direct 
relationship with firm performance, however, strategic preferences were shown to mediate 
the relationship (van Essen, van Oosterhout, & Carney, 2012). These large systematic 
reviews of the literature reveals that it is very difficult to draw any conclusion regarding 
board characteristics and firm performance in different samples from all around the world. 
Much of the difficulty with applying agency theory in governance research stems from the 
simplicity of the way current literature defines board composition. Presence of independent 
directors and CEO duality are the most vigorously studied variables in board composition, 
and they serve as the basis for determining board independence, which is considered to be 
the most crucial factor in effective monitoring of agents by principals (Johnson et al., 1993). 
However, corporate boards inevitably consist of directors who influence each other by ways 
they form relationships within and outside their boards. The governance research solely 
based on the agency theoretical lens has not paid enough attention to the intricate interactions 
and relationships that exist in each board, and the effect of board relational properties on 
board decision making. One way to address this is to further examine the relational subtleties 
that exist within each board (Daily & Dalton, 1994), as well as delving deeper into the sub 
level characteristics that cannot be detected when treating boards as similar entities with few 
observable differences. Many critical processes and decisions of boards do not derive from 
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the board-at-large, but rather from nuanced sublevel groups (Bilimoria & Piderit, 1994; 
Lorsh & Maclver, 1989) that are formed based on formal appointments (audit, compensation, 
or supervisory committees) or informal social cliques (insider vs. outsider, executive vs. 
independent groups).  
The agency perspective of the board places strong emphasis on the balance between 
insiders and outsiders, which overlooks the heterogeneity of boards’ capabilities and the 
variance in boards’ influence on firm decisions. Directors bring a wide range of attributes to 
the boardroom that may help the board with completing varied tasks (Baysinger & Butler, 
1985; Gompers, Ishii, & Metrick, 2001; Hermalin & Weisbach, 2001). Some directors may 
have more experience than others in certain industries or geographic contexts; other directors 
may have relevant functional backgrounds that set them apart. In addition, many directors are 
CEOs or members of top management teams, they often provide the boardroom with 
invaluable knowledge and expertise to counsel firm management (Fama & Jensen, 1983; 
Zahra & Pearce, 1989), which means that outside directors do not only serve to monitor 
managerial opportunism. When comparing outside directors of different boards, there may be 
large variation in the levels of corporate/industry experience, functional background, age, 
and tenure. Therefore, outside directors of different boards are not equivalent and it is much 
more meaningful to examine the unique composition and heterogeneity of boards than to 
focus purely on board independence. Although agency theory provides an important 
framework regarding the monitoring relationship of the board with the firm, not all roles of 
the board are accounted for. Research on board-firm performance link requires 
complementary theoretical perspectives. 
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 In addition, scholars have suggested that a social theory of agency could be a natural 
extension of the existing agency perspective, where institutional contexts and investments in 
governance mechanisms are examined alongside agency problems (Wiseman, Cuevas-
Rodriguez, & Gomez-Mejia, 2012). An extension of the agency perspective expands its 
applicability and relevance to a certain extent. Much of the agency scholarship has implicitly 
taken a view of exchanges between principals and agents that overlooks the relational aspects 
of their interactions (Wiseman et al., 2012), which cannot be ignored because actors differ 
across relational contexts and are ultimately socially embedded (Aguilera & Jackson, 2010) . 
A social theory of agency identifies constructs of institution, cognition, social capital, 
networks, and power relations as aspects of society that influence the process of agents and 
principals interactions as well as the solutions to their problems (Dobbin, 2004). In 
particular, the constructs of social capital, networks, and power relations represent a 
relational view within the social theory of agency. Applying a relational perspective in 
accordance to the social theory of agency on board of directors could supplement existing 
theoretical frameworks by revealing overlooked aspects of the board-performance linkage. In 
particular, investigating the social capital and network ties enjoyed by the board allows the 
examination of information brokerage and resource exchange between boards; additionally, 
inspecting the power relations of a board will reveal the ownership concentration and 
decision power distribution within the board, which can shed light on the likelihood of 
incentive alignment and monitoring be used in a complementary fashion, as well as directors’ 
level of accountability for focal firm’s performance outcomes (Wiseman et al., 2012). 
Therefore, existing literature on board-performance linkage can be greatly enhanced by 
supplementing existing theoretical frameworks with a relational perspective. 
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Resource Dependence Perspective on Boards 
Aside from the monitoring function, boards also have the important role of providing 
resources (Hillman & Dalziel, 2003). Resource dependence theory suggests that board 
members are appointed based on their ability to support the organization and concern 
themselves with the firm’s problems (Hillman, Cannella, & Paetzold, 2000; Pfeffer, 1972; 
Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). According to this theoretical approach, boards provide firms with 
four primary resources (Hillman & Dalziel, 2003): (1) advice and counsel, (2) legitimacy, (3) 
channels for communicating information between external organizations and the firm, and 
(4) preferential access to support from outside the firm. The resource dependence logic 
assumes that the board’s provision of resources directly relate to firm performance (Hillman 
& Dalziel, 2003). Director resources help reduce the organization’s dependency on external 
contingencies (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978), lower transaction costs (Williamson, 1984), 
diminish uncertainty in the environment (Pfeffer, 1972), and enhance the firm’s probability 
for survival (Sigh, House, & Tucker 1986). Under the resource dependence perspective, 
several board characteristics are extensively studied and each of these characteristics 
contribute to overall board capital. Director expertise, experience, reputation, skills, and 
knowledge have all been used to represent the board’s provision of resources (Coleman, 
1988). In addition, resource dependence scholars have shown that useful resources are also 
derived from director social capital embedded in their social ties (Nahapiet & Goshal, 1998).  
Interestingly, the most extensively studied proxy for the resource provision function 
of the board and its linkage to firm performance is the size of the board (Dalton, Daily, 
Johnson, & Ellstrand, 1999; Gulati & Sytch, 2007; Ozcan & Eisenhardt, 2009). As the 
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theoretical foundation for this perspective, resource dependence theory links board size to a 
firm’s overall ability to establish environmental links to secure critical resources (Goodstein, 
Gautam, & Boeker, 1994). The size of the board is assumed to capture the availability and 
quantity of resources that a firm is able to obtain. In this view, firms with greater need for 
effective external linkage would require more members on their boards (Pfeffer & Salancik, 
1978). In addition, larger board size has been associated with a firm’s ability to obtain 
essential resources such as sufficient budget, external funding, and leverage from its 
environment (Dalton et al., 1999; Pfeffer, 1972; Provan, 1980). When faced with a lack of 
information and an overall environmental uncertainty, firms have been shown to respond by 
increasing the size of their boards (Hillman, Cannella, & Paetzold, 2000). Larger boards are 
also linked to better firm outcomes via more extensive board interlocks because they provide 
more possibilities for capital acquisition and minimizing uncertainties (Burt, 1980, 1997; 
Stearns & Mizruchi, 1993). On the other hand, there are performance advantages to having 
smaller boards. Smaller boards are believed to function more effectively and have greater 
focus, participation, and debates, in addition to avoiding CEO control (Jensen, 1993; 
Kameda, Stasson, Davis, Parks, & Zimmerman, 1992; Lipton & Lorsch, 1992). When board 
size is constrained, board members are not easily manipulated by top management when 
compared to their large and diverse counterparts (Mintzberg, 1983), and smaller boards are 
less likely to form factions and coalitions that lead to group conflicts, which could further 
develop into slow reaction and indecisions in a crisis (Daily & Dalton, 1994; Goodstein et 
al., 1994). Once again, the literature champions a wealth of theory-driven rationales that 
point to a relationship between board characteristics and firm performance, but when it 
comes to board size, there is no consensus on the direction of the relationship. Dalton and 
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colleague’s (1999) meta-analysis attempted to address this issue and found a small positive 
relationship between board size and performance, but van Essen and colleague’s (2012) 
meta-analysis on Asian firms found no meaningful relationship. 
A noteworthy weakness of the resource dependence perspective is that there is an 
underlying assumption that resources provided by directors are directly useful to the firm 
(Zahra & Pearce, 1989). This perspective disregards the power dynamics and structural 
idiosyncrasies within boards and how they can affect the usefulness of director resources. 
Existing literature largely ignores the relational intricacies that inevitably influence directors’ 
ability to benefit the firm. For example, a director with invaluable experience and knowledge 
may not have the status or power to speak up against other directors when bad decisions are 
made, therefore, simply having resourceful directors on the board does not directly translate 
to positive outcomes. Although the resource dependence perspective provides a convincing 
explanation of how firms use the board to obtain a supply of necessary resources, the 
overwhelming focus on the size of the board and functional background characteristics 
suggests that all board members provide the similar amount of useful resources and that 
every board member can contribute freely. This assumption is misleading and does not 
examine the boundary conditions under which board resources are transformed into effective 
outcomes. Therefore, it is crucial to enhance our understanding of the board-performance 
linkage by supplementing other theoretical perspectives. Examining the board through a 
relational lens makes it possible to assess the likelihood that director resources can be used to 
benefit the firm, which helps with addressing the issue of equating theoretically supported 
useful director characteristics directly to positive effects on firm outcomes. 
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Supplementing Agency and Resource Dependence Perspectives 
Incorporating a wide range of theoretical perspectives, scholars have produced an 
impressive body of research over the past four decades on the relationship between board 
characteristics and firm performance. However, the persistent lack of consensus in the 
literature may suggest that we need to examine board characteristics through a different lens.  
Many scholars have noted the importance of supplementing current theoretical frameworks 
with other perspectives (e.g., Dalton et al., 1998; Dalton et al., 1999; Hillman & Dalziel, 
2003; Lynall, Golden, & Hillman, 2003). The link between board of directors and 
performance is perhaps more complicated than the literature suggests, so a direct one on one 
relationship may not be apparent. As Hillman and Dalziel (2003) recommends, in addition to 
examining boards’ monitoring function and resource provision function, it is necessary to go 
a step beyond and understand antecedents of these functions in order to sufficiently examine 
board members’ effects on performance.  
According to the agency perspective, a primary antecedent to the monitory function is 
board incentives, when incentives are aligned with shareholder interests, boards will be more 
effective monitors of management. Board incentives cannot be accurately examined by only 
looking at board composition based on the presence of independent directors,  because the 
independent label does not guarantee that these directors are without family, social, or 
business ties with management, which compromises the integrity and motivation behind their 
monitoring behavior. Therefore, it is important to supplement the examination of board 
composition with information on directors’ additional roles, especially if the directors are 
also the firm’s shareholders (Dalton et al., 2003). The resource dependence perspective of the 
board can also be enhanced by examining additional latent characteristics , such as board 
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members’ human capital, which include director expertise, experience, and reputation 
(Coleman, 1988). In addition, the sum of tangible and potential resources embedded within 
board members’ relationships and social networks represent board members’ relational 
capital, which is a construct that resource dependence scholars have directed increasing 
attention to when examining performance linkages. Studying board capital, which 
encompasses both human and relational capital, is a helpful way to complement the 
traditional approach to board influence on firm performance (Hillman & Dalziel, 2003).  
Board members, each carrying unique relationships and network ties, exhibit multiple 
forms of connections with other board members and people in their external networks.  For 
example, the configuration of directors’ heterogeneous relations in organizational settings 
could represent a distinctive characteristic of the board that current literature does not 
carefully examine. What make each individual board different from one another are perhaps 
the unique combinations of relationships and dependencies that exist between board 
members. Studying board of directors through a relational lens allows scholars to focus on 
latent variables that have not garnered sufficient attention. A number of studies have applied 
a relational perspective to examine performance outcomes across different levels of analysis, 
for example, studies have looked at work related implications by examining individuals with 
multiple relationships and roles, (Pratt & Rafaeli, 1997), and how identities affect 
cooperation and performance between group members (Milton & Westphal, 2005). On the 
team level, theoretical and empirical research have explored the connection between social 
and relational structures and team performance outcomes (Oh, Chung, & Labianca, 2004; 
Roberson & Colquitt, 2005). However, the origins and consequences of having multiple 
inter-team relations are ignored (Gulati et al., 2011). On the firm level, multiplexity in 
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relationships can affect competition between firms (Baker & Faulkner, 2002) and 
heterogeneous relations and influence stock market value (Zuckerman, 1999). As suggested 
by Little (2012, p. 143), “the molecule of all social life is the social ly constructed and 
socially situated individual, who lives, acts, and develops within a set of proximate social 
relationships, institutions, norms, and rules”, it is important to remember that board members 
and their behaviors are embedded in a set of social relationships and networks that shape 
their agency (Westphal & Zajac, 2013), especially when research conducted via this 
perspective are scant. Therefore, applying a relational perspective developing a relational 
framework for the corporate governance literature could supplement existing theoretical 
frameworks by revealing overlooked aspects of the board-performance linkage. The purpose 
of this paper is to shed light on the performance effect of boards by examining the relational 
interdependencies within boards through the theoretical perspective of relational pluralism as 
well as exploring the effects of potential firm level and environment level moderators . This 
will enhance the current literature by examining both internal and external elements of 
corporate boards as well as many latent variables that have been neglected by the dominant 
frameworks. 
 
Upper Echelons Theory 
Another major theory that has contributed to the understanding of board-performance 
linkage is upper echelons theory (Hambrick & Mason, 1984). One of the persisting themes in 
the vast literature under the upper echelons research stream focuses on examining top 
management team (TMT) characteristics and their influence on strategic decisions and firm 
outcomes (Carpenter, Geletkanycz, & Sanders, 2004). The emphasis on the effect that top 
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managers have on their firms has led to the development of several specialized fields of 
research, such as the study of boards and directors, chief executive succession and 
compensation, and the relationships between the TMT composition and different aspects of 
the organization (Pettigrew, 1992).  
Overall, upper echelons theory focuses on the study of TMTs’ observable 
characteristics of its members. According to Pfeffer (1983:352), demographic characteristics 
are the variables of choice due to their "comprehensibility, logical coherence, predictive 
power, and testability". Observable TMT characteristics are assumed to influence the 
behaviors and preferences of individuals. These characteristics are mostly used as proxies, 
because direct cognitive and psychological measures are more difficult to measure  and obtain 
in the context of corporate elites (Carpenter, Geletkanycz, & Sanders, 2004; Hambrick & 
Mason, 1984). Hambrick and Mason (1984) initially proposed that both psychological and 
observable characteristics of the upper echelons determine organizational performance 
through their influence on strategic choices. The observable variables proposed by Hambrick 
& Mason (1984) included age, functional tracks, career experiences, education, 
socioeconomic foundation, and financial position. These variables, however, were not meant 
to be exhaustive and demographic characteristics like race and gender have been included in  
recent studies of upper echelons as they garner more theoretical attention (Carpenter et al., 
2004; Westphal & Milton, 2000). In addition to focusing on demographic characteristics, 
upper echelons theory also emphasizes the study of an entire group, the TMT (Hambrick & 
Mason, 1984). Different definitions of this group have been used, and there is still 
controversy about the boundaries for inclusion of individuals as members of the top 
management team (Carpenter et al., 2004). More traditional definitions of TMT include only 
20 
 
a company's executives, whereas a more broad definition known as supra-TMT incorporates 
the board of directors as well as the executives (Finkelstein, Hambrick, & Cannella, 1996; 
Jensen & Zajac, 2004). A number of studies consistently provide support for the upper 
echelons propositions that focuses on examining a company’s executives (Carpenter, 
Geletkanycz, & Sanders 2004; Hambrick, 2005), specifically in terms of top executives’ 
cognitive characteristics, educational level, international experience, and how they relate to 
firm strategic choice and innovation (Hambrick, 2005), as well as acquisition success 
(Cannella & Hambrick, 1993; Krishnan, Miller, & Judge, 1997) and overall performance 
(Hambrick & Fukutomi, 1991).  
A second line of research extends the existing definition of the TMT to include the 
board’s effect on firm level strategy (Goodstein, Gautam, & Boeker, 1994; Rindova, 1999). 
This extension of the upper echelons perspective became the catalyst that initiated a large 
body of research on studying the role of directors. Following Hambrick and Mason’s (1984) 
upper echelons approach, where “primary emphasis is placed on observable managerial 
characteristics as indicators of the givens that a manager brings to an administrative 
situation,” TMT studies that include the board use demographic variables proposed by the 
theory, such as gender, functional background, and age as proxies for the cognitive and 
psychological models of top managers. Along this line of research, board member 
demographic characteristics and board composition have been found to affect strategic 
change (Golden & Zajac, 2001; Goodstein at al., 1994). In addition, Hillman, Cannella, and 
Paetzold (2000) proposed resource dependence roles of the board using resource dependence 
theory through the upper echelons lens to better examine the effects of the supra TMT on 
board and firm strategy. Furthermore, scholars have also drew from theories and findings in 
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the agency perspective of the board to disaggregate the board into executive and non-
executive director subgroups, instead of “focusing on the corporate elites as an aggregate 
whole” (Jensen & Zajac, 2004:521). Along this stream of research, board independence and 
CEO duality garnered renewed attention, especially in studies that examine firm investment 
strategy and R&D intensity (Kor, 2006). This inclusion of board of directors in upper 
echelons theory also broadened its application in the entrepreneurship literature, because in 
entrepreneurial firms, the activities of executives and directors are more intertwined, and 
boards often have a dominating affect over firm strategies and performance (Boeker & 
Wiltbank, 2005; Carpenter, Pollock & Leary, 2003; Kor & Misangyi, 2008). 
 A review of upper echelons theory by Carpenter, Geletkanycz, and Sanders (2004) 
emphasizes that the vast literature using the upper echelons perspective mainly focuses on 
demographic backgrounds as the primary determinants of board behaviors and mindset. 
Nonetheless, this approach ignores many important structural determinants such as the 
heterogeneity, compensation, and relational dynamics within each board. The link between 
the board and firm decision making is founded upon complicated interactions between 
members of the upper echelon, therefore, studies that examine the effect of boards should 
pay more attention to the complexity of interactions and decision processes. Studies in 
executive change demonstrate that latent variables such as political and power dynamics of 
the TMT can greatly shape major organizational outcomes (Bigley & Wiersema, 2002).  
Using upper echelons theory alone does not provide sufficient theoretical scope to capture all 
the necessary factors that contribute to our understanding of the link between boards and firm 
outcomes. Some scholars have made successful attempts to supplement the upper echelon 
lens with agency theory (Boeker & Wiltbank, 2005; Carpenter, Pollock & Leary, 2003; Kor, 
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2006) and resource dependence theory (Hillman, Cannella, & Paetzold; 2000), however, a 
further push toward a more comprehensive and integrated multidisciplinary theoretical 
approach is highly encouraged (Carpenter et al., 2004; Strandholm, Kumar, & Subramanian, 
2004). By adopting a relational lens, I argue that the board-performance linkage literature 
can be greatly enhanced by answering the call for a broader and more inclusive approach and 
examine not only the board characteristics championed by upper echelons theory, agency 
theory, and resource dependence theory, but also latent board characteristics such as 
heterogeneity, director network positions, compensation, within board power dynamics and 
hierarchy. In addition, applying a relational perspective and developing a relational 
framework to examine the board further expands applicability of existing dominant theories 
to be used beyond the management discipline. 
 
Interdisciplinary Theoretical Supplementation  
Addressing the call for a more interdisciplinary approach (Carpenter et al., 2004; 
Hillman & Dalziel, 2003; Wiseman et al., 2012), many scholars have expanded their research 
to include other well developed theoretical perspectives to better explain board effectiveness. 
Taking a step beyond linking important salient director characteristics such as gender, age, 
ethnicity, functional background, and experience directly to board performance (Hillman, 
Cannella, & Harris, 2002; Westphal & Stern, 2007), latent board dimensions such as in-
group out-groups (Westphal & Milton, 2000; Zhu, Shen, & Hillman, 2014), faultlines 
(Kaczmarek, Kimino, & Pye, 2012; Lau & Murnighan, 2005; Li & Hambrick, 2005), social 
networks (Larcker, So, & Wang, 2013), and power hierarchies (He & Huang, 2011). For 
instance, to supplement the vast literature that focuses on board demographic diversity, Zhu, 
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Shen, and Hillman (2014) build on social categorization theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) and 
recategorization theory (Gaertner, Dovidio, Banker, Houlette, Johnson, & McGlynn, 2000) to 
examine board diversity and its effect on director reclassification processes into the in-group. 
Exploring further into the board demographic diversity literature, several studies draw from 
faultline theory to examine the boundaries of potential board subgroups based on major 
background characteristics and how the strength of board faultlines are reduced by board 
heterogeneity over time (Lau & Murnighan, 2005; Sawyer, Houletter, & Yeagley, 2006). Li 
and Hambrick’s (2005) study on factional groups and demographic dissimilarity also 
provides foundation for future corporate governance research to explore task, emotional 
conflict and board behavioral disintegration caused by faultlines.  
Another key latent board characteristic that has gathered significant attention is the 
social capital of board members and how directors use their networks to affect firm 
outcomes, especially through board interlock (Beckman, Haunschild, & Phillips, 2004; 
Davis, Yoo, & Baker, 2003; Palmer, Friedland, & Singh, 1986). Interlocking directorate 
network has been used to answer questions regarding board independence (Bizjak, Lemmon, 
& Whitby, 2009; Chiu, Teoh, & Tian, 2013), monitoring effectiveness (Core, Holthausen, & 
Larcker, 1999; Fich & Shivadasni, 2006), firm performance (Larcker et al., 2013), firm 
financial reporting quality (Omer, Shelley, & Tice, 2014a), and firm value (Omer et al., 
2014b). Drawing from social network theory, scholars have examined directors’ ability to 
access information and control information flow (Borgatti & Halgin, 2011; Phelps, Heidl, & 
Wadhwa, 2012), as well as boards’ overall network position and their ability to positively 
influence firm outcomes (Larcker et al., 2013; Omer et al., 2014). By incorporating the social 
network perspective, scholars are able to look one step beyond salient director characteristics 
24 
 
and obtain a more comprehensive understanding of the board-performance linkage where 
easily observable director characteristics are supplemented by the latent social capital 
dimension.  
In addition, many scholars suggest that interactions and within board dynamics should 
be a point of interest in order to truly understand how boards affect firm performance (Carter 
& Lorsch, 2004; Finkelstein & Mooney, 2003; Johnson, Daily, & Ellstrand, 1996). Many 
have started to pay attention to the informal aspects of corporate boards such as director 
relationships and conflicts and their critical role in defining director interactions and decision 
making (Johnson & O’Leary-Kelly, 2003; Westphal & Stern, 2006). Drawing from a group 
perspective, directors on a board are expected to automatically sort into an informal 
hierarchy based on deference that they have for each other’s competence and ranking (Gould, 
2002; Magee & Galinsky, 2008). When such informal social structures are formed, the 
implicit hierarchy dictates the power dynamics within the board and orchestrates board 
interactions, which eventually influences board effectiveness. A board’s ranking composition 
based on members’ average rank in the corporate community and the overall power balance 
between board members are both shown to be important factors in understanding the 
relationship between boards and firm performance (He & Huang, 2011). Examining within 
board power relationships and informal structures recognizes and addresses the overlooked 
fact that boards are fundamentally groups of human individuals, as Finkelstein and Mooney 
(2003) have pointed out, latent group features and processes such as conflict, teamwork, and 
comprehensiveness are all vital determinants of board effectiveness. Incorporating a social 
group perspective can greatly enrich the board-performance linkage literature. Johnson, 
Schnatterly, and Hill (2013)’s comprehensive review of the board characteristics literature 
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has revealed that the growing literature demonstrating the link between board composition 
and firm outcomes needs to be extended by paying more nuanced attention to the aggregation 
of latent board characteristics to obtain more meaningful understanding of the impact of 
boards on firms. More studies need to analyze the mechanisms underlying the direct 
composition and performance relationship (Adam, Hermalin, & Weisbach, 2010) 
Overall, a relational pluralistic view of the board tactfully incorporates all of the 
aforementioned latent board characteristics, while at the same time, builds upon existing 
dominating theoretical frameworks such as agency theory, resource dependence theory, and 
upper echelons theory. Adapting a comprehensive approach supplements existing literature 
with latent board characteristics and answers the call for research by numerous reviews 
(Carpenter et al., 2004; Finkelstein & Mooney, 2003; Hillman & Dalziel, 2003; Wiseman et 
al., 2013). Using a more inclusive perspective via a relational lens also provides a much 
needed response to address the lack of consensus about the relationship between key board 
characteristics and firm performance (Dalton et al., 1998; Dalton et al., 1999; van Essen et 
al., 2014; Westphal & Zajac, 2013). 
 
CHAPTER III 
THEORY AND MULTIDIMENSIONAL CONSTRUCT DEVELOPMENT 
 
Concept of Relational Pluralism 
“An infinite range of individualizing combinations is made possible by the 
fact that the individual belongs to a multiplicity of groups, in which the 
relationship between competition and socialization varies greatly.”  
26 
 
        - Georg Simmel (1955: 151) 
Examining factors regarding the firm points to the fact that organizations, as complex 
systems, are entangled in heterogeneous networks consisting of many different kinds of 
interactive pathways (Kilduff, Crossland, Tsai, & Krackhardt, 2008; Shipilov, Gulati, 
Kilduff, Li, & Tsai, 2014). Studying these interrelated networks naturally leads to studying 
the entities (individuals, dyads, groups) involved and opens up opportunities to discover new 
conduits for research (Shipilov, 2012; Shipilov et al., 2014). Relational pluralism is defined 
as the extent to which a focal entity (a person, a team, or an organization) der ives its 
meaning and its potential for action from multiple kinds of relations with other entities 
(Gulati, Kilduff, Li, Shipilov, & Tsai, 2010; Shipilov et al., 2014). For example, the members 
of a board can have multiple responsibilities to firm’s multiple stakeholders (e.g., investors, 
customers, community, and/or representatives of the parent company), which may influence 
their ability and incentive to make decisions (Beckman et al., 2014; Lan & Heracleous, 
2010).  Relational pluralism also helps to highlight the power mechanisms and 
interdependencies between different types of relationships within a network (Beckman et al., 
2014; Ranganathan & Rosenkopf, 2014; Rogan, 2014; Sytch & Tatarynowicz, 2014). From a 
connectionism and structuralism perspective (Borgatti & Foster, 2003), relational pluralism 
can be described as a collection of multi-faceted ties that shape organizational decisions via 
the dissemination of knowledge and influence (Beckman et al., 2014). Recent studies have 
begun to examine the phenomenon of relational pluralism and its implications (Shiplov et al., 
2014). Within this emerging area of inquiry, a noticeable emphasis has been placed on 
relational pluralism its effect on social identity, where a focal actor’s sense of self is 
dependent on their group memberships (Tajfel, 1979). The pluralistic nature of social 
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relationship leads to multiple ways social ties can form between any entities, and these social 
ties shape individual realities and behaviors (Simmel, 1955). In the context of corporate 
boards for example, board composition and power dynamics directly affect directors’ ability 
to advise and monitor executive decision making (Dalton & Dalton, 2011; He & Huang, 
2011). On the firm level, both the type of ties between firms and the structure of the firms’ 
networks are found to dictate the opportunities and constraints to the firm (Ranganathan & 
Rosenkopf, 2013; Shipilov & Li, 2012). However, substantial gaps still exist in the literature 
regarding the existence and validity of the relational pluralism framework, and significant 
work needs to be done to enhance our understanding of the relational pluralism framework.  
As aforementioned, corporate boards are the perfect research subjects in this 
emerging literature because boards can be examined as an instantiation of relational 
pluralism (Beckman et al., 2014). By conceptualizing relational pluralism as a collection of 
nested ties instantiated in the board of directors, the board performance linkage literature can 
supplement its focus on the observable characteristics and structural features by delving 
deeper into the latent dimensions of board member dynamics. Boards are able to demonstrate 
multiple dimensions of the relational pluralism collective, such as board level heterogeneity, 
multiplexity, connectedness, and skewedness, through which they shape and regulate the 
focal firm’s behaviors. A relational pluralistic view of the board extends the current 
understanding of director behavior by aggregating director relationships on multiple 
relational dimensions to explore nuanced effects on firm outcomes (Beckman et al., 2014). In 
addition, relational pluralism provides a theoretical framework corporate boards incarnate a 
collection of relationships that can significantly influence organizational performance. 
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Dimensions of Relational Pluralism 
 Gulati et al. (2010) introduced three dimensions of relational pluralism: 
heterogeneity, multiplexity, and overlap to examine the extent to which an individual, a 
team, or an organization derives its meaning and courses of action from relationships with 
other entities. In this paper, the focus is on the board. Heterogeneity is the extent to which a 
board consists of directors that form connections with others from diverse backgrounds 
(functional and demographic), multiplexity is the extent to which a board enjoys multiple 
types of relationships, and overlap is the degree to which the board’s relationships are 
clustered in one group or scattered across different groups. This paper examines all three 
dimensions, however, the term connectedness is used in place of overlap because the 
theoretical focus of this paper lies in the board’s contribution to firm performance, which 
means that instead of looking at the distribution of a relationships, it is more theoretically 
relevant to examine the network position of board members in order to infer the availability 
and quantity of resources they can bring to the focal firm. Therefore, I choose the term 
connectedness to describe boards’ collective social capital, particularly the extent to which a 
board occupies central or dominant positions within their networks. A fourth dimension, 
skewedness, is added to the original three dimensions to more fully represent the effect of 
board relational pluralism on performance. This dimension focuses on investigating the 
imbalanced distribution of power and status amongst directors. When the board grants certain 
individuals significantly more decision power and or resources than others, the power 
balance is disturbed, which decreases the likelihood that the board can successfully 
accomplish its advisory and monitoring responsibilities. Following the theoretical footsteps 
of existing literature on board independence, the skewedness dimension aims to capture the 
29 
 
effect of disproportional distribution of power within boards on firm performance. To 
empirically examine these four dimensions of relational pluralism, multiple facets of director 
characteristics, ties, identities, power relations, and interlocking directorate networks are 
observed and aggregated on the board level to represent their focal firms. Unlike prior 
studies that mainly emphasize on board structure and observable characteristics, this paper 
extends the scope of the current literature by supplementing current knowledge with 
relational dimensions illuminated by the relational pluralism framework. 
 I propose that a firm’s board of directors provides differential benefits/limitations to 
firm performance outcomes in terms of heterogeneity, multiplexity, connectedness, and 
skewedness. This paper answers the call for research on relational pluralism (Gulati et al., 
2010; Shipilov et al., 2014), in addition to developing theory and providing empirical 
evidence to motivate and justify a four-dimension model of relational pluralism, which is 
illustrated in Figure 1. 
 
Board Heterogeneity  
The heterogeneity dimension of relational pluralism highlights the importance of 
relationships formed between individuals with different demographic and or functional 
backgrounds. This dimension is crucial to the board-performance literature for several 
reasons. First of all, heterogeneous boards are more likely to have effective problem solving, 
increased creativity, and a better understanding of the market (Cannella, Park, & Lee, 2008; 
Carter, Simkins, & Simpson, 2003; Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1996). The existing literature 
most commonly explores board heterogeneity through the theoretical lens of group 
membership diversity, where diverse groups have been found to promote the exchange of 
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ideas (Schippers, Hartog, Koopman, & Wienk, 2003). Specifically in the context of board 
membership and consistent with resource dependence theories, directors with different 
backgrounds bring varied ideas and viewpoints that are unique to each individual director 
(Hillman et al, 2002; Lückerath-Rovers, 2013), which provides the board with novel insights 
and perspectives that could lead to a means of improving organizational value (Carter et al., 
2003; Coffey & Wang, 1998), and increases the likelihood that the board will comprise of 
members who are more capable of representing varied stakeholder interests (Huse & 
Rindova, 2001). Theoretically and empirically, board member diversity is an aspect of the 
board that has received rigorous investigation in the corporate governance literature 
(Cannella, Park, & Lee, 2008; Carpenter, Geletkanycz & Sanders, 2004; Finkelstein & 
Hambrick, 1996). There has been an increasing public and academic curiosity in the 
mechanisms of corporate boards and how boards can be used to align shareholders’ interests 
and management strategies (Burton, 2000; Mueller, 2006). Government agencies, social 
activists, and shareholder groups frequently advocate for greater heterogeneity among 
directors based on the assumption that managers and firms benefit from directors with 
diverse social and functional viewpoints to the boardroom. In addition, corporate governance 
codes based on the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
model has been adopted and implemented in many developing countries in the past decade 
(Tsamenyi & Uddin 2008; Soobaroyen & Mahadeo 2008), which has contributed to 
increasing interest in optimizing board composition and structural design.  Therefore, the 
heterogeneity dimension of relational pluralism plays a key role in understanding the board-
performance linkage. Several board characteristics contribute to board heterogeneity, which 
means that the heterogeneity dimension consists of more than one indicator. According to 
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Kang, Cheng, and Gray (2007), a heterogeneous board composition refers to having diversity 
amongst board members, and board member diversity consists of observable characteristics 
such as gender, age, and race, as well as less visible characteristics such as level of 
education, and functional background (Kilduff et al., 2000; Milliken & Martins, 1996). In the 
aforementioned board characteristics, gender and functional background diversity have the 
strongest theoretical and empirical evidence that link them to firm performance.  
First of all, in terms of observable board characteristics, management research in the 
past two decades have begun to focus on gender diversity in top management positions and 
boardrooms (Bilimoria & Piderit, 1994; Carter et al., 2003; Daily et al., 1999; Kang, Cheng, 
& Gray, 2007). Gender diversity has repeatedly been shown to positively affect firm value 
(Adams & Ferreira, 2003; Carter et al., 2003) and firm performance (Catalyst, 2004; Erhardt, 
Werbel, & Shrader, 2003; Smith, Smith, & Verner, 2006; Van der Walt, Ingley, Shergill, & 
Townsend, 2006). In addition to observable characteristic, management scholars have argued 
that director functional diversity is one of the most important non-observable board 
characteristics that affect firm outcomes (Erhardt et al., 2003; Milliken & Martins, 1996). 
Diversity in board member functional background refers to the occupational and educational 
heterogeneity of board members (Murray, 1989). This type of diversity greatly enhances the 
range and scope of knowledge and expertise that directors bring into the boardroom, which 
leads to better decision making and greater likelihood for improved performance outcomes 
(Cannella, Park, & Lee, 2008; Cho & Hambrick, 2006; Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1996; Kim 
& Rasheed, 2014). Therefore, in the board-performance literature, gender, occupational, and 
educational background diversity are indicator variables that most accurately capture the 
heterogeneity dimension of the relational pluralism framework.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               
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Board Multiplexity 
Another dimension of relational pluralism is multiplexity, which refers to the extent 
to which individuals are connected by multiple ties (Gulati et al., 2010). According to 
Shipilov et al. (2014), members of a group demonstrate the multiplex aspect of relational 
pluralism by maintaining multiple relations and/or identities simultaneously. For example, 
one way that multiplex relationships are expressed is when group members hold one shared 
identity and multiple ties (Shipilov et al., 2014), in an organizational setting, employees can 
form both informal friendship ties and formal reporting ties with each other while sharing the 
same identity as supervisors or subordinates (Toegel, Kilduf, & Anand, 2013); interlocking 
directors between cooperating joint ventures can establish multiple ties within the 
interlocking network to encourage alliance formation while maintaining a shared identity as 
collaborating directors (Beckman, Haunschild, & Philips, 2004; Gulati & Westphal, 1999); 
coworkers who share common work identities can also form both advisory ties and 
supervisory ties to satisfy personal and professional needs (Toegel et al., 2013); both 
competitive and cooperative relationships form among firms in the auto industry (Kim & 
Tsai, 2012).   
On the other hand, multiplexity is represented by having one type of tie and multiple 
identities (Shipilov, et al., 2014). A firm can form relationships with a supplier as a buyer, 
but also act as a connector between suppliers to influence formation of relationships. In the 
example of tie formation between issuers (firms that place stocks in financial markets) and 
lead underwriters (investment banks hired to underwrite stock issues), the lead underwriter 
and the issuer form a customer-supplier relationship, but the issuer can also play the role of 
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connector by influencing relationships between investment banks (Shipilov & li, 2012). The 
issuer may ask the lead underwriter to include in its syndicate specific investment banks with 
which the issuer has already developed working relationships. Therefore, the issuer in this 
case, maintains dual identity of customer and connecter while maintaining a buyer-supplier 
tie with the lead underwriter. In the groups and teams context, group members sometimes 
form informal ties with each other based on multiple demographic and cultural identities 
(Mehra, Kilduff, & Brass, 1998). In addition, the most complex form of multiplexity in a 
group is when members have multiple identities and ties. An example is when there are 
informal, workflow, and resource sharing ties between employees who have different 
identities based on race, age, or formal positions (Briscoe & Tsai, 2011). There are many 
consequences of relational multiplexity (Shipilov, 2009; Ibarra, 1993), such as subsequent 
alliance formation (Kenis & Knoke, 2002), variety and range of future ties (Lomi & Pattison, 
2006), and overall performance in collaborative groups (Provan & Sebastian, 1998).  
The multiplexity dimension of the relational pluralism framework is important in the 
board-performance literature because board of directors often maintain multiple types of ties 
or identities that influence board effectiveness. Directors serving on the same board often 
share a common network through the formal appointment to the board, but some directors 
hold multiple identities and additional relationships outside of the board that could 
potentially impact firm outcomes. For example, the corporate governance l iterature 
differentiates between board members who are insiders, such as directors who are also 
currently serving as managers or executives, and decision controllers who are outsiders 
(Finkelstein, Hambrick, & Cannella, 2009; Gulati & Westphal, 1999). Insider directors have 
shared attitudes, a common identity (McDonald & Westphal, 2010), familiarity of expertise 
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(Zahra & Pearce, 1990), and compatible behavioral styles (Westphal & Stern, 2006), 
therefore, one type of board multiplexity lies in director independence. In addition, outside 
directors often represent large shareholders (Hill & Snell, 1988; Qi, Wu, & Zhang, 2000; 
Peng, 2004; Ramaswamy, Li, & Veliyath, 2002), by having directors who identify with the 
interests of large shareholders, the collective voice of the board are more likely to be 
concerned with overall performance in order to maximize shareholder investment (Peng, 
2004). Compared to boards solely consisting of inside directors with a uniform sense of 
identity and ties, multiplex boards that maintain a mix of inside and outside directors are able 
to provide a more comprehensive assessment of firm wellbeing and CEO behavior, as well as 
a more representative voice for large shareholders and external stakeholders (Claessens , 
Djankov, Fan, & Lang, 2002; Dahya & McConnell, 2007; Peng, 2004). Overall, outside 
directors share a formal tie and identity with other board members, but fundamentally 
champion additional identities that make them outsiders and shareholder representatives, 
which contribute to the overall multiplexity of a board. 
Furthermore, many directors, both insiders and outsiders are themselves shareholders 
of the focal company they serve. A multiplex tie is hence created when a board member has 
an additional point of connection with the firm by being an investor (Gulati et al., 2010). 
Shareholder directors can potentially bring additional information to the firm through the 
lens of investors and provide the firm with in-depth knowledge as well as a deeper 
understanding of the environment. Shareholder directors not only hold shared formal ties and 
identities with other directors on the board, they also have an extra tie with the firm by 
having personal stakes in the firm. Therefore, having board members who hold significant 
amount of the focal firm’s stock increases the overall multiplexity of the board. 
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Another way that board members display relational multiplexity is through 
maintaining external ties. In the case of boardrooms, directors share a common network with 
other directors by serving the same board, but some directors also maintain useful external 
networks that may positively influence firm outcomes. Resource dependence theory argues 
that directors often utilize their social and/or professional ties between the firm and its 
external stakeholders to influence decision making (Peng, 2004; Pfeffer, 1972). 
Conventionally, the board most commonly consists of directors with relevant functional 
background that is in alignment with the firm’s needs, however, an additional group of 
directors that have garnered increased attention in recent years is those with political 
affiliations via prior appointments in governmental and political institutions. Directors with 
political ties serve as conduits of information and grant access to invaluable political 
resources that are especially beneficial to firms that operate in highly regulated environment 
(Hillman, 2005). Therefore, besides shared formal ties and identities with other board 
members, directors with political ties through prior political appointments represent a group 
of directors that have additional external ties that could benefit firm outcomes. The inclusion 
of politically connected directors increase the overall board multiplexity.  
In summary, the multiplexity dimension of the relational pluralism framework 
recognizes that directors maintain multiple ties and identities. The multiplexity of boards can 
influence board effectiveness and is critical to the board-performance literature. The 
multifaceted nature of director ties and identities are demonstrated by outsider director 
representation, director stock ownership, and director external political ties. 
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Board Connectedness  
Extended from the overlap dimension of the relational pluralism framework, which 
refers to distribution of a focal actor’s ties and the extent to which these relationships are 
dense and clustered, the connectedness dimension focuses on directors’ contribution to their 
focal firm’s performance, which means that compared to the distribution of a focal director’s 
relationships, the network position of a director is more important when assessing the 
availability and quantity of resources a director can bring to the focal firm. Connectedness 
describes boards’ collective social capital, particularly the extent to which a board’s directors 
occupy central or dominant positions within their networks.  An individual’s social and 
economic networks serve as conduits for interpersonal and interorganizational support, 
influence, and information flow (Larcker, So, & Wang, 2013). One of the key types of 
network in the corporate finance literature is the boardroom network formed by shared board 
directorates. The potential costs and benefits of network connections are well documented by 
extensive research in the field of organizational sociology, finance and economics.  
Board members’ formal or professional ties can be proxies for the concept of board 
connectedness. Although it is likely that directors’ networks extend far beyond those 
associated with formal board appointments and are influenced by informal social 
connections, it is important to note that formal and informal networks are positively 
correlated and can be complementary (Hwang & Kim, 2012; Westphal, Boivie, Chng, & 
Han, 2006). Due to the fact that directors’ formal network is substantially more readily 
observable by market participants than informal ties, focusing on boardroom formal network 
is more meaningful when examining financial performance. Well connected boards enjoy a 
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greater number of ties and are central to the interlock network’s collective flow of 
information and resources, therefore, should observe performance benefits.  
The dimension of board connectedness is inherently multifaceted. Network theory has 
provided several distinct yet related notions of connectedness, Larcker and colleagues (2013) 
have suggested that boards’ level of connectedness in their interlock network can provide 
substantial firm level performance benefits. First, a board is considered to be well connected 
if it has multiple channels of communication that allow it to gather information and 
participate in resource exchange. Connected boards that enjoy opportunities and alternatives 
that are otherwise unavailable are often central boards within their board interlock networks. 
These boards have a higher overall degree of centrality than otherwise comparable firms. 
Second, a board is also considered to be well connected if it has closer ties to outside boards, 
therefore making information and resource exchange occur quicker. These boards are able to 
obtain information and resources more easily and more frequently due the relatively fewer 
steps between boards in their interlock network. Connected firms enjoy a closeness to outside 
boards in terms of having more direct access to beneficial resources than their less connected 
counterparts. Third, a board is well connected if it is positioned in between relatively more 
pairs of outside boards, which makes such a board an important broker of information and 
resource exchange. The high level of betweenness in this case provides significant 
advantages for the focal firm due to its board’s ability to control and leverage information 
flow.  
Hence, the connectedness dimension of the relational pluralism framework 
acknowledges and investigates the extent to which a board can obtain special advantages 
through leveraging its professional network based on its connections to other boards. The 
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connectedness of a board directly influence its ability to obtain and broker resources, which 
is highlighted in the existing board-performance literature. The multifaceted nature of board 
connectedness are demonstrated by degree centrality, closeness centrality, and betweenness 
centrality to capture different ways in which boards are connected to other boards in their 
interlocking directorate networks. 
 
Board Skewedness  
The dimension of skewedness refers to the uneven distribution of power and influence 
amongst board members. When the board grants certain individuals significantly more 
decision power than others, the power balance is disturbed, which decreases the likelihood 
that the board can successfully accomplish its advisory and monitoring responsibi lities. In a 
group setting, when one or few individuals have considerably more power and/or status than 
everyone else, it becomes almost impossible for the majority of the group to give honest 
opinions and suggestions during problem solving, the weaker majority also do not dare to 
object ideas and decisions championed by the powerful individuals (Salin, 2003). Power 
imbalance is extremely detrimental to group effectiveness and commitment because it can 
lead to workplace bullying and aggression (Ashforth, 1994; Hoel, Einarsen, & Cooper, 2003; 
Keashly & Jagatic, 2003). This leads to a phenomenon where one or a few individuals have 
control and dominance over everyone else, so group decision making only exists on the 
surface, which greatly diminishes the potential benefits of having a group. 
One of the most extensively studied elements of the corporate governance literature 
regarding power imbalance is the general concern for board independence, which revolves 
around the common phenomenon of CEO duality, where the positions of CEO and board 
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chairperson are held simultaneously by the same person. The topic of CEO duality has 
generated an impressive body of literature over the past few decades. Many scholars argue 
that the role of CEO and chair of the board should not be occupied by the same individual 
because directors are unable, or unwilling to objectively evaluate the performance and 
practices of a firm’s CEO when that CEO in question is also serving as the chairperson of the 
board (Conger & Lawler, 2009; Fama & Jensen, 1983; Monks & Minow, 2008). CEO duality 
presents a fundamental conflict of interest and can be viewed as the functional equivalent of 
a “CEO grading his/her own homework” (Brickley, Coles, & Jarrell, 1997:190). Advocates 
of agency theory have argued that having the CEO chair they board which evaluates his/her 
own work defeats all of which the board stands for (Boyd, 1995; Dalton et al., 2008; Fama & 
Jensen, 1983) due to the absence of separation of decision management and decision cont rol. 
When CEO duality is present, the decision power and status of the CEO is drastically 
increased, this heavily skews the power dynamic of the board and TMT to be in favor with 
the CEO. The CEO in this scenario is more likely to use the power as board chairperson to 
pursue personal goals, abuse resources for self-interest, and select directors who are 
agreeable to the status quo and who are not able to or dare to challenge CEO actions (Conger 
& Lawler, 2009; Fama & Jensen, 1983; Jensen, 1993; Westphal & Zajac, 1995). 
Similarly, an issue of power imbalance arises when controlling shareholders occupy 
seats on a board. The presence of controlling shareholders creates a new type of agency 
problem because the interests of controlling and minority shareholders are not perfectly 
aligned, especially when there is a separation of ownership and control (Bebchuk, Kraakman, 
& Triantis, 2000; Claessens, Djankov, Fan, & Lang, 2002). Since controlling shareholders 
often obtain power and ownership through complex pyramid structures, interlocking 
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ownership, and voting pacts that promotes the preserves majority voting rights, they make 
decisions but do not bear the full cost, therefore, the agency problem is exacerbated (Ben-
amar & Andre, 2006). Large shareholders often perform the practice of tunneling, where they 
create group structures such as pyramids that enable them to transfer profits to other 
dominated parties (Johnson et al., 2000). Firms with large controlling shareholders, 
especially in the case of founding families, may forgo maximum profits due to their inability 
to separate their financial preferences with those of outside owners (Anderson, Mansi, & 
Reeb, 2010; Faccio & Lang, 2002; Morck & Yeung, 2000). Controlling shareholders are also 
able to draw scarce resources away from profitable projects in order to pursue personal 
endeavors (Demsetz, 1983; Fama & Jensen, 1983), as well as extract private benefits from 
the firm without considering the wellbeing of other shareholders (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997).  
Another way that boards exhibit power imbalance is through informal hierarchy (He 
& Huang, 2011). Board informal hierarchical order affects firm performance by shaping the 
board’s group processes. Just like any other human group, an informal hierarchy forms 
naturally in boards (Gould, 2002; Magee & Galinsky, 2008; Overbeck, Correll, & Park, 
2005). According to Forbes and Milliken (1999), boards of directors can be characterized as 
elite decision making groups that depend heavily on social psychological processes, 
especially those related to group participation, interaction, informational exchange, and 
critical discussion. Board members spontaneously form hierarchical social structures based 
on the comparative number of additional board membership they maintain (D’Aveni, 1990). 
Directors form inferences about each other’s competence to guide their interactions – each 
director receive different levels of respect from other board members with regard to their 
views on firm strategic issues (Belliveau, O’Reilly, & Wade, 1996).  A high level of informal 
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hierarchy in a board represents a set of implicit rules for its members on when to speak, how 
to speak, and with whom they can speak, which makes it very difficult for low ranking 
members to voice their opinion. However, having high informal rank does not automatically 
translate to being a more effective board member because having multiple additional board 
memberships sometimes compromises director independence and leads to inadequate 
monitoring (Core, Holthausen, & Larcker, 1999). Higher ranking directors inherently hold 
more power and credibility, therefore are able to ignore dissenting views and heavily 
influence other members’ actions (He & Huang, 2011). Therefore, boards with a clear 
hierarchical structure grants an unjustified amount of power to a minority group of directors. 
Boards with CEO duality, controlling shareholders, and high degree of informal 
hierarchy suffer from a diminished ability to execute their advisory and monitoring 
functions. The skewed distribution of power in favor of CEO board chairs, controlling 
shareholders, and high ranking directors leads to agency and power dynamic issues that 
significantly reduce the effectiveness and usefulness of boards. These represent three major 
aspects of board skewedness in relational pluralism that deserve attention in the board-
performance literature. 
Hypothesis 1: Four dimensions (Heterogeneity, Multiplexity, Connectedness, and 
Skewedness) together define the second-order latent variable construct – relational pluralism. 
 
RELATIONAL PLURALISM AND FIRM PERFORMANCE 
 After proposing the construct validity of the four dimensional relational pluralism 
model, I draw upon existing theories to examine the model’s link to firm performance. The 
primary reason for developing a multidimensional view of board relational pluralism is to 
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explore its effect on firm performance. Although there has been a call for research on the 
outcomes of relational pluralism (Gulati et al., 2010), existing papers has not yet developed a 
relational pluralism framework tailored specifically for the corporate governance literature 
with a focus on linkage to firm level performance. Therefore, in addition to establishing the 
multidimensional model of board relational pluralism and identifying indicators for each 
dimension, it is also crucial to examine the performance consequences. The following section 
of this paper will focus on the prediction of relationships between each of the four 
dimensions and firm performance.  
 
Board Heterogeneity and Performance 
The board heterogeneity dimension of the relational pluralism framework has critical 
implications to the board-performance literature. Theoretically and empirically, board 
diversity is an aspect of the board that has received rigorous investigation in the corporate 
governance literature (Cannella, Park, & Lee, 2008; Carpenter, Geletkanycz & Sanders, 
2004; Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1996). The existing literature mostly explores board 
heterogeneity through the theoretical lens of group membership diversity, where diverse 
groups have been found to greatly stimulate the exchange of diverse ideas (Schippers, 
Hartog, Koopman, & Wienk, 2003). Consistent with resource dependence theories, 
heterogeneous boards are more likely to have effective problem solving, increased creativity, 
and a better understanding of the market (Cannella, Park, & Lee, 2008; Carter, Simkins, & 
Simpson, 2003; Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1996). Having a mix of heterogeneous directors 
also increases the likelihood that the board is more capable of representing varied 
stakeholder interests (Huse & Rindova, 2001). Heterogeneous boards also enjoy varied 
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viewpoints and expertise (Hillman et al, 2002; Lückerath-Rovers, 2013), which could 
translate to novel insights and perspectives that lead to improved organizational value (Carter 
et al., 2003; Coffey & Wang, 1998).  
Gender diversity and director functional background diversity, the two major 
components identified in the heterogeneity dimension, are arguably the most important 
aspects of board diversity that affects firm performance. Gender is undeniably one of the 
most debated element in the board composition literature. There are numerous competitive 
benefits that female directors bring to firms (Bear, Rahman, & Post, 2010; Burke & Cooper, 
2004; Erhardt, Werbel, & Shrader, 2003; Zelechowski & Bilimoria, 2004). In particular, 
female directors exhibit greater conscientiousness in their monitoring responsibilities as well 
as reporting with transparency (Adams & Ferreira, 2009). Females, when compared to their 
male counterpart, also display higher levels of empathy, concern for others, and interest in 
actualizing values in relationships (Boulouta, 2013; Campbell & Mínguez-Vera, 2008; Eagly, 
Karau, & Makhijani, 1995; Fondas, 1997; Miller & Triana, 2009), which is conducive to 
helping firms create enduring relationship with their internal and external stakeholders. 
Female directors are also less tolerant than male directors towards opportunist behavior 
(Srinidhi, Gul, & Tsui, 2011). These views suggest that gender diversity pushes boards to be 
stricter monitors and should lead to better performance (Smith, Smith, & Verner, 2006). 
Numerous empirical studies show that in many cases, board gender diversity does indeed 
correlates with better performance. Firms with gender diverse boards enjoy higher return on 
asset and investments (Erhardt et al., 2003), higher rate of innovation (Miller & Triana, 
2009), higher assessed company value (Campbell & Mínguez-Vera, 2008), more positive 
corporate reputation (Bear, Rahman, & Post, 2010). Although some evidence suggest that 
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women director participation are sometimes used as a legitimating device to appease 
stakeholder demands and regulatory recommendations (Adams & Ferreira, 2008), the effect 
of board gender diversity on performance cannot be ignored. A comprehensive report on 353 
US Fortune 500 companies (Catalyst, 2004) discovered that compared to companies low 
female representation, companies with the greatest gender diversity in their top management 
teams enjoyed 35% higher return on equity and 34% higher total return to shareholders. 
Overall, boardroom gender diversity is likely to have a positive impact on firm performance.  
In addition to gender diversity, the other main component of the board heterogeneity 
dimension is director functional background diversity. As one of the most relevant non-
observable board characteristics (Erhardt et al., 2003), diversity in board member functional 
background refers to the occupational and educational heterogeneity of board members 
(Murray, 1989). The performance benefit comes from the cognitive and informational 
diversity that diverse board members bring to the process of group decision making (Jackson 
& Joshi, 2002). In a group setting, variation amongst members’ cognitive backgrounds 
contribute to diversity in values, attitudes, perspectives, knowledge, skills, and problem 
solving behaviors, which enhances decision comprehensiveness and accuracy (Milliken & 
Martine, 1996). Diversity in educational and functional backgrounds should widen the scope 
of a board’s cognitive perspectives, since members from different occupational backgrounds 
and educational backgrounds bring a wide range of experience and expertise into the 
boardroom, which yields a more extensive list of alternatives, more accurate estimate of 
environmental changes, and higher quality evaluation of strategic options (Finkelstein & 
Hambrick, 1996). Diversity in board functional background also encourages constructive 
debate, therefore increasing resourcefulness in problem solving while deterring narrow-
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mindedness (Kim & Rasheed, 2014). In addition, board members with dissimilar functional 
experience would contribute to a richer and more thorough assessment of market 
opportunities (Cho & Hambrick, 2006), as well as a heightened ability to address product -
market issues and environmental changes (Cannella, Park, & Lee, 2008). Therefore, 
heterogeneity in board member functional background (occupational and educational 
background diversity), together with board gender heterogeneity, are likely to relate to 
positive performance outcomes.  
H2: The degree of heterogeneity of the board, as indicated by director gender 
diversity, occupational background diversity, and educational background diversity, 
positively relates to firm performance. 
 
Board Multiplexity and Performance 
The multiplexity dimension of relational pluralism refers to the extent to which 
individuals are connected by multiple ties (Gulati et al., 2010), specifically, members of a 
group demonstrate the multiplex aspect of relational pluralism by maintaining mult iple 
relations and/or identities simultaneously. Directors serving on the same board that hold 
multiple identities and additional relationships outside of the board could potentially impact 
firm outcomes. Each of the three components of the multiplexity dimension has obtained 
some support in the literature that link them to firm performance. 
Since the major function of outside directors is to control and monitor the CEO’s 
behavior, outside directors hold a separate identity and the relationship between the insider 
and outsider groups is often competitive. Agency theory suggests that the separation of 
corporate ownership and control could lead to selfish actions by executives (Claessens, 
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Djankov, Fan, & Lang, 2002; Jensen & Mecklin, 1976), although the establishment of boards 
is to combat agency problems, the inclusion of current officers on boards present a threat to 
boards’ effectiveness. The insider directors have shared attitudes, a common identity 
(McDonald & Westphal, 2010), familiarity of expertise (Burris et al., 2009), and compatible 
behavioral styles (Westphal & Stern, 2006), therefore it could be difficult to avoid self -
interested actions, and they might not be equipped with the experience or perspectives 
different enough from their peers to challenge questionable decisions. In addition, outside 
directors often represent large shareholders (Hill & Snell, 1988; Qu, Wu, & Zhang, 2000; 
Peng, 2004; Ramaswamy, Li, & Veliyath, 2002), whose presence have been linked to 
positive firm performance (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). By having directors who identify with 
the interests of large shareholders, the collective voice of the board are more likely to be 
concerned with overall performance in order to maximize shareholder investment (Peng, 
2004). Compared to boards solely consisting of inside directors with a uniform sense of 
identity and ties, multiplex boards that maintain a mix of inside and outside directors are able 
to provide a more comprehensive assessment of firm wellbeing and CEO behavior, as well as 
a more representative voice for large shareholders and external stakeholders (Claessens et al., 
2002; Dahya & McConnel, 2007; Peng, 2004). Due to their presumed independence relative 
to insiders, outside directors are more likely to do a better job at performing monitoring and 
controlling roles, thus helping to improve firm performance (Dahya & McConnel, 2007; 
Duchin, Matsusaka, & Ozbas, 2010; Walsh & Seward, 1990). Overall, it is reasonable to 
assume that outside directors are expected to play an increasingly active role in corporate 
governance and strategic decision making via their monitoring and advisory functions 
(Finkelstein & Mooney, 2003).  
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Another important aspect of corporate board that has attained some attention in the 
corporate governance literature is stock ownership of board members (Bhagat, Carey, & 
Elson, 1999). In the multiplexity dimension, shareholder directors’ extra tie with the firm as 
investors fundamentally change their motivation as advisors and monitors of the firm due to 
their personal stakes. Directors with stock ownership potentially bring additional information 
to the firm through the lens of investors and provide the firm with in-depth knowledge as 
well as a deeper understanding of the environment. This type of multiplex tie also indicates 
higher levels of cohesiveness within the boardroom due to more trust and shared information 
between individual directors. In addition, board members with appropriate stock ownership 
have more incentive to provide effective monitoring and oversight of important corporate 
decisions (Bhagat & Bolton, 2014), and the amount of board member stock ownership has 
been shown to positively relate to future operating performance and the probability of 
disciplinary management of poor performance (Bhagat & Bolton, 2007). Moreover, greater 
stock ownership by the board also helps with internalizing the costs and benefits of 
compensation disclosure at the board decision making level (Hermalin & Weisbach, 2007). 
Some scholars argue that senior policy makes and corporate boards in general should expend 
more efforts to improve governance effectiveness by focusing on improving stock ownership 
of board members (Bhagat & Bolton, 2007). Therefore, board stock ownership likely relate 
to firm performance positively. 
Some directors also maintain useful external networks that may positively influence 
firm outcomes. Resource dependence theory argues that directors often utilize their social 
and/or professional ties between the firm and its external stakeholders to influence decision  
making (Peng, 2004; Pfeffer, 1972). In this perspective, board members serve several 
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important functions to accrue benefits for the firm: access to resources, advice and expertise, 
and legitimacy (Gulati & Sytch, 2007; Hillman, 2005; Pfeffer, 2003; Pfeffer & Salancik, 
1978). Conventionally, the board most commonly consists of directors with relevant 
functional background that is in alignment with the firm’s needs. These directors possess 
valuable technical know-hows and provide useful advice to top managers based on their 
expertise in the industry. Similarly, some directors possess an additional type of background 
that is beneficial to the firm. Directors with political affiliations via prior appointments in 
governmental and political institutions are some of the most important players in the 
corporate world. Directors with political ties serve as conduits of information and grant 
access to invaluable political resources that are especially beneficial to firms that operate in 
highly regulated environment (Hillman, 2005). Appointing politicians or ex-politicians has 
been a method used by many firms to reduce uncertainty (Hillman, 2005; Lang & Lockhart, 
1990; Mahon & Murray, 1981). Firms with politically connected directors has been shown to 
enjoy various positive performance outcomes such as stock value (Faccio, 2007), access to 
financial resource at more favorable and convenient conditions (Boubakri, Cosset, & 
Guedhami, 2009; Faccio, 2010; Gomez & Jomo, 1999), and increase in corporate value 
(Faccio, 2007; Goldman, Rocholl, & So, 2009). In countries with a weak legal system and a 
high level of corruption, political connections are particularly valuable to a corporation. In 
emerging markets in South America, Eastern Europe, and Asia, government actors play a key 
role in steering resources toward firms with political connections (Li, Chen, Liu, & Peng, 
2012; Shi, Markóczy, & Stan, 2014). A wealth of recent research on Chinese firms has found 
that political ties are playing an increasing role, where business managers and state officials 
interdependently shape economic policy (Kennedy, 2005; Li, Meng, Wang, & Zhou, 2008; 
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Sheng, Zhou, & Li, 2011). Although there is increasing levels of economic liberalization in 
emerging markets, the new market based economies often lack a complimentary regulatory 
system due to the absence of political liberalization (Luo & Chung, 2005). Therefore, 
political ties remain important in the emerging markets because firms continue to exhibit 
severe resource dependence on the government. Firms in transitional markets like China rely 
on the government for critical information, despite the progress made in the marketization 
process (Shi, Markóczy, & Stan, 2014). Therefore, it is highly beneficial for firms to obtain 
directors with political ties in emerging markets. Surprisingly, the importance of political ties 
cannot be ignored even in developed economies. In the US, financial and legal institutions 
are strong and well developed, political connections therefore should not significantly 
influence company success, but empirical data shows quite the contrary. In the post-election 
period after the 2000 Presidential Election, the portfolio of S&P500 companies classified as 
having a Republican board significantly outperforms (in terms of cumulative abnormal 
return) those classified as having a Democrat board (Goldman, Rocholl, & So, 2009). More 
comprehensively, firms’ overall political affiliations to US political campaigns positively and 
significantly correlate with future returns (Claessens, Feijen, & Laeven, 2006; Cooper, 
Gulen, & Ovtchinnikov, 2009). Similarly, German public companies that are politically 
connected exhibit significantly better accounting and stock market performance (Niessen & 
Ruenzi, 2010). A comprehensive bailout study that covered firms from 35 countries has 
found that politically connected firms are significantly more likely to be bailed out than 
similar firms with no connections (Faccio, Masulis, & McConnell, 2006). Therefore, it is 
reasonable to posit that developed economies are not immune from the preferential treatment 
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of companies due to their political ties. Directors with political ties exercise their power to 
affect the economic values of public firms all around the world. 
H3: The degree of multiplexity of the board, as indicated by the proportion of outside 
directors vs. inside directors, the degree of director stock ownership, and the existence of 
directors with political ties, is positively related to firm performance. 
 
Board Connectedness and Performance 
The concept of board connectedness is conceptualized based on board members’ 
formal or professional ties. In the past decade, there has been an increasing level of interest 
in the application of social network analysis to interorganizational context. The network 
perspective adds explanatory power to organizational outcomes, and expands the span and 
scope of organizational phenomena from a relational view (Zaheer, Gozubuyuk, & Milanov, 
2010). Corporations with well-connected boards have better access to information on 
industry trends, market conditions, and regulatory changes, which leads to a comparative 
advantage in making strategic decisions (Mizruchi, 1990; Mol, 2001). Boardroom networks 
also allow firms to leverage social relationships to reduce ambiguity and uncertainty in the 
environment to maximize performance outcomes (Schoorman, Bazerman, & Atkin, 1981). In 
addition, interlock networks allow directors to gather useful business contacts that could turn 
into beneficial business relationships (e.g., clients, suppliers, alliance partners) (Nicholson, 
Alexander, & Kiel, 2004), to learn about effective governance mechanisms and innovative 
compensation structures from other firms in the interlock network (Haunschild & Beckman, 
1998), and to obtain personal and political favors facilitates resource exchange (Mol, 2001; 
Nicholson et al., 2004). Boardroom network fosters collusive competitive behavior by 
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creating a channel of communication (Larcker et al., 2013; Pennings, 1980), which helps 
firms to enjoy favorable lending terms, better credit ratings, enhanced stock price 
performance (Engelberg, Gao, & Parsons, 2012), reduce ambiguity in uncertain business 
environment to improve return on equity (Boyd, 1990), and become more likely to be 
targeted in mergers and acquisition deals (Stuart & Yim, 2010). 
 To study shared directorates between boards as channels of resource exchange, the 
tools of analysis developed by social network theory are particularly relevant and appropriate 
(Larcker et al., 2013). Network theory provides measures of centrality to identify the most 
prominent or well-connected actors in a network (Wasserman & Faust, 1994). First, a firm 
has a central board when its directors possess many first-degree links to outside boards 
(DEGREE centrality). This is the most commonly used and most basic of all the centrality 
measures – it refers to the simple count of the number of each director’s ties. An actor with a 
high degree centrality is in direct contact with many other directors, is highly visible and has 
access to many channels of communication and alternatives (Larcker et al., 2013; Tsai, 2001; 
Wasserman & Faust, 1994). Second, a board enjoys a central position in its network when its 
directors possess relatively closer ties to outside board, which implies that it takes fewer 
steps between boards to reach each point of connection (CLOSENESS centrality). This 
measure captures the speed and ease at which directors are able to draw upon useful 
information in their networks. Directors with a high closeness centrality have access to more 
readily available resources. Third, a central board is present on more paths between pairs of 
outside boards, which suggest that its directors are important information or resource brokers 
who have control over information flow and direction of resource exchange 
(BETWEENNESS centrality) (Freeman, 1977). This measure captures the importance of a 
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board in terms of connecting other boards to each other, as well as the average proportion of 
paths between two outside boards on which a focal board lies. The distance of the shortest 
path between two firms is proportional to the costs of communication or exchanging favors 
between them, therefore, betweenness centrality also depicts the reduction of average cost for 
obtaining information and resources. 
Overall, the concept of a centrality is multidimensional and highly relational. The 
degree to which a board can maintain advantages and leverage its professional network 
depends on how much better connected it is than its peers. Prior research has empirically 
demonstrated that firm centrality positively affects several aspects of firm performance 
(Larcker et al., 2013; Larcker, So, & Wang, 2010). Central firms in the biotech and chemical 
industries enjoy higher revenue, employment growth, patenting rate, R&D spending growth 
(Baum, Calabrese, & Silverman, 2000), and increased innovation output (Ahuja, 2000). 
Evidence suggests that boardroom centrality is beneficial to firm outcomes (Tsai, 2001; 
2002) and the concentration or cluster of director ties that central boards enjoy can positively 
affect performance.  
 
H4: The degree of connectedness in board ties, as indicated by degree centrality, 
closeness centrality, and betweenness centrality, is positively related to firm performance.  
 
Board Skewedness and Performance 
When one or a few directors control significantly more decision power than others, 
the power balance of the board is disturbed, which decreases the likelihood that the board can 
successfully accomplish its advisory and monitoring responsibilities. Board skewedness 
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focuses on power imbalance amongst board members, which is represented by two important 
aspects of the board that have significant performance implications. 
First, when the role of CEO and chair of the board are occupied by the same person, it 
drastically compromises other directors’ willingness to objectively evaluate the performance 
and practices of a firm’s CEO when that CEO in question is also serving as the head of the 
board (Conger & Lawler, 2009; Jensen, 1993; Monks & Minow, 2008). This severe conflict 
of interest weakens a board’s ability to execute its control function (Brickley, Coles, & 
Jarrell, 1997:190) and undermines all of which the board stands for due to the absence of 
separation of decision management and decision control (Boyd, 1995; Dalton et al., 2008; 
Fama & Jensen, 1983). Additionally, the board’s ability to perform control and monitory role 
effectively depends on the distribution of power between the board and the CEO (Finkelstein 
et al., 1996), so CEO duality directly threatens the effectiveness of the board, which then 
leads to negative performance outcomes (Conger & Lawler, 2009; Jensen, 1993). When the 
integrity and utility of the board are compromised, the CEO is unlikely to be penalized and 
rectified for behavior that damage shareholder interest. CEO duality heavily skews the power 
dynamic of the board in favor of the CEO, making it more likely for the CEO to use the 
formal power embedded in the board chair position to legitimize the pursuit of personal goals 
at the expense of other shareholders (Conger & Lawler, 2009; Fama & Jensen, 1983; Jensen, 
1993; Westphal & Zajac, 1995). Therefore, boards that are chaired by the CEO are less likely 
to be focus on the interests of shareholders, which translates to more agency problems 
overall, leads to poor performance (Rechner and Dalton, 1991).  
Likewise, the presence of controlling shareholders in a board have negative 
performance implications because the interests of controlling and minority shareholders do 
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not completely coincide, especially when there is a separation of ownership and control 
(Bebchuk, Kraakman, & Triantis, 2000; Claessens, Djankov, Fan, & Lang, 2002). 
Controlling shareholder directors do not always have the expertise or competency to properly 
counsel and monitor management, which has negative impact on firm value (Ben-Amar & 
Andre, 2006). The amount of power that controlling shareholders have on a board do not 
align with the benefit they can offer to the firm, the opportunity costs created by a 
suboptimal board appointment is shared by all shareholders while the private benefits accrue 
to the controlling shareholders (Peres-Gonzalez, 2001). Due to controlling shareholders’ 
ability to expropriate valuable firm resources for personal gain, granting them formal 
monitory roles on the board will have negative performance implications.  
Furthermore, individual board members are informally ranked against each other 
based on the number of additional board membership they maintain (Belliveau, O’Reilly, & 
Wade, 1996). A high degree of hierarchical differentiation between directors is likely to 
negatively influence board effectiveness because a deference-based hierarchical order 
promotes severe power imbalance. Board informal hierarchy provides a strict social order 
within which the decisions made by high ranking directors are much more respected and  
their opinions are rarely challenged, especially when the CEO occupies the highest rank in 
the informal hierarchy (He & Huang, 2011). A clear hierarchical differentiation subdues 
diverse viewpoints and reduces the quality of objectivity of decisions (Finkelstein & 
Mooney, 2003), where higher ranking directors actively or unconsciously suppresses 
opposing opinions with little to no risk of retaliation. In addition, directors with many 
additional board memberships are linked to fostering excess CEO compensation (Core, 
Holthausen, & Larcker, 1999), where these directors are more likely to be chosen for 
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additional seats if the CEO of the firm is involved in the director selection process, which 
undermines the independence of the board (Shivdasani & Yermack, 1999). This suggests that 
a high degree of informal hierarchy is especially problematic because higher ranked directors 
are given special deferential privileges and more power, but are often ineffective monitors. 
Boards with CEO duality, controlling shareholders, and a high degree of hierarchical 
differentiation suffer from a diminished ability to execute their advisory and monitoring 
functions. The skewed distribution of power in favor of CEO board chairs, controlling 
shareholders, and high ranking directors leads to agency problems that greatly reduce the 
effectiveness and utility of boards.  
H5: The degree of skewedness of the board, as indicated by CEO duality, the presence 
of controlling shareholder, and the degree of hierarchical differentiation is negatively related 
to firm performance. 
 
CHAPTER IV  
Contingent Nature of Board Relational Pluralism 
As noted in earlier research (Dalton et al., 1998; Dalton et al., 1999; Larcker et al., 
2013; Westphal & Zajac, 2013), the board and firm performance relationship carries an 
assumption that the choice of various governance options is associated with organizational 
strategy, the context in which the firm operates may influence the governance of 
organizations in ways that temper boards’ ability to affect firm performance. Applying the 
relational pluralism model to the board-performance literature leads to the obligatory 
consideration regarding the strategic contexts under which the firms operate.  
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Miles and Snow Typology 
The Miles and Snow (1978) typology categorizes organizational patterns of strategic 
behavior into three main strategic problem and solution sets: (1) entrepreneurial problems 
(product-market domain), (2) engineering problems (choice of technologies), and (3) 
administrative problems (structure and processes). Based on this categorization, the Miles  
and Snow typology defines four distinct strategic types: Prospectors, Defenders, Analyzers 
and Reactors. With empirical evidence, Miles and Snow (1978) developed a strategy 
typology interrelating organizational strategy, structure, and process within the theoretical 
framework of organizational adaption, which is the process of actively aligning and adjusting 
the organization with its environment (Miles, Snow, Meyer, & Coleman, 1978).  
To build onto the contingency theory of the multidimensional relational pluralism 
model, a set of potential moderators can be derived from Miles and Snow’s strategy typology 
(1978). This typology has been used in other contingency theory research and has been 
widely used in the management literature (e.g., Doty, Glick, & Huber, 1993; Hambrick, 
2003; Lin, Tsai, & Wu, 2014; Rajagopolan, 1997; Rajagopolan & Finkelstein, 1992; Sollosy, 
Guidice, & Parboteeah, 2015; Thomas, Lischert, & Ramaswamy, 1991). Three of the four 
strategy types in Miles and Snow’s typology fall along a continuum where the “prospector 
and the defender are endpoints and the analyzer is the midpoint of the continuum” (Doty et 
al., 1993: 1227). This assumption is based on Miles and Snow’s argument that “the defender 
and the prospector reside at opposite ends of a continuum” and that the analyzer lies 
“between those extremes” (1978: 68). The continuum perspective of the Miles and Snow’s 
typology lends itself better to empirically testing the contingency interrelationships among 
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board relational pluralism, organizational environments, strategy, and performance (Smith, 
1989).  
Prospectors are organizations that seek to gain a first-mover advantage by constantly 
developing new products and markets. The product and market innovations require the 
prospectors to be risk takers, often resulting in prospectors operating within broad product-
market domains. Since prospectors rely on their ability to pioneer new ideas in the market  
(Miles & Snow, 1978), their effectiveness maximizes when they operate in turbulent and 
uncertain environments. As a result, prospectors favor organizational structures and 
compositions that exhibit high flexibility and diversity, which makes them better equipped to 
respond to the demands of rapidly changing environmental conditions. Following Weick's 
(1979) observation that external diversity should be matched by internal diversity, 
prospectors are expected to benefit more from having a relatively heterogeneous governing 
board in terms of demographic and functional background. The need for innovation and fast-
paced decision making necessitates a diverse mix of directors from differentiated 
backgrounds in order to adequately perform their advisory function. Moreover, the varied 
and turbulent environment that prospectors face makes it very important for their boards to 
have an advantageous network position in order to receive and broker information and 
resource exchange frequently. Director external ties are also extremely valuable to 
prospectors because the high level of external diversity can only be managed by directors 
with experience and expertise in differentiated areas relevant to the firm’s success. External 
ties such as political ties are especially useful to prospectors because they are constantly 
under the stress of environmental change. To deal with potential institutional or 
governmental constraints, prospectors could benefit greatly from having directors with 
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political affiliations as well as directors with central positions in their interlocking directorate 
networks. In addition, the prospector competes by focusing on innovation and new market 
opportunities, which sacrifices internal efficiency for external effectiveness. This lop-sided 
focus can have potential negative impact on the effectiveness of governance if the board 
already suffers from an imbalance of power. Prospectors are likely to exacerbate the negative 
effects of having a board that is unable to competently complete its monitoring function. 
Hence, board relational pluralism has an amplified effect on firm performance if the firm 
focuses on using the prospector strategy. 
On the other hand, defenders focus on stable product-market domains and obtain 
competitive advantages through operational efficiencies (Miles & Snow, 1978). Defenders do 
their best to protect their existing market positions and avoid risky product and market 
innovations (Dess, Lumpkin, & Covin, 1997). The survival and prosperity of defenders 
depend on minimizing operational costs and dominating in their limited product-market 
domains. In addition, defenders tend to maintain a simple and mechanistic administrative 
system that can best be described as centralized and inorganic to ensure operational 
efficiencies (Miles et al., 1978). Therefore, when compared to prospectors, defenders are less 
likely to benefit from having a board that’s diverse, well connected, and politically affiliated, 
this is due to the fact that defenders do not have an intrinsic need to frequently draw upon 
information and resources that are outside of their existing positions. Therefore, board 
relational pluralism does not have as strong an impact on firm performance when the firm 
has a defender strategy in place.  
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To summarize, board relational pluralism’s effect on firm performance is  largely 
contingent on the firm’s strategic context, where prospectors are much more likely to exhibit 
the proposed performance effects due to dimensions of relational pluralism than defenders.  
The other two strategy types are analyzers and reactors. Analyzers can be summed up 
as a hybrid strategy type which lies somewhere in between prospectors and defenders (Miles 
& Snow, 1978). Due to their dual characteristics, the success of analyzers depends on 
balancing product and market innovations with operational efficiencies. However, analyzers 
do not necessarily exhibit a perfect balance of prospector and defender strategies at all times, 
which sometimes makes it difficult to accurately categorize at a single point in time. Finally, 
reactors lack a consistent strategic approach to solving problems. The reactor strategy type is 
considered impractical and unfeasible, as a result, it is usually omitted from studies. Because 
Reactors may vary their behavior any time to exhibit the characteristics of a Defender, 
Analyzer or Prospector type, they are also difficult to characterize at a single point in time 
using objective approaches (Blackmore & Nesbitt, 2013). Consistent with prior research in 
both management and accounting (Bentley, Omer, & Sharp, 2013; Hambrick, 1981, 1983; 
Saraç, Ertan, & Yücel, 2014; Simons, 1987), the current study focuses on prospectors and 
defenders.  
Hypothesis 6: The relationships in H2-5 are stronger in the hypothesized direction in 
prospector firms when compared to defender firms. 
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CHAPTER V 
METHODS 
 
Sample and Data 
My sample consists of Chinese A-share public companies listed on the Shanghai or 
Shenzhen Stock Exchanges between 2007 and 2010. The data is obtained from the China Stock 
Market and Accounting Research (CSMAR) database. Firms with missing information that 
would prevent the calculation of any of the twelve first-order latent variables of board relational 
pluralism are excluded. Firms with missing financial information are also excluded. Interlocking 
directorate network information is collected for all directors in included firms from annual 
reports and corporate websites, from which the centrality measures are constructed. For the years 
between 2007 and 2010, there are 1,530, 1,604, 1,700, and 2,063 domestically listed Chinese 
firms respectively, after matching data across all four years and excluding firms with missing 
key data, a final panel sample containing data of 1,172 firms are included. Network measures are 
constructed based on the full sample, therefore, omitted firms do not affect the network data of 
focal firms. A total of 56,256 individual director level panel data are aggregated into the board 
level to construct the final data. 
 The time range of my study is carefully chosen based on several reasons. First, corporate 
governance in China has been established and reexamined alongside massive state-owned 
enterprise reforms and private sector growth in the past decade (OECD, 2011). China has started 
the creation of a legal system for corporate governance to keep up with the Western standards in 
the early 2000s, and the system has developed fairly quickly and increasingly similar to US and 
European systems. The China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) has identified the 
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improvement of corporate governance as a priority, and has adopted many measures in the areas 
of independent directorship, information disclosure, interest related party transaction, general 
shareholders’ meeting, merger and acquisition and reorganization and investor protection within 
the framework of the Company Law and the Securities Law between the years 2001 and 2007. 
By 2007, major components of corporate governance laws and guidelines that are shared by the 
international community have been implemented in Chinese listed firms, common corporate 
governance practices in US and Europe have finally been adopted. Therefore, it is important for 
me to choose 2007 as the starting point of my study to maximize the generalizability of my 
findings. Second, the National People’s Congress passed a revision of China’s Company Law in 
October 2005, which turned the 2002 CSRC requirement of independent directors into a legal 
necessity. This change has greatly altered the composition of most Chinese boards and I choose 
the start time of 2007, which is two years after the new laws, to capture Chinese boards’ 
characteristics after changes have been made. Furthermore, the Chinese government started to 
allow mainland citizens to invest in non-mainland stock markets in 2007, this policy pushed 
Chinese firms to accelerate corporate governance reform to match their US, European, and Hong 
Kong counterparts in order to stay competitive for investors (OECD, 2011). This makes 2007 a 
very fitting starting point for my study because Chinese boards had many idiosyncrasies that 
were not generalizable to other countries prior to 2007. Overall, 2007 marks a time by which 
Chinese has fully adapted to the Anglo-American style of governance mechanisms. 
 The end point of my time range is also carefully chosen. Shortly after Xi Jinping 
established and confirmed his status as the successor to Hu Jintao as the next president of China, 
Xi began the preparations for his long term anti-corruption campaign, and new sets of anti-
corruptions laws were passed in 2011 (CECC, 2011). As a result, roughly 160,000 Chinese 
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officials were reprimanded in 2012, and the number has been growing every year ever since 
(Donovan, 2014). The anti-corruption campaign has also greatly affected the composition of 
corporate boards – under new rules, university educators and government officials are no longer 
allowed to receive separate paychecks outside their primary jobs (Li, 2016), consequently, 
corporate boards have been witnessing an exodus of independent directors who have political 
affiliations or hold university positions1. Therefore, Chinese board composition and network data 
gathered after 2010 are undoubtedly greatly affected by the new laws, which could lead to severe 
confounds to my findings, especially when the number of “shadow directors” is likely to 
increase. “Shadow directors” still influence their firms to a significant extent by virtue of their 
hidden relationships and functions to the firms, while not letting their names appear in any 
corporate records or legal documents (Wang, 2014), which makes it impossible to capture their 
information in public data. While many key variables will remain observable, it is very likely 
that there will be invisible components of board characteristics that will weaken or threaten the 
validity of my findings. Overall, the 2007 to 2010 window represents the ideal timeframe to use 
Chinese boards for this study due to generalizability and relative stability. 
 Using the Chinese context is a suitable theoretical and empirical setting for this study 
because as China emerges as a global economic power, the corporate governance and 
performance of Chinese firms demands more research attention (Chen & Young, 2009; Peng et 
al., 2010; Wright et al., 2005). Existing work, especially those conducted in emerging markets, 
has largely focused on the direct relationship between board characteristics and firm performance 
(Peng, Zhang, & Li, 2007; Peng et al., 2010; Peng, Tan, & Tong, 2004), the relational pluralism 
                                                          
1 e.g. Liu Ya, vice principal of the University of International Business and Economics in Beijing, was fired because 
he received 1.2 million yuan (about $185,000) as compensation for his director memberships in corporations. 
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framework developed and validated in this study provides promising theoretical foundations to 
motivate research that explore how board characteristics interact with each other to further 
influence firm performance. The relational pluralism framework has very recently been applied 
to the corporate governance literature in the US context, it would be very meaningful to extend 
this new stream of research to the context of emerging markets to answer the call for research on 
board characteristic interactions and their performance implications (Peng et al., 2010). Although 
there are undeniable institutional and cultural differences between China and other countries, in 
terms of corporate governance, drastic reforms in regulations in recent years have greatly 
transformed Chinese boards under Anglo-American standards, which alleviates some concerns 
regarding the generalizability of findings, while on the other hand, explores the boundary effects 
of international corporate governance practices on performance under different institutional 
contexts. Therefore, the similarities and dissimilarities of the Chinese context compared to the 
US context provides invaluable research opportunities. 
 In addition, China is a relational society, where most business transactions are carried out 
between parties with close social ties; and individuals’ behaviors are governed not by universal 
law but by social norms and informal rules (Fei, Hamilton, & Wang, 1992; Granoetter, 1985). 
The corporate environment in China is much more relationship-based than rule-based (Ding, 
Sun, & Au, 2014). In a relationship-based context, managers usually use established social ties to 
exploit opportunities (Gao, Wang, Xia, & Yu, 2014). Rather than relying on formal channels, 
directors in China rely on their relationships and interactions to build trust, inform decisions, and 
obtain resources (Wong, 2016). This phenomenon amplifies the effect of Chinese boards’ social 
networks and relational dynamics on firm outcomes, which makes China the ideal context to 
study the board relational pluralism framework. Board relational pluralism focuses on 
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directors’ relationships within, between, outside the board; Chinese boards, arguably rely  
more on these relationships to make decisions than most other countries. Therefore, the 
Chinese context in this case is not simply a setting, it motivates my study because it provides 
unique opportunities that examine phenomenon that would otherwise be less salient in other 
contexts. This answers the call for more context driven and context appropriate management 
scholarship (George, 2014). 
Construct Validity of Relational Pluralism 
Operationalization 
Four dimensions of relational pluralism: 
1) Heterogeneity 
Gender diversity. This is measured by using a Blau index (Blau & Blau, 1982). The Blau index is 
a useful diversity measure when the variables are categorical (Harrison & Klein, 2007). A Blau 
index is calculated and the geometric mean is obtained. Blau’s Index is defined as: 
𝐵𝑙𝑎𝑢 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 𝑖𝑗  =  1 − ∑ 𝑃𝑖𝑗𝑡
2
𝑛
𝑡=1
 
the board heterogeneity index for firm i during year j, t is the number of categories a director can 
belong to, and P is the proportion of directors on board i who belong to category j at time t (Blau, 
1977). The value range of the diversity index falls between 0 and 1, with values close to 1 
indicating greater diversity. 
Occupational background diversity. This is measured by calculating a Blau index and obtaining 
the geometric mean. Different occupational backgrounds are represented by a unique number. (1-
5): 1 = business background (including commercial and investment banks, or venture capital); 2 
= government background (including all official and semi-official government positions, 
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government-supported nonprofit organization, or military units); 3 = consulting background 
(including law firms, accounting, or management consulting firms); 4 = academic background 
(including universities or research centers); and 5 = others. 
Educational background diversity. This is measured by calculating a Blau index and obtaining 
the geometric mean. Different educational backgrounds are represented by a unique number (1-
6): 1 = management; 2 = engineering; 3 = marketing; 4 = accounting or finance; 5 = law; and 6 = 
others. 
2) Multiplexity 
Independent directors. This is measured by the ratio of independent directors to inside directors 
on a board. 
Director stock ownership. This is measured by a count measure of directors with stock 
ownership. 
Political ties. This is measured by counting the total number of political ties enjoyed by directors 
on a board. Political affiliations are represented by prior or current appointments in the central 
government. In addition, a dummy variable (0, 1) is created to represent the existence of political 
ties in a board. 
3) Connectedness 
All three centrality measures in the Connectedness dimension are calculated by constructing an 
undirected boardroom interlock network formed by shared directorates. Shared directorate is 
defined by the linkage between two firms based on having at least one board member that is 
shared by both firms. An undirected network is one in which boardrooms are either connected or 
not, and there is no assumptions place on the direction of the flow of information and resources. 
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Degree centrality. A board interlock network matrix is used to calculate this measure using the 
UCINET software program (Bonacich, 1987). This measure examines the number of channels of 
communication or resource exchange that a board enjoys (Larcker, So, & Wang, 2013).The 
formula below is used to obtain the number of first-degree links to outside boards, where the 
term δ(i, j) represents an indicator that boards i and j share a director, for a given firm i in the 
network.  
 
Closeness centrality. A board interlock network matrix is used to calculate this measure using 
the UCINET software program. This measure represents how easily or quickly a board can reach 
an outside board through its interlock network (Larcker et al., 2013). The formula below is used 
to calculate the steps in the path between two boards, where the term ӏ(i, j) is the number of steps 
in the shortest path between board i and j. 
 
Betweenness centrality. A board interlock network matrix is used to calculate this measure using 
the UCINET software program. This measure captures how important a board is in connecting 
other boards to each other, or how advantageous its network paths are (Larcker et al., 2013). The 
formula below calculates the average proportion of paths between two outside boards on which a 
board is positioned. The term Pi(kj) represents the total number of shortest paths between board k 
and j, the term P(kj) represents the total number of shortest paths between k and j. 
 
Each of these three connectedness measures is aggregated to the board level by averaging the 
centrality scores of directors on the same board (Omer, Shelley, & Tice, 2014). 
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4) Skewedness 
CEO duality. This is measured by a dummy variable (0, 1), with a value of 1 indicating that the 
chair of a board is also the CEO of the same firm, 0 otherwise.  
Controlling shareholder. This is measured by a dummy variable (0, 1), with a value of 1 
indicating the existence of a shareholder director who owns more than fifty percent of the shares 
in a company, 0 otherwise. 
Informal hierarchy. Measured by board membership ranking inequality using a Gini coefficient: 
𝐺 =  
2𝑐𝑜𝑣 (𝑦, 𝑟𝑦)
𝑁?̅?
 
 
Where G= Gini coefficient; y = total number of board memberships held by the board; r = rank 
of each director based on the number of board memberships held (i.e. a board member with 3 
board memberships is ranked above a board member with 2 board memberships, etc.); cov(y, r) 
= covariance of y and r; N = number of directors on the board. The value range of the Gini 
coefficient falls between 0 and 1, with values close to 1 indicating greater inequality. 
 
 
Relational Pluralism and Firm Performance Linkage 
Operationalization 
Dimensions of relational pluralism. The factor scores derived from the principal components 
factor analysis are used as a single composite measure for each of the dimensions of relational 
pluralism. These factor scores are automatically calculated for each dimension when the 
principal components analysis is conducted. Five unique factor scores (each representing one 
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dimension of relational pluralism) per board are saved in the regression format, in order to be 
used as independent variables in my regression models. 
Performance. Return on assets (ROA), Return on equity (ROE), and Tobin’s q.  
ROA is one of the most effective financial measure to assess company performance (Buck, Liu, 
& Skovoroda, 2008; Chizema, Liu, Lu, & Gao, 2014). It captures the fundamentals of business 
performance by looking at both income statement performance and the assets required to run a 
business. Commonly used performance metrics such as return on equity (ROE) and net income 
are susceptible to financial manipulation (e.g., debt leverage, taxes, interest, one-time charges). 
Many assets, such as property, equipment, and intangibles involve long-term asset decisions that 
are more difficult to tamper with, therefore, ROA is less vulnerable to short-term gaming (Hagel, 
Samoylova, & Lui, 2013; Shift Index, 2013). Using ROA as a key performance metric focuses 
management attention on the assets required to run the business. Additionally, ROA is a better 
metric of financial performance than income statement profitability measures like return on sales 
(Hagel, Brown, & Davison, 2010) because ROA explicitly takes into account the assets used to 
support business activities. It determines whether the company is able to generate a sufficient 
return on these assets rather than simply showing healthy return on sales. ROA is calculated as 
operating income over total assets. Although there are strong arguments for using ROA as the 
key performance indicator, in order to be thorough, ROE will also be observed because it 
remains one of the commonly used performance metrics in the management literature and in 
practice. ROE is calculated as net income over total equity. 
In addition to ROA and ROE, I use Tobin’s q to assess firm value. Tobin’s q is the firm’s 
current market-to-book ratio (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Morck et al., 1988). Tobin’s q is 
calculated by dividing the firm’s market value by the replacement cost of its assets, where 
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market value is the value of common equity plus the book value of preferred stock and debt, and 
the replacement cost of assets is their actual book value. Theoretically, Tobin’s q is a commonly 
used performance measure because q implicitly uses the correct risk-adjusted discount rate and 
minimizes accounting convention and tax law related distortions (Wernerfelt & Montgomery, 
1988).  
For all three performance measures, I use the log transformation and 1-year lag in my 
analysis. I also conduct t-tests for all three performance measures between my firms included in 
my final sample and excluded firms, the two groups, are not significantly different (ROA: t-value 
= 0.387, p = 0.198; ROE: t-value = 0.763, p = 0.261; Tobin’s Q: t-value = 0.814, p = 0.149). 
 
Firm strategy. Miles and Snow Typology 
There are several ways to measure business strategies. Snow and Hambrick (1980) 
introduced four main methods: (1) Self-typing, which allows the organization's top managers to 
identify and summarize the organization's strategy,  (2) Investigator inference, where the 
researcher uses available information to assess the organization's strategy,  (3) External 
assessment, in which a panel of experts evaluates the organization’s strategy, and finally (4) 
Objective indicators, which focuses on measuring financial and accounting parameters that 
provide information on the organization’s strategy (Sarac, Ertan, & Yucel, 2014). The Objective 
indicators method has advantages over the other methods because objective data are not 
dependent on the assumptions and biases of researchers, managers, or consultants. Objective data 
are also comprised of large, heterogeneous samples that makes it possible to assess relative 
strategic properties (Blackmore & Nesbitt, 2012). Furthermore, if data are available 
longitudinally, this method allows differentiation between strategic changes and strategic 
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adjustments, as well as capturing executed strategies rather than intended strategies (Thomas & 
Ramaswamy, 1996: 255).  
The nature of my study, which requires that large amounts of data be collected from 
different industries and different time periods, fits well with a measurement approach that is 
based on objective measures. In the literature, there is a lack of commonly agreed upon objective 
measures to assess Miles and Snow’s strategy types. Therefore, I have selected the most 
appropriate existing measures in the literature to accompany the dimensions of Miles and Snow’s 
typologies (Blackmore & Nesbitt 2012; Bentley et al., 2013; Ittner, Lacker, & Rajan, 1997). I 
find a set of measures used by Bentley et al. (2013) and Ittner et al. (1997): (1) the ratio of 
research and development to sales, (2) the ratio of employees to sales, (3) a historical growth 
measure (one-year percentage change in total sales), (4) the ratio of marketing to sales, (5) a 
measure of employee fluctuations (standard deviation of total employees) and (6) a measure of 
capital intensity net PPE scaled by total assets. As advised by several scholars (Conant, Mokwa, 
& Varadarajan, 1990; Blackmore & Nesbitt, 2013), these six measures capture the appropriate 
characteristics and all of the dimensions (stability, efficiency, growth, product development 
research, marketing, and capital intensity) of Miles and Snow’s Strategy typologies. Each of the 
measures is calculated and ranked into quintiles, the observations in the highest quintiles are 
given a score of 5, those in the second highest quintile are given a score of 4, and so on, the 
observations in the lowest quintile are given a score of 1 (except the capital intensity measure, 
which is reverse-coded so the quintile scores are also reversed). The scores are then summed 
over the six measures per company-year where a firm could potentially obtain a maximum score 
of 30 (prospector type) and a minimum score of 6 (defender type). The scores are then further 
categorized into defenders (scores between 6 and 17) and prospectors (scores between 18 and 
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30). All firms in my sample are coded as either defenders or prospectors following this method, 
resulting in 1,653 defender firms and 1,863 prospector firms. 
 
Control Variables 
Control variables include other firm characteristics that may affect the link between board 
composition and firm performance. Prior research has suggested that the board performance 
relationship is related to firm size (Core, Holthausen, & Larcker, 1999; Haleblian & Finkelstein, 
1993), ownership structure (Demsetz & Villalonga, 2001; Kapopoulos & Lazaretou, 2007), as 
well as board level factors such as board size (van Essen, van Oosterhout, & Carney, 2012), 
audit/advisory committee meetings (Fauzi & Locke, 2012), average director age and tenure 
(Westphal & Shani, 2016), and compensation (Rhoades, Rechner, & Sundaramurthy, 2001), 
therefore, I control for 1) Firm Size (the natural logarithm of firm total assets), 2) Audit/advisory 
committee (the number of audit/advisory committee meetings per year), 3) Board Size (number 
of directors on a board), 4) Board compensation (reported total cash compensation of a board, 
log transformed), 5) Director Age (mean age of directors on a board), 6) Director Tenure (mean 
tenure of directors on a board), 7) SOE (dummy variable to indicate state ownership). I also 
include industry, year, and province dummies in order to control for the industry, year, and sub 
country regional effects.  
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CHAPTER VI 
RESULTS 
 I first report the descriptive statistics and bivariate correlations for all indicator variables 
used in this study (see Table 1). A total of 56,256 individual director level panel data are 
aggregated into the board level (N=4,688) to construct the twelve indicator variables used in the 
construct validity analyses of my study. A review of the correlation matrix reveals that all 
indicator variables are significantly correlated, this is not surprising because theoretically, 
different components of relational pluralism are not orthogonal constructs, and this provides face 
validity for my proposition that these indicator variables on the board level describe one second 
order latent variable, board relational pluralism. The magnitude of correlation is as expected, that 
is, the within-dimension variable correlations are generally higher than the correlations of 
variables between dimensions. However, there are a few exceptions: Degree centrality is highly 
correlated with not only Betweenness Centrality (β= 0.839) and Closeness Centrality (β= 0.698), 
it is also strongly correlated with Independent Directors (β= 0.797) and Political ties (β= 0.715). 
Similarly, Gender Diversity and Informal Hierarchy correlate with each other more strongly (β= 
0.425) than their respective measures in the proposed dimensions. Although simply examining 
the correlations between the indicator variables does not provide concrete information regarding 
the underlying relationships between the variables, they do offer some insights to understanding 
the outcomes of exploratory factor analysis, which is presented in the next section. In addition, 
the descriptive statistics reveal that boards in my sample have relatively low occupational 
diversity (mean= 0.288), educational diversity (mean= 0.164), and gender diversity 
(mean=0.063) when compared to existing literature with non-Chinese data, where mean 
occupational and educational diversity range from 0.2 to 0.5, and mean gender diversity range 
from 0.1 to 0.2 (Erhardt, Werbel, & Shrader, 2003; Jindal & Jaiswall, 2015; Stern & Westphal, 
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2010). 4,669 out of 56,256 director level panel observations are female (8.3% of the data); male 
directors hold on average 1.62 board memberships, female directors hold on average 3.41 board 
memberships; 8.2% of female directors have 5 board memberships (5 is the maximum allowed 
per individual), 1.6% male directors have 5 board memberships. The average number of directors 
per board is 12.0, and the average number of independent directors per board is 3.3. On average, 
3.7 directors per board have stock ownership, and 1.1 directors have political ties. 14.6% of 
board exhibit CEO duality and 12.2% of boards have controlling shareholder directors. The 
informal hierarchy of boards is represented by the Gini coefficients, where numbers closer to 0 
indicate perfect equality and numbers closer to 1 indicate perfect inequality, the mean score in 
my data is 0.297.  
 I also report the descriptive statistics and bivariate correlations for all variables included 
in all regression models (Table 7). The average firm size in my sample is 21.3; advisory 
committees meet 3.55 times annually, the average size of boards is 12.0, board members are on 
average 48.57 years old, and the average tenure for directors is 2.92 years (this number is low 
compared to other countries because the new government regulations on mandatory independent 
directors has caused a huge new wave of directors, which lowers the overall mean director 
tenure). Board compensation as a whole averages 14.04, which translates to RMB 1,255,280 or 
$189,292 before log transformation. The mean of firm size is 21.3, which is RMB 1.78 billion or 
$268million; the mean of ROA is 3 percent, the mean ROE is 2 percent, and the mean Tobin’s Q 
is 1.36. 53% of firms in my sample are categorized into the prospector strategic type. 
Construct Validity of Relational Pluralism 
A two-step process is used to obtain evidence of construct validity of relational pluralism. 
The first step is to identify the optimal factor structure using exploratory factor analysis 
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techniques. Doing so provides a theoretical understanding of how the twelve indicator variables 
group together to create multiple first order constructs within the instrument. Since no prior 
published studies have examined the construct validity of board relational pluralism, it is 
invaluable to begin with an exploration of the factor structure (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2013). The 
second step is to confirm the structure using confirmatory factor analysis methods. To assess the 
board relational pluralism construct validity through both exploratory factor analysis and 
confirmatory factor analysis, the matched sample of 1,172 firms over four years (2007-2010) is 
used. The complete sample is then split randomly into two using the SPSS 22 random selection 
technique (n = 586 in each sample). The first sample is randomly selected for the exploratory 
factor analysis procedure and the second is used for the confirmatory factor analysis procedure. 
The logic behind randomly splitting the sample for the two analyses is that a model is very likely 
to fit the data set it was created from better than any other random sample from the same 
population, therefore, to obtain an honest and unbiased test of how well a model fits the data, the 
confirmatory factor analysis should be conducted on a different sample than the exploratory 
factor analysis (Bollen, 1989). 
 
Exploratory Factor Analysis 
A review of the literature revealed a number of recommendations for determining 
adequate sample size when conducting an exploratory factor analysis. According to Comrey and 
Lee (1992), a guideline for ample sample size is as follows: 100 = poor, 200 = fair, 300 = good, 
500 = very good, and 1,000 or more = excellent. In addition, each variable involved in the 
analysis should have at least 20 cases (Hair, Anderson, Tatham, & Black, 1995), and it is 
important that some high loadings (>0.8) and communalities in the range of 0.5 are present in the 
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results (MacCallum, Widaman, Zhang, & Hong, 1999). The current study’s sample size (n = 
586) falls within the “very good” range on the assessment adequacy scale (Comrey & Lee, 
1992), and the subjects to items ratio is well above the 20:1 criteria (Costello & Osborne, 2009).  
Standard methods of performing factor analysis (typically based on a matrix of Pearson’s 
correlations) assume that all variables are continuous and that they follow a multivariate normal 
distribution. However, the current study includes variables that are categorical, if Pearson 
correlations are used in this case, the relationship between measures would be artificially 
restricted due to the restrictions put in place by categorization (Gilley & Uhlig, 1993), with 
Pearson correlations, these restrictions in assigning scores to subjects would lead to an 
underestimation of the association between observed variables, as well as a decrease in the factor 
weightings (DiStefano, 2002). In order to combat this issue, Jöreskog and Sörbom (1996) found 
that polychoric correlations are the more consistent and robust estimator, regardless of sample 
size and population correlation. Therefore, factor analysis in this study should utilize a 
polychoric correlation matrix, which can include variables that are binary, ordinal, or continuous 
(Holgado-Tello, Chacón, Barbero, & Vila, 2010). In Stata 13, I generate a matrix of polychoric 
correlations to use in exploratory factor analysis.  In addition to using a polychoric correlation, I 
further examine the factorability of the data by conducting the Kaiser Meyer Olkin (KMO) test 
(see table 2), which assesses the partial correlations among pairs of items. The the KMO test 
value is 0.719, which suggests the existence of some partial correlations, but the test result still 
falls within the range of a standard matrix for use in exploratory factor analysis (Kaiser, 1974; 
Tabachnick & Fidell, 2013). In addition, Bartlett’s test of sphericity is conducted to examine the 
null hypothesis that the item-level bivariate correlations are zero, the test results indicates that 
the matrix has nonzero bivariate correlations, χ2(59) = 7,474.565, p < 0.0001. The results of 
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these factorability tests suggest that it is feasible and appropriate to proceed with an exploratory 
factor analysis. 
An exploratory factor analysis is conducted using IBM SPSS AMOS Version 22. I use 
the principal component method with varimax rotation and identify an optimal five-factor 
solution that explains 70.489% of the variance in the items (see table 3). Item communalities are 
high, with the lowest communality value being the Informal Hierarchy indicator, which has a 
value of 0.715, all other items have communality values ranging from 0.781 to 0.962, which 
indicates that a large proportion of the variance in each item is explained by the five factor 
structure, the mean communality score is 0.851, which is larger than the suggested minimum of 
0.60 (Kaiser, 1974; William, Onsman, & Brown, 2010), in addition, all individual communality 
values are greater than the 0.60 benchmark. Component loadings are high and supports a five 
dimension model. Loadings lower than 0.40 are deleted, which leaves only one item with cross 
loading (see table 4). This suggests that board relational pluralism measures five first order latent 
constructs, instead of the four as proposed. I conduct the analyses year-wise for the four year 
period 2007-2010. Consistent and stable results across the years increased my confidence in the 
validity, reliability, and stability of the board relational pluralism construct. 
The results largely confirms my proposed first order latent variables for board relational 
pluralism, however, two of the indicator variables are extracted into a fifth dimension (Gender 
Diversity and Informal Hierarchy), where all other variables are loaded into hypothesized 
dimensions (see Figure 2 for the five-dimension model). Although Degree Centrality is shown to 
highly correlate with a number of variables outside of its proposed dimension as discussed 
earlier, all repeated year-wise analyses consistently exhibit the same component structure for the 
Connectedness dimension (Degree Centrality, Betweenness Centrality, and Closeness 
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Centrality) and the results of the principal component analysis are very encouraging. However, it 
is very interesting that a fifth dimension emerges in my analysis, one explanation for this is that 
the data in this study contains only Chinese firms, where there is a phenomenon that a small elite 
group of female directors who sit on multiple boards, which explains why the gender diversity 
and informal hierarchy variables have loaded into a separate dimension of their own. In China, 
there are many obstacles for women when it comes to obtaining board positions (Hewlett & 
Rashid, 2011), in addition, unlike a number of European countries, where there are legal gender 
quotas for board appointments (Ahern & Dittmar, 2012), Chinese firms do not pay much 
attention to board gender diversity (Süssmuth-Dyckerhoff, Wang, & Chen, 2012). Therefore, 
women who have successful obtained board positions are likely to standout and become 
successful in obtaining additional board positions. I further examine the data and find that female 
directors make up 8.3% of the data (4,669 out of 56,256 director level observations between 
2007 and 2010), and the average number of board membership of female directors is more than 
twice that of male directors (3.41 compared to 1.62), and the percentage of female directors who 
have four or five board seats (five being the maximum allowed per individual) is also drastically 
higher than male directors with four or five board seats (32.8% compared to 7.6%). This 
idiosyncrasy in the Chinese context could potentially explain the five dimensional model, 
compared to the four dimensional model proposed in this study based on existing theoretical and 
empirical evidence. 
Confirmatory Factor Analysis 
Although exploratory factor analysis is helpful in determining the dimensionality of the 
construct, it only provides a theoretical factor structure. Therefore, confirmatory factor analysis 
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methods must be used to validate the factor structure and provide additional evidence of 
construct validity (Fabrigar & Wegener, 2012). 
After extracting the components from the exploratory factor analysis, I conduct a second-
order confirmatory factor analysis using IBM SPSS AMOS 22. Confirmatory factor analysis 
enables hypothesis testing of the proposed factors because it explicitly tests both the overall 
qualities of the proposed model and the specific parameters composing the model. The first-order 
latent constructs obtained in the exploratory factor analysis are tested to define the second-order 
latent variable construct – relational pluralism. The operationalized measures for each 
dimensions are the indicator variables that measure the first-order latent constructs. I conduct 
multiple goodness of fit measures to determine the overall fit of the mode. Instead of the normal 
minimum fit function chi-square, I use the Satorra-Bentler scaled chi-square because it adjusts 
for the non-normality in the data. I also apply the normed fit index (NFI), goodness of fit index 
(GFI), and relative fit index (RFI). Goodness-of-fit indices ranging between 0.9 and 1.0 indicate 
good fit (See table 5). The next step in examining the results of the confirmatory factor analysis 
is to investigate the significance of the parameters of the specified paths (See figure 2). 
Significance tests for each paths’ parameters test the validity of the model specifications. All of 
the paths specified in my model are significant at p <0.01, these results provide good support for 
convergent validity. The paths of all first-order dimensions are significant in measuring the 
second-order latent construct – board relational pluralism. In addition, repeated analyses of all 
four years show consistent parameter estimates and good fit indices, this attests to the reliability 
of the proposed model. To address the alternative hypothesis that relational pluralism is three-
dimensional (Shipilov et al., 2014), as well as my own hypothesis for a four-dimensional model, 
I compare the three-dimensional and four-dimensional model fit with my five-dimensional 
79 
 
model fit, and the five-dimensional model consistently exhibits better results. Therefore, based 
on the results of both exploratory facto analysis and confirmatory factor analysis, hypothesis 1 
receives partial support. 
 
Predictive Validity of Relational Pluralism 
After testing for the construct validity for the five dimensions of board relational 
pluralism, I proceed to test for the model’s predictive validity, which involves testing the degree 
of correspondence of the construct with a particular criterion (Carmines & Zeller, 1979). My 
primary motivation for developing a multidimensional view of the board is to explore its effect 
on firm performance as well as its contingencies. As aforementioned, the effect that the 
dimensions of board relational pluralism have on firm performance are likely to be influenced by 
a firm’s strategy. Therefore, predictive validity for the multidimensional construct of board 
relational pluralism can be tested by showing that under particular strategic contexts, the 
different dimensions of the board relational pluralism construct have differential effects on firm 
performance.  
I include a panel sample consisting of 4,688 firm-year observations. In order to test my 
hypotheses longitudinally, I must first determine the appropriate regression model, I conduct the 
Hausman specification test in (Hausman, 1978), which compares an estimator that is known to 
be consistent with another estimator that is efficient under the assumption being tested. The null 
hypothesis is that there is no systematic differences between the two estimators. The result of the 
Hausman test rejects the null hypothesis, χ2 = 65.84, p < .0000; χ2 = 23.64, p < .0028; χ2 = 
55.97, p < .0000 for ROA, ROE, and Tobin’s Q, respectively (See Table 6), therefore, a fixed 
effects model is appropriate.  
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There are several advantages to using the fixed effects model. First, it addresses the issue 
of unobserved within firm heterogeneity by modeling each firm as a dummy variable in the 
regression equation (Greene, 2008). The firm dummies will act as a control for all other 
unknown firm specific and time invariant factors that may affect the dependent variable (Koka & 
Prescott, 2002), therefore, the estimated coefficients of the fixed effects model cannot be biased 
due to omitted time-invariant characteristics of the firm (Torres-Reyna, 2007). Second, this 
model addresses the issue of serially correlated errors that could have an impact on the study’s 
validity. In addition, fixed effects can ameliorate endogeneity concerns (Roberts & Whited, 
2012), where firm-specific intercepts are included and using longitudinal panel design eliminates 
the endogeneity due to unobserved heterogeneity (Baltagi, 2008; Wooldridge, 2006). Overall, the 
fixed effects panel model is a very conservative test. Furthermore, I confirm the causal 
relationship in my model by conducting the Granger causality test in STATA 13.0, where I reject 
the null hypothesis that coefficients of my independent variables are equal to 0 (Prob>F=0.0000), 
therefore establishing the causal relationship between dimensions of board relational pluralism 
and firm performance (Stock & Watson, 2007; Greene, 2008). 
Table 8 provides the results of the panel fixed effects regression analysis (with firm 
performance as the dependent variable: ROA, ROE, and Tobins’ Q). Tables 9, 10, and 11 
provide the regression results with firm strategy as a contingent variable. Models 4, 5, and 6 
show the results for the complete sample with ROA (R-squared = 0.0789, p < 0.0001; Change in 
R-squared = 0.0448, p < 0.0001), ROE (R-squared = 0.0280, p < 0.05; Change in R-squared = 
0.0136, p < 0.05), and Tobin’s Q (R-squared = 0.0610, p < 0.001; Change in R-squared = 
0.0252, p < 0.001) as dependent variable, respectively. For performance measure ROA, 
Connectedness (β = 0.0543, p < 0.0001), Skewedness (β = -0.1721, p < 0.0001), and Multiplexity 
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(β = 0.2292, p < 0.0001) are strongly significant in the hypothesized direction. Heterogeneity (β 
= -0.2711, p < 0.001), is significant in the opposite direction. For performance measure ROE, 
Connectedness (β = 0.0307, p < 0.01), Skewedness (β = -0.0876, p < 0.05), and Multiplexity (β = 
0.1107, p < 0.05) are significant in the hypothesized direction. Heterogeneity (β = -0.1476, p < 
0.001), is significant in the opposite direction. For performance measure Tobin’s Q, 
Connectedness (β = 0.0478, p < 0.0001), Skewedness (β = -0.1454, p < 0.0001), and Multiplexity 
(β = 0.1917, p < 0.0001) are strongly significant in the hypothesized direction. Heterogeneity (β 
= -0.1980, p < 0.01), once again, is significant in the opposite direction. The fifth dimension, 
Hierarchy, does not significantly predict any of the three performance measures. Therefore, the 
Connectedness, Multiplexity, and Skewedness dimensions of board relational pluralism 
significantly affect firm ROA and Tobin’s Q in the hypothesized direction. These dimensions 
also show significant, but weaker effects on ROE. Therefore, hypotheses 3, 4, and 5 receive 
strong support.  
Interestingly, the fifth dimension, which includes gender diversity and informal 
hierarchy, does not significantly predict any of the three performance variables. This is likely 
due to fact that higher levels of gender diversity combined with higher informal hierarchy 
captures information regarding a relatively small group of female directors that have multiple 
seats on multiple boards, which arguably represents the phenomenon of token female directors in 
boards (Burgess & Tharenou, 2002; Torchia, Calabrò, & Huse, 2011), where the same group of 
female directors are present in many boards to artificially inflate the demographic diversity of 
these boards (Singh & Vinnicombe, 2004), therefore, the true performance effects of these 
female directors are diluted. Research on corporate boardroom tokenism has shown that female 
directors with corporate experience are recruited to be highly visible members who at the same 
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time do not have a voice in the boardroom (Burgess & Tharenou, 2002), in addition, as tokens, 
female directors are often perceived negatively, and are not trusted by other board members 
(Torchia, Calabrò, & Huse, 2011). With increasing pressure to ensure stronger representation of 
women on corporate boards, the pressure for gender diversity complicates the process of female 
directors’ entry into the boardroom (Gregoric, Oxelheim, Randøy, & Thomsen, 2013), evidence 
suggests that even symbolic actions such as recruiting a single female director, can efficiently 
alleviate external pressure for organizational change (Chizema & Shinozawa, 2012; Davis, 
2005). As a result, female directors are not chosen on the same standard and motivation as their 
male counterparts, therefore, it is not surprising to see that this dimension of board relational 
pluralism does not have meaningful effects on firm performance. 
What’s also extremely interesting is that while 4 out of 5 dimensions of relational 
pluralism significantly predict firm performance (ROA and Tobin’s Q), the first dimension 
(heterogeneity) exhibits a significant relationship in the opposite direction from my hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 2 does not receive support in my predicted direction, but its consistently significant 
effects in the opposite direction cannot be ignored. Board heterogeneity and its indicators are 
arguably some of the most well studied board characteristics in the current literature, although 
there is a large number of studies that show individual board heterogeneity characteristics 
positive influence many firm outcomes, the results of my study has convinced me to dig deeper 
into the literature to find alternative explanations. It is possible that when both educational 
background diversity and occupational diversity are high in a boardroom, board members’ 
dissimilarity with each other and biases against each other’s backgrounds become more 
detrimental than beneficial. While prior research have shown that that some level of diversity in 
a boardroom is necessary for functionality and effectiveness, there could very well be “too 
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much” diversity in the boardroom and a board that does not enjoy educational and occupational 
diversity is in fact much more conducive to better performance. It is likely that the benefit of 
having a socially cohesive and compatible board outweighs the benefit of having diverse 
knowledge and viewpoints based on director background. Li and Hambrick’s (2005) study on 
factional groups and demographic dissimilarity shows that emotional conflict and board 
behavioral disintegration can be caused by vast differences in members’ background. Board 
diversity has also been linked to reduced group cohesion and increased member dissatisfaction 
(Dobbin & Jung, 2011). Considering research on social categorization theory, social identity 
theory, similarity-attraction theory and their application to the performance of board members 
also suggest that board rooms that are filled with directors who do not have educational or 
functional similarities with other are more likely to encounter conflict and misunderstandings 
(Bell, Villado, Lukasik, Belau, & Brigga, 2011; Harrison & Klein, 2007), which could ultimately 
lead to the failure of a board. In this study, the results suggest that board heterogeneity 
significantly and negatively affect all three measures of firm performance (ROA: β = -0.2711, p 
< 0.001; ROE: β = -0.1476, p < 0.05; Tobin’s Q: β = -0.1980, p < 0.01), in other words, 
homogenous boards are more likely to positively influence firm performance. 
Firm Strategy as Contingency  
To test the hypothesis that board relational pluralism’s effect on firm performance is 
largely contingent on the firm’s strategic context, where prospectors are much more likely to 
exhibit the proposed performance effects due to dimensions of relational pluralism than 
defenders, I conduct sub-sample analysis and examine the predictive effect of relational 
pluralism on prospectors versus defenders. Models 7 and 8 demonstrate results for prospector 
and defender firms in relation to ROA; models 9 and 10 are results for for ROE, and models 11 
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and 12 are results for Tobin’s Q. The results are shown in tables 9, 10, and 11. For ROA, 
Heterogeneity (β = -0.3698, p < 0.001), Connectedness (β = 0.0721, p < 0.001), Skewedness (β = 
-0.2259, p < 0.0001), and Multiplexity (β = 0.2712, p < 0.01) are strongly significant for 
prospector firms (R-squared: 0.0977, p < 0.0001; Change in R-squared: 0.0636, p < 0.0001); 
none of the dimensions of board relational pluralism are significant for defenders firms. For 
ROE, only Heterogeneity (β = -0.4879, p < 0.05) is significant for prospector firms (R-squared: 
0.0420, p < 0.05; Change in R-squared: 0.0276, p < 0.05); none of the dimensions of board 
relational pluralism are significant for defenders firms. For Tobin’s Q, Heterogeneity (β = -
0.3077, p < 0.05), Connectedness (β = 0.0590, p < 0.01), Skewedness (β = -0.1954, p < 0.001), 
and Multiplexity (β = 0.2940, p < 0.001) are significant for prospector firms (R-squared: 0.0925, 
p < 0.001; Change in R-squared: 0.0567, p < 0.001); none of the dimensions of board relational 
pluralism are significant for defenders firms. The fifth dimension Hierarchy is not a significant 
predictor for any of the performance measures for neither prospector firms nor defender firms. 
Overall, the results show strong evidence that there are significant differences between 
prospector firms and defender firms for the effect of different dimensions of relational pluralism 
on firm performance. For prospector firms, when compared to defender firms, the dimensions 
Heterogeneity, Connectedness, Multiplexity, and Skewedness more significantly affect 
performance (Connectedness, Multiplexity, and Skewedness, in the hypothesized direction; 
Heterogeneity, in the opposite direction). What’s shocking is that none of the five dimensions of 
relational pluralism predict performance outcomes for defender firms. These results are largely 
in line with hypothesis 6, however, the degree to which defender firms are less affected by 
relational pluralism is more severe than expected. In other words, not only do four out of five 
dimensions of relational pluralism impact prospector firms’ performance more than that of 
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defender firms, the results provide very strong evidence that relational pluralism only affect 
prospector firms’ performance. Hypothesis 6 receives strong support. 
Another interesting phenomenon observed in my results is relational pluralism’s weak to 
non-existence effect on ROE. This finding is understandable considering ROE as a performance 
measure is surrounded by scrutiny and uncertainty. A firm’s reported ROE is very susceptible to 
financial manipulation (e.g., debt leverage, taxes, interest, one-time charges). Many argue that 
ROE is easy to tamper with to give inflated or falsely presented information to investors, it is 
also quite vulnerable to short-term gaming (Shift Index, 2013) (i.e. Dell’s ROE has been well 
above Apple’s for many years of the past decade). Nonetheless, my results indicate that the 
dimensions of board relational pluralism do not consistently nor confidently predict a firm’s 
ROE. Overall, my results provide support for my hypothesis and establish predictive validity of 
the board relational pluralism construct. The results also confirms the contingent nature of the 
dimensions of relational pluralism. 
The R-squares observed in this study are low (ROA: 0.0341 – 0.0977; ROE: 0.0144 – 
0.042; Tobin’s Q: 0.0358 – 0.0745) according to common standards of effect size assessment 
(Cohen, 1977), however, meaningful interpretation requires the comparison between effects 
observed and measures used in strategy research. In a comprehensive analysis of 200 predictors 
of firm performance, only one set of predictor variables accounted for more than 10 per cent of 
the variance in financial performance (R&D, 10.7%), while most other aggregated predictors 
explained 1% to 5% of performance variance (Capon, Farley, & Hoenig, 1990). A meta-analysis 
(228 studies) on the relationship between performance and board composition/board leadership 
structure found that the effect sizes ranged from 0.01 to 0.11, the average percentage of variance 
explained across board characteristics is around 1% (Dalton et al., 1998). Another meta-analysis 
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on board structure (22 studies) observed effect sizes between 0.01 and 0.12 (Rhoades et al., 
2001). Interestingly, a meta-analysis that focused on Asian boards (86 studies) found effect sizes 
similar to their US counterparts, ranging from 0.01 to 0.24 (van Essen et al., 2012). The effect 
sizes in my study range between 0.01 and 0.13, which is consistent with existing literature. 
Although the individual models in this study at best explains 9.77% of the variance in 
performance, and the highest change in variance explained is 6.36% (i.e. change in r-squared due 
to adding the relational pluralism dimensions), considering the generally small to modest effects 
of board level variables have on performance and the substantially large number of factors that 
have been shown to affect performance, the findings in this study are still worth noting.  
 
Endogeneity Tests 
 Empirical corporate governance research, which often attempts to explain the causal 
effects of boards on performance, sometimes has serious issues with endogeneity. It is usually 
difficult to find exogenous factors or natural experiments with which to examine the 
relationships proposed. Works that do not adequately address potential endogeneity issues can 
have severe implications for their usefulness because “endogeneity leads to biased and 
inconsistent parameter estimates that make reliable inference virtually impossible (Roberts & 
Whited, 2011)”. I test the reverse causality between all five relational pluralism dimensions and 
three performance measures with fixed effects panel model. None of the three performance 
measures are significant at t-0, t-1, or t-2. The results provide strong evidence that suggests 
endogeneity is not an issue in the current study. The only significant predictor of any relational 
pluralism dimensions (in this case Connectedness and Multiplexity) is one of the control 
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variables, board compensation, at t-1. This is to be expected because boards that are 
compensated well are more appealing to board members that are viewed as more valuable. For 
Connectedness, directors with more advantageous interlocking network positions are more likely 
to sit on boards that pay well; while for Multiplexity, higher pay can attract directors with 
political affiliations and more independent directors. The predictive relationship between 
compensation and these two dimensions of relational pluralism is especially salient in the 
Chinese context, because government regulations limit the maximum directorships per director, 
valuable directors who are well-connected and politically affiliated can be viewed as a scarce 
resource in China. In addition, new regulations mandate that all listed Chinese firms must 
include independent directors (China Securities Regulatory Commission, 2004), in combination 
with the limitation of maximum board membership, qualified independent directors are also in 
high demand. Therefore, higher board compensation is a common way for firms to recruit 
directors with characteristics that are captured in the Connectedness and Multiplexity dimensions 
of my relational pluralism model, hence the significant relationship observed in the reverse-
causality test.  
Post Hoc Analyses 
Curvilinear Relationship 
 While 4 out of 5 dimensions of relational pluralism significantly predict firm 
performance (ROA and Tobin’s Q) in my study, the first dimension (heterogeneity) exhibits a 
significant relationship in the opposite direction from my hypothesis. This puzzling finding has 
triggered my curiosity to examine a potentially curvilinear relationship between relational 
pluralism heterogeneity and firm performance. Perhaps board heterogeneity positively affects 
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performance only to a certain extent and too much diversity can hurt performance. Therefore, it 
is possible that the relationship between heterogeneity and performance is bell shaped and not 
linear. I conduct year-wise quadratic curve estimation regressions on heterogeneity and all three 
performance measures to examine the goodness of fit and significance of the curvilinear models 
after creating and centering the quadratic term (See Table 12), in addition, I examine the curve-
fit plots to inspect the nature of the curvilinear relationship. Although all main terms 
(heterogeneity) are positive while the quadratic term (heterogeneity^2) are negative, which 
provides strong support for a bell shaped curve as expected, none of the quadratic terms in the 
analyses are significant. The results do not provide enough evidence to support a curvilinear 
relationship, however, the consistent bell shaped curves in each analysis provides some support 
to justify and motivate future research on this relationship. 
SOE and Firm Strategy 
The control variable SOE is significant in models 1 to 6, which leads to some suspicion 
that SOE could confound the interaction results if more defender firms are state-owned and the 
main driver of the observed effect is SOE and not firm strategy. I examine the correlation 
between SOE and Firm Strategy (r = -0.0088, p < 0.068) and determine that although SOE and 
Firm Strategy are negatively correlated (i.e. state-owned firms are less likely to be prospectors), 
the relationship is not statistically significant. This alleviates the concern that results on defender 
firms are caused by state ownership. In the past decade, China has put considerable efforts into 
corporate privatization and decentralization to keep up with other market economies (Wong, 
2016), and many regulatory changes have been implemented to limit the control of 
government ownership and to protect the interests of minority shareholders (Berkman, Cole, 
& Fu, 2011). While SOEs are acting more and more like private firms, a large number of 
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SOEs have been transformed into private firms (Fan et al., 2013). These reforms in 
privatization and a shift in SOE behaviors can explain the phenomenon that SOEs are not 
more likely to be defenders than other firms. I further test SOE as a potential moderator (see 
Table 13), but none of the five interaction terms are significant predictors of any of the three firm 
performance measures at p < 0.01. The only significant interaction term is SOE*Connectedness 
(β = 0.0718, p < 0.05) for Tobin’s Q, which means that state ownership positively moderates the 
effect of Connectedness on a firm’s market performance, Tobin’s Q; in other words, directors’ 
advantageous interlock network positions are more likely to benefit a firm’s market performance 
when the firm is state-owned. 
Firm Strategy Sub-sample t-tests 
 To further confirm the interpretations of the sub-sample analysis in the firm strategy 
contingency model, I first conduct two-sample t-tests with unequal variances for all three 
dependent measures of firm performance and state ownership between prospectors and defender 
in order to shed light on any systematic differences between the two sub-samples that may 
confound my results (see Table 14). For ROA (t-value = 0.6410, p = 0.5216), ROE (t-value = 
0.2086, p = 0.8347), Tobin’s Q (t-value = 0.9750, p = 0.3296), and SOE (t-value = 0.3994, p = 
0.6896), prospector firms and defender firms do not exhibit significant differences in terms of 
performance. The results of the two-sample t-tests reveal no significant differences between the 
sub-samples for none of the three dependent variables, therefore, I fail to reject the null 
hypothesis that the two sub-samples have the same performance means and state ownership 
characteristics. In other words, there is no evidence that suggests the two sub-samples are 
different. To further confirm my findings in the sub-sample analysis, I test the null hypothesis 
that the coefficients of relational pluralism are the same between prospectors and defenders. I use 
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the suest postestimation command in STATA to compare the coefficients of my sub-sample 
analysis models. The results show significant differences between for all models (ROA: Chi-
squared: 3945.01, p < 0.000; ROE: Chi-squared: 2870.19, p = 0.000; Tobin’s Q: Chi-squared: 
3719.68, p = 0.000), therefore, I reject the null hypothesis that the coefficients of relational 
pluralism are the same in my sub-sample analysis between prospectors and defenders. My 
interpretation of my findings for the test for firm strategy as a contingency variable remains the 
same. 
Firm Strategy as Moderator in addition to Sub-sample Analysis 
 In addition to the sub-sample analysis of prospector and defender firms, I examine firm 
strategy as a moderator in my complete sample, results are displayed in models 13, 14, and 15 
(see Table 15). For performance measure ROA, the interaction terms Firm Strategy * 
Heterogeneity (β = -0.0782, p < 0.01), Firm Strategy * Connectedness (β = 0.1138, p < 0.001), 
Firm Strategy * Skewedness (β = -0.0307, p < 0.01), and Firm Strategy * Multiplexity (β = -
0.0647, p < 0.05) are significant in the direction consistent with findings in the sub-sample 
analysis. For performance measure Tobin’s Q, the interaction terms Firm Strategy * 
Heterogeneity (β = -0.0309, p < 0.001), Firm Strategy * Connectedness (β = 0.0845, p < 0.001), 
Firm Strategy * Skewedness (β = -0.0279, p < 0.01), and Firm Strategy * Multiplexity (β = -
0.0294, p < 0.05) are significant in the direction consistent with findings in the sub-sample 
analysis. For ROE, none of the five interaction terms are significant, also the interaction term 
Firm Strategy * Hierarchy is not significant in any of the three models. The results suggest that 
firm strategy significantly positively moderates the effects of Heterogeneity, Connectedness, 
Skewedness, and Multiplexity on ROA and Tobin’s Q, in other words, prospector firms enjoy the 
performance benefits of board relational pluralism much more than defender firms. One 
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interesting observation is that firm strategy does not significantly predict performance in 
isolation, this finding is consistent with prior research that have linked firm strategy directly to 
performance (Hambrick, 1983; Kabanoff & Brown, 2008; Sarac, Ertan, & Yucel, 2014), which 
further strengthens the argument that many factors can influence the performance outcomes of 
different strategic types (Desarbo et al., 2005; Zahra & Pearce, 1990), in this case, board 
relational pluralism.   
Female Directors and Informal Hierarchy 
The emergence of an additional dimension outside of my proposed model is surprising 
but very interesting. The fifth dimension, which consists of Gender Diversity and Informal 
Hierarchy warrants a closer examination of the interaction between female directors and board 
membership in my data. I suspect that female directors, albeit small in number (8.3% of whole 
sample), have a high number of board membership when compared to their male counterparts, 
which explains why the gender diversity and informal hierarchy variables have loaded into a 
separate dimension of their own. In my data, 4,669 out of 56,256 director level observations 
(between 2007 and 2010) are female, the average number of board membership of female 
directors is more than twice that of male directors (3.41 compared to 1.62), and the percentage of 
female directors who have four or five board seats (five being the maximum allowed per 
individual2) is considerably higher than male directors with four or five board seats (32.8% 
compared to 7.6%). This idiosyncrasy in the Chinese context could potentially explain the five 
dimensional model, compared to the four dimensional model proposed in this study based on 
existing theoretical and empirical evidence. This observation also suggests that the fifth 
                                                          
2 Compared to male directors, there is also a higher percentage of female directors who occupy the maximum of 5 
seats. In my sample, 8.2% of females (compared to 1.6% of males) have 5 board memberships. 
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dimension is uniquely salient in the Chinese context due to the phenomenon of token elite female 
directors, therefore, it is not unreasonable to assume that my proposed four dimensional model 
remains theoretically sound, but may not be completely appropriate or accurate when empirically 
tested in this context. 
 
CHAPTER VII 
DISCUSSION 
Theoretical Implications 
Applying a relational perspective to the board-performance literature answers the call 
for research in integrating research under agency, resource dependence, and upper echelons 
theory, as well as promoting the development of a social theory of agency. This paper also 
contributes to building comprehensive models of board dynamics by integrating literatures in 
social capital, power relations, and interest alignment. Furthermore, my paper captures 
important latent characteristics of the board that are traditionally studied in isolation and 
provides a unifying framework that pieces together relevant dimensions of the board in 
accordance to the call for interdisciplinary and integrative research. 
First of all, my study contributes to the emerging literature on relational pluralism by 
establishing the construct validity of relational pluralism in board of directors. I argue that 
the relational pluralism framework proposed and tested in this study represents a reliable way 
to capture the uniqueness of each board. Building upon the perspective that individuals, 
teams, and organizations derive their distinctiveness from relations with other entities 
(Shipilov et al., 2014), I use this relational perspective to reveal neglected or overlooked 
aspects (i.e. board power dynamics, hierarchy, incentive alignment, etc.) of how boards 
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utilize social interactions and how they navigate through social systems that inevitably play a 
part in their effectiveness. By shifting towards a relational approach, we can gain insights on 
new pathways for research in the governance literature (Gulati et al., 2010; Kilduff et al., & 
Krackhardt, 2008; Shipilov et al., 2014). In addition to providing empirical evidence to 
support the existence and validity of the relational pluralism framework, this paper examines 
the relational pluralism model in the corporate governance context extensively. Multiple 
facets of director characteristics, ties, identities, power relations, and interlocking directorate 
networks are observed and aggregated on the board level to represent their focal firms. 
Unlike prior studies that mainly emphasize on board structure and observable board 
characteristics, this paper extends the scope of the current literature by not only examining 
variables that have been well supported, but also supplementing current knowledge with 
latent relational dimensions illuminated by the relational pluralism framework. In addition to 
demonstrating the relevance and applicability of the framework, I tailor it specifically for the 
board to more accurately define the relational pluralism of the board. The results of the 
exploratory factor analysis and confirmatory factor analysis not only expands the existing 
understanding of relational pluralism, they also provide encouraging foundations for the 
current study as well as motivating future studies to continue developing and examining the 
board relational pluralism framework. My study paves the way for the corporate governance 
literature to greatly benefit from adopting a relational lens, which supplements and 
strengthens existing theoretical approaches. 
It is worth noting that in this paper, I propose a four dimensional board relational 
pluralism model based on robust theoretical evidence in the existing literature, however, a five 
dimensional model emerges from my construct validity analyses. The existence of a fifth 
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dimension is very interesting to say the least, I argue that the mismatch between my theoretical 
model and my empirical results can be due to two possible reasons. One reason is that the board 
relational pluralism framework truly consists of five latent dimensions, and the theoretical 
justification based on existing evidence for four dimensions does not represent the reality and 
true nature of board relational pluralism. Therefore, the theoretical development of the four 
dimensional model needs to be reexamined and modified to reflect the five dimensional model. 
On the other hand, a different explanation for the fifth dimension is that the empirical setting of 
this study plays a huge role, due to idiosyncrasies that exist only in this set of data, the proposed 
four dimensional model is not accurately tested, which leads to the emergence of an extra 
dimension. As discussed in my post hoc analyses section, this study contains only Chinese firms, 
and there is a phenomenon that a small elite group of female directors obtain more board 
memberships per person than their male counterparts. Women who have successful obtained 
board positions in China are likely to standout and become successful in obtaining additional 
board positions. Although female directors make up only 8.3% of the data3 (4,669 out of 56,256 
director level observations between 2007 and 2010), the average number of board membership of 
female directors is more than twice that of male directors (3.41 compared to 1.62), and the 
percentage of female directors who have four or five board seats (five being the maximum 
allowed per individual) is also drastically higher than male directors with four or five board seats 
(32.8% compared to 7.6%). There is no evidence in current literature that would suggest that this 
phenomenon, especially the severity of this phenomenon, is common anywhere else. Therefore, 
it is reasonable to assume that this is unique to the Chinese context, which explains why the 
Gender Diversity and Informal Hierarchy variables have loaded into a separate dimension of 
                                                          
3 8.3% is relatively low compared to US female board membership of 15.7% in 2010, and 35.5% in Scandinavian 
countries 
95 
 
their own in the EFA step of my empirical tests – empirically, the interaction of these two 
variables are to be expected, even if there is no theoretical support for the existence of this 
dimension based on literature that contribute to board relational pluralism. Based on this 
information, it is likely that the explanation for the mismatch between the proposed four 
dimensional model and the empirically validated five dimensional model can be attributed to the 
idiosyncrasies in the data, and is not due to a misrepresentation during theory development or a 
true five dimensional model. 
In addition to developing the multi-dimensional relational pluralism model, this study 
makes significant contribution to the board-performance linkage literature by examining the 
performance implications of the model. One of the main reasons for developing a 
multidimensional view of board relational pluralism is to explore its effect on firm 
performance. While large systematic studies have failed to produce any consistent evidence 
to show direct linkage between single characteristics of board composition and board 
structures (Dalton et al., 1998; van Essen et al., 2012), my study can potentially guide future 
research toward a more fruitful path.  
Although there has been a call for research on the outcomes of relational pluralism 
(Gulati et al., 2010) to potentially expand and enhance the board-performance literature, no 
existing paper has a dedicated relational pluralism model specifically made for the corporate 
governance literature with a focus on predicting firm level performance. Therefore, in 
addition to establishing the multidimensional model of board relational pluralism and 
identifying key concepts for each dimension, my study also provides great insights on the 
model’s consequences by focusing on the prediction of relationships between each of the 
four dimensions and firm performance. Board characteristics in existing literature that fall 
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under each dimension of the relational pluralism framework are often linked directly to 
performance. By predicting firm performance with the first order latent variables instead of 
the indicator variables, I demonstrate that the indicators are just small pieces of the puzzle, 
contrary to popular belief, they are not enough on their own to answer the questions 
regarding board-performance linkage. Specifically, my study shows that a firm’s board has 
differentiated effects on firm performance outcomes in terms of five dimensions, where four 
(originally proposed) out of the five dimensions are found to significantly affect firm 
performance (ROA and Tobin’s Q). Therefore, by developing and introducing the relational 
pluralism framework and testing it with longitudinal and comprehensive data, this paper 
provides theoretical and empirical contributions to the board-performance literature. 
Furthermore, as noted by many some scholars (Dalton et al., 1998; Dalton et al., 
1999; Rhoades et al., 2001; Larcker et al., 2013; Westphal & Zajac, 2013), the board and 
firm performance relationship is inevitably affected by the firm’s strategic behavior, the 
organizational context dictates the governance choices of organizations, which could directly 
influence boards’ ability to affect firm performance. Applying the relational pluralism model 
to the board-performance literature necessarily leads to the consideration concerning the 
strategic contexts under which the firms operate. My study successfully demonstrates the 
contingent nature of board relational pluralism, and exhibits that four out of the five 
relational pluralism dimensions have differential effects on firm performance (ROA and 
Tobin’s Q) under different strategic contexts.  
In addition, not only does relational pluralism impact prospector firms’ performance 
more than that of defender firms, my results provide strong evidence that relational pluralism do 
not have influence defender firms much at all. This observation motivates the consideration for 
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other potential moderators. In particular, firms in different industries are likely to have 
differentiated performance effect for relational pluralism. I suspect that firms in industries that 
place more emphasis on R&D and risk taking (e.g., electronics, instruments, information 
technologies, etc.) and industries that in general have more prospectors will benefit more from 
board relational pluralism.  
 
Managerial Implications 
This study also has managerial implications in that the board relational pluralism 
framework can potentially serve as a guideline to help firms, especially prospector firms, 
with decisions regarding board member appointments, retention, and perhaps even removal. 
By using the board relational pluralism framework proposed and tested in this study as a 
reference, firms are more likely to make board composition decisions in an informed way to 
maximize the performance benefits that directors can bring to the firm.  
In particular, having both educational and functional background diversity in the 
boardroom is not beneficial to firm performance as previously expected (see Models 4-6, 
Table 8). Although there is some evidence to suggest a bell shaped relationship between 
board diversity and performance, in other words, diversity perhaps positively affects 
performance up to a certain point before the effect becomes negative, the findings in this 
study strongly suggests that having diverse boards harms performance. If the impact of board 
diversity on corporate performance is negative, as shown in this study, and requires 
implementation costs, such as hiring directors for the sake of increasing diversity (Gregoric et 
al., 2013), transaction cost of managing diverse boards (Deon, Carbado, & Gulati, 2003), 
adjusting to diverse perspectives and dealing with higher levels of miscommunication (Li & 
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Hambrick, 2005), then managers must question the notion that more diversity is better for the 
board. When the performance effects of board diversity are unclear, should shareholders 
sustain the costs of inducing greater board diversity? According to the findings of this study, 
having board members who are very different from each other will hurt both accounting (i.e. 
reducing the growth rate of ROA by 27.11% and ROE by 14.76%) and market performance 
(i.e. reducing the Tobin’ Q ratio by 19.8%), therefore, two potential managerial decisions can 
address this problem: on one hand, board members’ educational and occupational 
background should be relatively homogeneous, since complete homogeneity is almost 
impossible (e.g. Chinese public boards must have at least one independent director with 
accounting background), it is important to minimize the likelihood of within board sub-group 
formations4. On the other hand, boards can attempt to promote social cohesion and minimize 
conflict between diverse members. This method can alleviate the negative outcomes of board 
diversity while maintaining the potential benefits of diversity. However, it is uncertain what 
is required to successfully encourage social cohesion amongst diverse board members in a 
cost effective way, so cost-benefit analyses are needed to determine the optimal plans of 
future action in this case.  
Well connected firms, on the other, are shown to reap performance benefits (see 
Models 4-6, Table 8). A board’s connectedness, or its collective social capital, can be 
manipulated by selecting directors based on their interlock network positions. A director’s 
social and economic networks serve as conduits for interpersonal and interorganizational 
support, influence, and information flow (Larcker, So, & Wang, 2013), therefore, it is crucial 
                                                          
4 For example, in a board of 9 directors, if 3 are accountants, 3 are engineers, and 3 are lawyers, this board will 
exhibit very high functional background diversity and it is likely that there will be three sub-groups within this 
board based on directors’ backgrounds. 
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for firms to find directors who have advantageous and strong social networks. Although it is 
likely that directors’ networks extend beyond those associated with formal board 
appointments and are influenced by informal social connections, it is important to note that 
formal and informal networks are positively correlated and can be complementary (Hwang & 
Kim, 2012; Westphal, Boivie, Chng, & Han, 2006). Board members’ formal or professional 
ties, in this case, interlocking ties, are a perfect way for firms to identify valuable directors 
because these ties are visible and quantifiable. Boards with well-connected directors enjoy 
central positions within the interlock network, which can lead to more opportunities to gather 
information and participate in resource exchange; well-connected boards also exhibit 
closeness of ties to outside boards, from which they can attain more direct access to 
beneficial resources; and finally, well-connected boards occupy interlock positions that are in 
between more pairs of outside board, which makes it more important as an information 
broker. The findings of this study, demonstrate that board connectedness can improve the 
growth of ROA by 5.43%, ROE by 3.07%, and Tobin’s Q by 4.78% , which supports the 
notion that well-connected firms outperform firms with less connected boards, can be used to 
guide firms in using a director’s connectedness as one of the criteria or references for 
selection and retention. 
My study also demonstrate that firms with boards that exhibit high levels of 
multiplexity performance better (see Models 4-6, Table 8). Directors serving on the same 
board often share a common network through the formal appointment to the board, but some 
directors hold multiple identities and additional relationships outside of the board that can 
benefit firm outcomes. In particular, the results of my study show that multiplex boards 
improve the growth of ROA by 22.92%, ROE by 11.07%, and Tobin’s Q by 19.17%. Firm 
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can potentially benefit via maintaining a high number of outside directors on their boards to 
protect the separation of ownership and control (Jensen & Mecklin, 1976) and to represent 
the interests of large shareholders (Qu, Wu, & Zhang, 2000; Peng, 2004; Ramaswamy, Li, & 
Veliyath, 2002). Boards should also seek out directors who are politically connected to 
reduce environmental and institutional uncertainty (Hillman, 2005; Lang & Lockhart, 1990) 
and get access to financial resources at more favorable and convenient conditions (Faccio, 
2010). In addition, firms should always give directors stock options as part of their 
compensation in order to maximize directors’ incentives to provide effective monitoring and 
oversight of important corporate decisions (Bhagat & Bolton, 2014).  
Furthermore, firms can also make more informed decisions about the composition of 
their boards by examining the distribution of power and influence amongst board members. 
When the board grants certain individuals significantly more decision power than others, the 
power balance is disturbed, which decreases the likelihood that the board can successfully 
accomplish its advisory and monitoring responsibilities. Power imbalance is extremely 
detrimental to group effectiveness and commitment because it can lead to workplace bullying 
and aggression (Hoel, Einarsen, & Cooper, 2003; Keashly & Jagatic, 2003). The findings of 
this study provides strong evidence that boards with high skewedness suffer performance 
consequences such as a decrease in growth of ROA by 17.21%, ROE by 8.76%, and Tobin’s 
Q by 14.54% (see Models 4-6, Table 8). Firms can decrease their boards’ skewedness by 
eliminating CEO duality and put forth measures to suppress the board presence of controlling 
shareholder directors.  
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Limitations and Future Research  
Corporate governance institutions in emerging economies such as China have come 
very far in terms of reforming under Anglo-American standards over the past two decades. 
However, certain aspects of the Chinese corporate governance are still not developed to the 
same degree as in the US (Heugens, van Essen, & van Oosterhout, 2009), and there are still 
some differences between Chinese and US boards, as well as differences in the institutional 
environment in which they operate in.  
The China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) implemented "The Guidance 
for Establishing Independent Director Institution in Listed Companies” in 2002. The 
regulation requires public companies to hire independent directors to safeguard the interests 
of the company and the interests of public shareholders . A revision of China’s Company Law 
in October 2005 has made the independent director requirement a legal necessity. As a result, a 
majority of companies were pressured to acquire experienced directors from other companies 
as independent directors to fill the quota. Therefore, interlocking networks have grown at a 
tremendous rate over a short period of time, and the formation of these networks have not 
been as organic as those built by US boards over a much longer period of time. This 
phenomenon can potentially weaken the relationship between board Connectedness and 
performance in the current study, in other words, conducting this study in the US context is 
likely to yield stronger results. However, the regulation has been in place in China for 
several years, and the motivation and benefits for forming interlocking networks in Chinese 
boards are shown to be aligned with those of US firms (Markóczy, Sun, Peng, Shi, & Ren, 
2013). Nevertheless, the relationship between Connectedness and performance (ROA and 
Tobin’s Q) exhibited in this study are consistently positive and strong, which provides 
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evidence to support the notion that board interlocks and board network position advantages 
positively affect performance in the Chinese context. Future research should reexamine the 
performance effect of board Connectedness in other contexts to compare the findings with 
the findings of this study. In addition, future research can examine the relationship between 
Connectedness and performance in the Chinese context over a longer period of time to 
examine whether or not the effect becomes stronger. In doing so, future research will be able 
to replicate the findings of this study and provide evidence to either support or challenge the 
idea that benefits for forming interlocking networks in Chinese boards are consistent wi th 
those of US firms. Another direction for future research is including data on informal 
network capital of Chinese boards to more fully represent the Connectedness dimension. The 
corporate governance environment in China are more relationship-based than rule-based, 
therefore, directors’ informal networks such as personal contacts, family members, business 
partners, coworkers in other firms, and personal friendships, etc., can also be extremely 
important in affecting the performance benefits that directors bring to their firms.  
 Another difference lies within board composition. Chinese boards, very much like US 
boards, consist of inside directors, who are current executives within the firm, and outside 
directors, who are non-management members (Peng, 2004). Unlike US boards, Chinese 
boards further categorize outside directors into two groups: (1) independent directors and (2) 
shareholder directors, who sit on the board on behalf of major shareholders. In the US, 
although major shareholders may be active participants in choosing independent directors, 
the chosen independent directors are usually not directly affiliated with the shareholder. In 
China, shareholder directors must be part of the institute of shareholders and are handpicked 
to be advocates and representatives for shareholder interests. The existence of this distinct 
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group of outside directors can potentially strengthen the relationship between board 
Multiplexity and performance because having shareholder directors in the outside director 
group makes the board more likely to effectively perform its monitoring function by 
lessening agency problems (Westphal & Zajac, 2013). Therefore, the effect observed in this 
study may be greater than that of a US study. Future studies can separate the two groups of 
outside directors and examine the potential moderating effect of outside director type on the 
performance effect of Multiplexity. 
 Chinese firms also differ from US firms in terms of compensation structure. While 
most US firms use the one size fits all models and pay their independent directors equally in 
the form of an annual retainer and stock options, Chinese directors on the same board can 
receive different types and varying amounts of compensation, and stock option payment is 
not nearly as common as in the US. One major reason for having variance in director 
compensation in China is the fact that experienced directors in China are highly demanded. 
The Chinese government restricts the maximum number of board that each director can sit on 
to five. This limitation alongside the independent director requirement greatly increased the 
demand for experienced directors. Furthermore, the number of Chinese firms that have gone 
public has almost doubled over the past decade (Ernst & Young Global IPO trends, 2012), 
which makes qualified directors even more desirable. The five-board per director limit could 
lead to the creation of “shadow directors”, where certain individuals performance all 
functions of a director and are compensated accordingly, but do not appear on public records. 
This could be a potential problem to the current study, especially the Multiplexity dimension 
of board relational pluralism, because these hidden directors and their information are not 
available to be analyzed, and the independent director representation variable could be 
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inaccurately reported. Along the same line of thought, directors with significant political 
connections may actively seek to avoid official affiliations with firms. These directors are 
often extremely valuable, but they are hidden from publically available data, which could 
affect the political ties variable. The shadow director phenomenon will especially be 
problematic in the Chinese context after 2011 due to new laws that forbid university 
educators and government officials from getting additional paychecks outside of their 
primary jobs. Overall, it is likely that the predictive power of the Multiplexity dimension is 
suppressed and weakened in the Chinese setting. Future relational pluralism studies, 
especially those that use Chinese data after year 2011 should be cognizant of this potential 
issue, in addition, future studies should examine the board relational pluralism model in non-
public firms, as well as other institutional contexts, to lessen issues regarding shadow 
directors and shed light on its generalizability. 
Another important contextual difference is that it is especially difficult for women to 
become directors in China (Hewlett & Rashid, 2011). Female directors are relatively rare and are 
often highly visible. Therefore, women who have successful obtained board positions are likely 
to be viewed as a scarce resource and therefore have a much easier time in obtaining additional 
board positions. This idiosyncrasy in the Chinese context likely provides the explanation for the 
empirical results of a five dimensional model, compared to the four dimensional model proposed 
in this study. As abovementioned, the five dimensional model may not apply in a non-Chinese 
context. Future studies need to reexamine the number of dimensions that are valid in this model 
in other contexts as well as reexamining the construct validity of the board relational 
pluralism framework. Based on existing literature, which are largely based on US and 
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European data, a four dimensional model, as originally proposed in this study, is likely to be 
more fitting.  
In addition the racial demographics of China and US are quite different. One of the 
major board demographics characteristics that have been examined in the existing literature 
is board racial diversity (Carter et al., 2003; Erhardt et al. , 2003). However, the 
overwhelming majority of Chinese public companies do not have any non-Chinese directors. 
Therefore, it is impossible to examine the effect of board racial diversity on performance in 
this study. Future studies that use the relational pluralism framework to examine board-
performance linkage should include racial diversity in the board heterogeneity dimension if 
possible. 
Another interesting finding that can potentially motivate a new stream of research is 
the unexpected results for Hypothesis 2 regarding board Heterogeneity and its consistently 
significant negative impact on firm performance. Theoretically and empirically, board 
diversity is an aspect of the board that has received rigorous investigation in the corporate 
governance literature (Cannella, Park, & Lee, 2008; Carpenter, Geletkanycz & Sanders, 
2004; Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1996). Studies have shown that heterogeneous boards are 
more likely to have effective problem solving, increased creativity, and a better 
understanding of the market (Cannella, Park, & Lee, 2008; Carter, Simkins, & Simpson, 
2003), and provide novel insights and perspectives that lead to improved organizational 
value (Carter et al., 2003; Coffey & Wang, 1998). However, social psychological 
perspectives have suggested that heterogeneity in a group can lead to a low degree of social 
integration and difficulties in communications (Hambrick, Cho, and Chen, 1996; Michel and 
Hambrick, 1992; Smith et al., 1994; Westphal and Bednar, 2005). Perhaps, the findings in 
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my study regarding board heterogeneity can be explained by taking on an interdisciplinary 
approach. In a recent study, board heterogeneity reduces effective communications among 
directors and exacerbates group polarization bias (Zhu, 2013). While prevailing perspectives 
on corporate governance often emphasize the benefits of diverse boards’ influence on 
strategic decisions (Cannella, Park, & Lee, 2008; Hambrick & Mason, 1984), the theory and 
findings from Zhu’s (2013) study suggest that board diversity can also add certain group 
decision-making biases to strategic decisions and become detrimental to firm outcomes. 
Future studies need to further explore the potential negative performance implications of 
board heterogeneity and contribute to the emerging interdisciplinary stream of corporate 
governance research.  
Finally, a major institutional characteristic of China that could potentially affect the 
implication and generalizability of this study is ownership structure. After years of market 
reform, the corporate structure of listed firms in China appears very similar to listed firms in 
the West (Wong, 2016), but ownership structure of these firms remains very different from 
most other market economies, with the most important feature being the dominance of 
government ownership. Many listed firms are restructured from SOEs, and when they go 
public, assets previously owned by the government are converted into shares owned directly 
or indirectly by the government. As a result, the government to this day still dominates the 
ownership of many public firms in China. Although there is a steady decrease in the 
percentage of SOEs in listed firms every year (74.86% in 2003, compared to 37.88% in 
2014), SOEs still make up a significant portion (41.9%) of the listed firms this study. 
Government control over Chinese SOEs has many negative effects on firm outcomes – for 
example, SOEs often have lower performance and depressed share prices when compared to 
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non-SOEs (Allen et al., 2015); CEOs who are current government officials underperform 
CEOs without political affiliations (Fan et al., 2007); and SOEs often have symbolic 
directors, who do not have any meaningful influence over management decisions and firm 
outcomes (Wong, 2016); in addition, many SOEs in China have been converted to privately 
owned companies over the past decade to promote privatization, but most of these firms are 
still partially controlled by the government via having government affiliated managers  and 
large government shareholders (Leutert, 2016). These findings raise the concern that the 
large representation of SOEs in this study may have weakened my results overall. In 
particular, the positive effect of Multiplexity is likely to be weaker in this study than what I 
might find in other contexts because politically connected directors in the Chinese context do 
not always benefit the firm. Future studies that examine politically tied directors need to find 
ways to identify whether or not they are on the board to bring in useful resources to benefit 
the firm, or appointed by the government to apply influence and control over the firm. Future 
studies can also focus on determining the true level of government influence on a firm based 
on company history, CEO political affiliation, managers/directors appointed by the 
government, large shareholder political affiliations, and other factors that can help us gauge 
the level of state control that may not be captured by the official public categorization of 
state ownership. Future studies can also examine the potential moderating effect of various 
levels of government control on board relational pluralism and performance.  
On a positive note, China has rigorously pushed for partial corporate privatization and 
decentralization in the past decade to increase its economic competitiveness against other 
market economies in the global market (Wong, 2016). In particular, numerous regulatory 
changes have been implemented to limit the control of government ownership and to protect 
108 
 
the interests of minority shareholders (Berkman, Cole, & Fu, 2011). One decentralization 
strategy that has been especially effective is the creation of “corporate pyramids” (e.g. 
company A is partially owned by parent company B, and parent company B is completely 
owned by the State, therefore, there is a corporate layer in between the State and company A, 
the overall structure is a two-layer corporate pyramid) by local governments, where 
corporate layers between the government and listed firms at the bottom of the pyramid can 
mitigate government intervention due to information loss (Fan et al., 2013). Adding 
corporate layers between the government and listed firms prevents the government from 
having direct contact with the firms’ strategic and operational information. Many local 
governments use this strategy to credibly commit to decentralization without having to adopt 
full privatization measures. This recent trend in regional privatization practices can 
potentially guide future research to examine the effect of regional institutional environment 
on the board-performance relationship. One way to explored this is examine whether or not 
there are differentiated effects of board relational pluralism on performance between 
different provinces or regions. To take things one step further, aspects of regional 
institutional environment can be assessed by examining the Marketization index (Cordeiro, 
He, Conyon, & Shaw, 2013; Li & Qian, 2013; Markóczy, Sun, Peng, & Ren, 2013; Peng, 
Sun, & Markóczy, 2015), which measures China’s institutional development and market 
reforms on the regional level. The marketization index can be used in future studies as a 
potential moderator for board relational pluralism and firm performance in order to shed light 
on the effects of regional level institutional characteristics on board-performance 
relationship. 
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Conclusion 
 This study is a large step towards developing a more comprehensive theory of 
relational pluralism in strategy research. By theoretically developing and empirically 
validating the relational pluralism framework in corporate boards, this study brings to the 
attention of managers the need to consider the entire composition of their boards on both 
observable characteristics and latent dynamics between board members. Although an 
enormous amount of research has focused on the direct link between board characteristics 
and firm performance, inconsistent and inconclusive findings has troubled scholars for 
decades – one of the most important goals that I hope to accomplish with this study is to 
motivate future research to steer away from simply linking surface level board characteristics 
directly to firm outcomes. As many papers have exhibited, examining isolated board 
characteristics do not often yield meaningful or generalizable results. I demonstrate in this 
study that it is extremely valuable to explore latent board social dynamics and the interaction 
of key board characteristics when attempting to predict performance outcomes.  
 Ultimately, with the growth of interest and attention on topics in corporate 
governance effectiveness, incremental reforms and transformations of corporate boards are 
likely to occur in the foreseeable future. An understanding of how board characteristics 
interact with each other to affect firm performance is not only instrumental to managers ’ 
ability to effectively serve their firms, it is also essential for policy and law makers to make 
educated decisions regarding corporate governance regulations and reforms to protect and 
ensure the well-being of all stakeholders, and the economy at large.  
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Figure 1 Board Relational Pluralism Theoretical Framework
Indicator Variables
First Order Latent 
Variables
Second Order 
Latent Variable
Relational 
Pluralism
Heterogeneity
Gender diversity
Occupational 
background 
diversity
Educational 
background 
diversity
Multiplexity
Independent 
directors
Director stock 
ownership
Political ties
Connectedness
Degree centrality
Closeness 
centrality
Betweenness 
centrality
Skewedness
CEO/Chair 
duality
Controlling 
shareholder
Informal 
hierarchy
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1.00 
1.00 
1.00 
1.00 
1.00 
0.46 
0.91 
1.09 
-0.93 
0.84 
0.52 
0.96 
1.00 
0.85 
0.99 
0.74 
0.40 
0.58 
Figure 2 Second-order confirmatory factor analysis structural equation model (2010 sample) 
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Table 1 Descriptive Statistics and Bivariate Correlation Matrix (12 indicator variables used in EFA) – Full Sample 
 
 
N 
 
Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
1. Occupational 
diversity 
 
4688 
 
0.288 
 
0.149 1            
2. Educational 
diversity 
 
4688 
 
0.164 
 
0.155 0.515 1           
3. Gender 
diversity 
 
4688 
 
0.063 
 
0.083 0.234 0.382 1          
4. Closeness 
centrality 
 
4688 
 
0.021 
 
0.088 -0.018 0.014 0.020 1         
5. Degree 
centrality 
 
4688 
 
11.75 
 
3.994 0.017 0.018 0.015 0.698 1        
6. Betweenness 
centrality 
 
4688 
 
89.26 
 
123.3 -0.023 0.014 0.018 0.420 0.839 1       
7. Independent 
directors 
 
4688 
 
3.306 
 
0.746 0.022 0.017 0.012 0.155 0.797 0.141 1      
8. Stock 
ownership 
 
4688 
 
3.732 
 
1.570 -0.026 0.013 0.046 0.048 0.434 0.063 0.736 1     
9. Political  
    ties 
 
4688 
 
1.132 
 
1.638 0.024 0.022 0.141 0.622 0.715 0.010 0.719 0.817 1    
10. Informal 
Hierarchy 
 
4688 
 
0.297 
 
0.255 0.019 0.021 0.425 -0.037 0.025 0.025 0.016 -0.023 0.030 1   
11. CEO  
   duality 
 
4688 
 
0.146 
 
0.327 -0.034 -0.017 -0.014 -0.063 -0.017 -0.041 -0.054 -0.531 -0.021 -0.033 1  
12. Controlling 
Shareholder 
 
4688 
 
0.122 
 
0.330 0.014 -0.047 -0.036 0.077 -0.011 -0.003 -0.023 0.103 -0.032 -0.268 0.610 1 
*All correlation coefficients are significant at the .05 level (two-tailed). 
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Table 2 Results of KMO and Bartlett’s Test 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy .719 
Bartlett's Test 
Approx. Chi-Square 7474.565 
df 59 
Sig. .000 
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Table 3 Results of Principal Component Analysis  
 
Communalities 
 Initial Extraction 
Occupational diversity 1.000 .884 
Educational diversity 1.000 .880 
Degree centrality 1.000 .962 
Closeness centrality 1.000 .796 
Betweenness centrality 1.000 .918 
CEO duality 1.000 .861 
Controlling shareholder 1.000 .781 
Independent director 1.000 .836 
Political ties 1.000 .922 
Stock ownership 1.000 .833 
Informal Hierarchy 1.000 .715 
Gender diversity 1.000 .822 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
 
Total Variance Explained 
Component Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings 
Total % of Variance Cumulative % Total % of Variance Cumulative % 
1 2.770 23.082 23.082 2.770 23.082 23.082 
2 2.339 19.489 42.571 2.339 19.489 42.571 
3 1.301 10.838 53.409 1.301 10.838 53.409 
4 1.029 8.576 61.985 1.029 8.576 61.985 
5 1.020 8.504 70.489 1.020 8.504 70.489 
6 .968 8.065 78.554    
7 .892 7.430 85.984    
8 .733 6.111 92.095    
9 .625 5.208 97.303    
10 .187 1.555 98.858    
11 .088 .729 99.588    
12 .049 .412 100.000    
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
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Table 4 Component Matrix 
 Component 
1 2 3 4 5 
Occupational diversity .891     
Educational diversity .861     
Degree centrality  .882    
Closeness centrality  .796    
Betweenness centrality  .690    
CEO duality   -.791   
Controlling shareholder   -.691   
Independent director    .815  
Political ties    .773  
Stock ownership    .625  
Informal Hierarchy   .401  .761 
Gender diversity     .621 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
a. 5 components extracted. 
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Table 5 Construct validity of the board relational pluralism model: five-factor solution                      
Path coefﬁcients year-wise results 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2007 
 
2008 
 
2009 
 
2010 
 
Measurement model     
Occupational diversity: 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
HETEROGENEITY     
Educational diversity: 0.97 0.95 0.92 0.96 
HETEROGENEITY     
Degree Centrality: 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
CONNECTEDNESS     
Closeness Centrality: 0.52 0.50 0.51 0.52 
CONNECTEDNESS     
Betweenness Centrality: 0.84 0.83 0.83 0.84 
CONNECTEDNESS     
CEO Duality: -0.88 -0.87 -0.90 -0.93 
SKEWEDNESS     
Controlling Shareholder: 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
SKEWEDNESS     
Independent directors: 1.12 1.04 0.98 1.09 
MULTIPLEXITY     
Stock ownership: 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
MULTIPLEXITY     
Political ties: 0.93 0.92 0.86 0.91 
MULTIPLEXITY     
Informal hierarchy: 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
HIERARCHY     
Gender diversity: 0.48 0.41 0.40 0.46 
HIERARCHY     
Structural model     
HETEROGENEITY: 0.96 0.94 0.83 0.85 
RELATIONAL PLURALISM     
CONNECTEDNESS: 1.29 0.98 0.91 0.99 
RELATIONAL PLURALISM     
SKEWEDNESS: 0.82 0.73 0.71 0.74 
RELATIONAL PLURALISM     
MULTIPLEXITY: 0.45 0.41 0.38 0.4 
RELATIONAL PLURALISM     
HIERARCHY: 0.65 0.62 0.56 0.58 
RELATIONAL PLURALISM     
Sample size 586 586 586 586 
d.f. 66 66 66 66 
Satorra-Bentler 22.58 19.92 21.22 23.74 
Chi-Square (p < 0.11) (p < 0.25) (p < 0.18) (p < 0.09) 
NFI 0.92 0.92 0.93 0.92 
GFI 0.91 0.91 0.92 0.92 
RFI 0.97 0.97 0.98 0.98 
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Table 6 Hausman’s Specification Test for Model Fit  
 
 ROA ROE Tobin’s Q 
chi2  65.84 23.64 55.97 
Prob > chi2 0.0000 0.0028 0.0000 
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Table 7 Description Statistics and Correlation Matrix 
 Variable Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
1 Firm Size 21.30 1.19 9.158 27.54 1                
2 Meetings 3.55 1.22 1.000 21.00 0.0219 1               
3 Board Size 12.00 2.23 1.000 25.00 -0.0079 0.1476 1              
4 Compensation 14.04 2.79 7.530 19.01 0.0397 0.0050 -0.0085 1             
5 Director Age 48.57 0.87 46.60 53.01 0.0234 0.0435 0.2134 -0.0133 1            
6 Director Tenure 2.92 0.80 1.000 5.780 0.0428 0.0090 0.0312 -0.0350 0.0202 1           
7 SOE 0.42 0.49 0.000 1.000 0.0152 0.0050 -0.0101 -0.0039 -0.0017 -0.0023 1          
8 ROA 0.03 8.42 -0.33 0.29 0.0329 0.0038 -0.0103 0.0380 -0.0165 -0.0502 -0.0149 1         
9 ROE 0.02 9.36 -0.26 0.64 0.0213 0.0037 0.0031 0.0091 -0.0134 -0.0030 -0.0166 
 
 
0.4892 1        
10 Tobin’s Q 1.36 1.30 0.10 2.72 0.0199 -0.0197 -0.0236 0.0250 -0.0083 -0.0266 -0.0396 0.0242 0.0231 1       
11 Factor Score 1 
Heterogeneity 
0.00 1.00 -0.138 5.077 -0.0171 -0.0043 0.0317 -0.1997 -0.0135 0.0877 -0.0123 -0.0934 -0.0414 0.0217 1      
12 Factor Score 2 
Connectedness 
0.00 1.00 -1047 15.00 -0.0025 -0.0065 0.0211 -0.0043 -0.0169 0.0048 0.0151 0.0417 0.0140 0.0230 0.0000 1     
13 Factor Score 3 
Skewedness 
0.00 1.00 -527.3 11.41 -0.0398 0.0048 -0.0021 0.0056 -0.0205 0.0122 -0.0224 -0.1264 -0.0853 0.0191 0.0000 0.0000 1    
14 Factor Score 4 
Multiplexity 
0.00 1.00 -152.4 9.063 -0.0252 -0.0025 -0.0128 -0.0260 -0.0044 0.0212 0.0369 0.0734 0.0035 0.0239 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1   
15 Factor Score 5 
Hierarchy 
 
0.00 1.00 3.519 151.7 0.0015 -0.0067 0.0020 -0.0172 -0.0072 0.0126 0.0050 -0.0158 0.0241 0.0190 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1  
16 Firm Strategy 
 
0.53 0.49 0.000 1.000 0.0190 0.0293 0.0144 -0.0121 0.1490 0.0731 -0.0088 0.0089 0.0056 0.0076 0.0319 0.0139 0.0112 0.0108 0.008
0 
1 
 
Notes: * Correlations above |.012| are significant at the .01 level. N = 4688 
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Table 8 Fixed Effects Regressions on Firm Performance (ROA, ROE, & Tobin’s Q) 
 Model 1 
ROA 
Model 2 
ROE 
Model 3 
Tobin’s Q 
Model 4 
ROA 
Model 5 
ROE 
Model 6 
Tobin’s Q 
       
Firm Size 0.0464*** 0.0400*** 0.0150*** 0.0451** 0.0387** 0.0120** 
Board Size 0.1079* 0.0221 0.0313 0.1035* 0.0210 0.0392 
Advisory Committee 0.0780 0.0775 -0.0249 0.0825 0.0782 -0.0403 
SOE -0.0512*** -0.0285** -0.0903*** -0.0142** -0.0094** -0.0557** 
Director Age 0.0288 0.0184 0.0204 0.0285 0.0200 0.0168 
Director Tenure 0.0536 -0.0333 -0.0774 0.0611 -0.0290 -0.0619 
Board Compensation  -0.0599* -0.0373 -0.0544* -0.0776* -0.0448 -0.0919** 
Firm Strategy 0.0512 -0.0215 0.0588 0.0436 -0.0123 0.0647 
Factor Score 1 (H2) 
Heterogeneity 
   -0.2711*** -0.1476* -0.1980** 
Factor Score 2 (H4) 
Connectedness 
   0.0543**** 0.0307** 0.0478**** 
Factor Score 3 (H5) 
Skewedness 
   -0.1721**** -0.0876* -0.1454**** 
Factor Score 4 (H3) 
Multiplexity 
   0.2292**** 0.1107* 0.1917**** 
Factor Score 5 
Hierarchy 
   0.0096 -0.0195 0.0278 
Constant -0.0739 -0.0178 -0.0678 0.0267 0.0789 0.2775 
Year, province, industry Controlled  Controlled  Controlled  Controlled  Controlled  Controlled  
Firm fixed effects Controlled  Controlled  Controlled  Controlled  Controlled  Controlled  
Observations 3,516 3,516 3,516 3,516 3,516 3,516 
R-squared 0.0341*** 0.0144* 0.0358*** 0.0789**** 0.0280* 0.0610*** 
Change in R-squared    0.0448**** 0.0136* 0.0252*** 
Notes: + p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001, **** p < 0.0001.  
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Table 9 Fixed effects Regressions on Firm Performance (ROA)  
with Firm Strategy as Contingent Variable  
 Model 4 
Complete set 
Model 7 
Prospector 
firms 
Model 8 
Defender 
firms 
    
Firm Size 0.0451** 0.0159 0.0019 
Board Size 0.1035* 0.1287 0.0591 
Advisory Committee 0.0825 0.0651 0.0694 
SOE -0.0142** -0.0296 -0.0195 
Director Age 0.0285 -0.0169 0.0254 
Director Tenure 0.0611 0.0882 0.0835 
Board Compensation  -0.0776* -0.100 0.0678 
Factor Score 1  
Heterogeneity 
-0.2711*** -0.3698** 0.1728 
Factor Score 2  
Connectedness 
0.0543**** 0.0721*** 0.0036 
Factor Score 3  
Skewedness 
-0.1721**** -0.2259**** 0.0214 
Factor Score 4  
Multiplexity 
0.2292**** 0.2712** 0.0526 
Factor Score 5 
Hierarchy 
0.0096 -0.0052 0.0145 
Constant 0.0267 0.2087 0.0106 
Year, province, industry Controlled  Controlled  Controlled  
Firm fixed effects Controlled  Controlled  Controlled  
Observations 3,516 1,863 1,653 
R-squared 0.0789**** 0.0977**** 0.0458 
Change in R-squared 0.0448**** 0.0636**** 0.0117 
      Notes: + p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001, **** p < 0.0001.  
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Table 10 Fixed effects Regressions on Firm Performance (ROE)  
with Firm Strategy as Contingent Variable  
 Model 5 
Complete set 
Model 9 
Prospector 
firms 
Model 10 
Defender 
firms 
    
Firm Size 0.0387** 0.0127 0.0835 
Board Size 0.0210 0.0015 0.0582 
Advisory Committee 0.0782 0.0805 -0.0244 
SOE -0.0094** -0.0389 0.0323 
Director Age 0.0200 0.0152 0.0298 
Director Tenure -0.0290 -0.1433 -0.0176 
Board Compensation  -0.0448 -0.0542 0.0054 
Factor Score 1  
Heterogeneity 
-0.1476* -0.4879* 0.7939 
Factor Score 2  
Connectedness 
0.0307** 0.0310 0.0756 
Factor Score 3  
Skewedness 
-0.0876* -0.0916 -0.0421 
Factor Score 4  
Multiplexity 
0.1107* 0.1039 0.1834 
Factor Score 5 
Hierarchy 
-0.0195 0.0117 -0.0350 
Constant 0.0789 0.2896 0.0014 
Year, province, industry Controlled  Controlled  Controlled  
Firm fixed effects Controlled  Controlled  Controlled  
Observations 3,516 1,863 1,653 
R-squared 0.0280* 0.0420* 0.0191 
Change in R-squared 0.0136* 0.0276* 0.0047 
      Notes: + p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001, **** p < 0.0001.  
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Table 11 Fixed effects Regressions on Firm Performance (Tobin’s Q)  
with Firm Strategy as Contingent Variable  
 Model 6 
Complete set 
Model 11 
Prospector 
firms 
Model 12 
Defender 
firms 
    
Firm Size 0.0120** 0.0112 0.0120 
Board Size 0.0392 0.0253 0.0547 
Advisory Committee -0.0403 -0.0831 -0.0028 
SOE -0.0557** -0.0634 0.0327 
Director Age 0.0168 -0.0416 0.0496 
Director Tenure -0.0619 -0.0648 -0.2107 
Board Compensation  -0.0919** -0.1488* -0.0293 
Factor Score 1  
Heterogeneity 
-0.1980** -0.3077* -0.0316 
Factor Score 2  
Connectedness 
0.0478**** 0.0590** 0.3995 
Factor Score 3  
Skewedness 
-0.1454**** -0.1954*** -0.0787 
Factor Score 4  
Multiplexity 
0.1917**** 0.2940*** -0.0637 
Factor Score 5 
Hierarchy 
0.0278 0.0401 0.0142 
Constant 0.2775 0.4229 0.1407 
Year, province, industry Controlled  Controlled  Controlled  
Firm fixed effects Controlled  Controlled  Controlled  
Observations 3,516 1,863 1,653 
R-squared 0.0610*** 0.0925*** 0.0501 
Change in R-squared 0.0252*** 0.0567*** 0.0143 
      Notes: + p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001, **** p < 0.0001.  
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Table 12 Quadratic Fit on Firm Performance (ROA, ROE, & Tobin’s Q) Year-wise 
DV Year IV & Quadratic term B t p 
ROA 2007 Heterogeneity 1.933 1.908 .067 
  Heterogeneity ** 2 -.771 -2.094 .057 
  (Constant) 2.179 3.967 .000 
ROE 2007 Heterogeneity 2.081 .767 .443 
  Heterogeneity ** 2 -.767 -.778 .437 
  (Constant) 4.526 3.075 .002 
Tobin's Q 2007 Heterogeneity .115 1.371 .171 
  Heterogeneity ** 2 -.039 -1.272 .204 
  (Constant) 1.323 29.115 .000 
ROA 2008 Heterogeneity .861 .845 .398 
  Heterogeneity ** 2 -.363 -1.061 .289 
  (Constant) 5.032 8.335 .000 
ROE 2008 Heterogeneity .870 .366 .314 
  Heterogeneity ** 2 -.457 -.572 .567 
  (Constant) 8.436 5.990 .000 
Tobin's Q 2008 Heterogeneity .053 .348 .228 
  Heterogeneity ** 2 -.016 -.309 .257 
  (Constant) 2.281 25.422 .000 
ROA 2009 Heterogeneity .389 .358 .320 
  Heterogeneity ** 2 -.169 -.455 .349 
  (Constant) 5.087 7.733 .000 
ROE 2009 Heterogeneity -3.641 -1.471 .141 
  Heterogeneity ** 2 1.129 1.335 .182 
  (Constant) 9.040 6.025 .000 
Tobin's Q 2009 Heterogeneity .013 .076 .339 
  Heterogeneity ** 2 -.039 -.689 .491 
  (Constant) 2.325 22.983 .000 
ROA 2010 Heterogeneity .245 .234 .215 
  Heterogeneity ** 2 -.033 -.083 .334 
  (Constant) 7.382 12.841 .000 
ROE 2010 Heterogeneity 2.931 1.402 .161 
  Heterogeneity ** 2 -.603 -.757 .449 
  (Constant) 7.649 6.661 .000 
Tobin's Q 2010 Heterogeneity .323 1.572 .116 
  Heterogeneity ** 2 -.086 -1.105 .269 
  (Constant) 2.141 18.987 .000 
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Table 13 Fixed Effects Regressions on Firm Performance with SOE Moderators (ROA, ROE, & 
Tobin’s Q) 
 Model 4 
ROA 
Model 5 
ROE 
Model 6 
Tobin’s Q 
Model 13 
ROA 
Model 14 
ROE 
Model 15 
Tobin’s Q 
Firm Size 0.0451** 0.0387** 0.0120** 0.0318** 0.0284** 0.0098** 
Board Size 0.1035* 0.0210 0.0392 0.1035 0.0210 0.0392 
Advisory Committee 0.0825 0.0782 -0.0403 0.0825 0.0782 -0.0403 
SOE -0.0142** -0.0094** -0.0557** -0.0196* -0.0094* -0.0557* 
Director Age 0.0285 0.0200 0.0168 0.0285 0.0200 0.0168 
Director Tenure 0.0611 -0.0290 -0.0619 0.0611 -0.0291 -0.0612 
Board Compensation  -0.0776* -0.0448 -0.0919** -0.0476** -0.0442 -0.0924** 
Firm Strategy 0.0436 -0.0123 0.0647 0.0404 -0.0098 0.0527 
Factor Score 1 (H2) 
Heterogeneity 
-0.2711*** -0.1476* -0.1980** -0.2421** -0.1432* -0.1951** 
Factor Score 2 (H4) 
Connectedness 
0.0543**** 0.0307** 0.0478**** 0.0591*** 0.0301* 0.0396** 
Factor Score 3 (H5) 
Skewedness 
-0.1721**** -0.0876* -0.1454**** -0.1787*** -0.0866* -0.1398**** 
Factor Score 4 (H3) 
Multiplexity 
0.2292**** 0.1107* 0.1917**** 0.1497*** 0.1036* 0.1577*** 
Factor Score 5 
Hierarchy 
0.0096 -0.0195 0.0278 0.0092 -0.0184 0.0367 
SOE * Heterogeneity    0.0533 -0.0128 -0.0188 
SOE * Connectedness    0.0752 -0.0265 0.0718* 
SOE * Skewedness    0.0482 0.0812 -0.0092 
SOE * Multiplexity    -0.0628 0.0011 0.0462 
SOE * Hierarchy    -0.0743 -0.0763 0.0192 
Constant 0.0267 0.0789 0.2775 0.0225 0.0679 0.2144 
Year, province, industry Controlled  Controlled  Controlled  Controlled  Controlled  Controlled  
Firm fixed effects Controlled  Controlled  Controlled  Controlled  Controlled  Controlled  
Observations 3,516 3,516 3,516 3,516 3,516 3,516 
R-squared 0.0789**** 0.0280* 0.0610*** 0.0816**** 0.0297* 0.0745**** 
Change in R-squared 0.0448**** 0.0136* 0.0252*** 0.0017 0.0017 0.0135* 
Notes: + p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001, **** p < 0.0001. 
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Table 14 Sub-sample t-tests between Defenders and Prospectors on Performance (ROA, ROE 
& Tobin’s Q) and State Ownership 
 
ROA 
Firm Strategy Mean Std. Dev. 95% Confidence Interval  
Defender 5.216 8.610 5.014 5.734 
Prospector 5.374 8.247 4.892 5.540 
t-value = 0.641; p = 0.522 
ROE 
Firm Strategy Mean Std. Dev. 95% Confidence Interval  
Defender 7.746 19.405 6.935 8.558 
Prospector 7.628 19.317 6.868 8.387 
t-value = 0.209; p = 0.835 
Tobin’s Q 
Firm Strategy Mean Std. Dev. 95% Confidence Interval  
Defender 2.056 1.279 2.002 2.109 
Prospector 2.093 1.325 2.041 2.145 
t-value = 0.975; p = 0.330 
SOE 
Firm Strategy Mean Std. Dev. 95% Confidence Interval  
Defender 0.421 0.493 0.395 0.436 
Prospector 0.415 0.494 0.402 0.441 
t-value = 0.399; p = 0.690 
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Table 15 Fixed Effects Regressions on Firm Performance with Firm Strategy Moderators (ROA, ROE, 
& Tobin’s Q) 
 Model 4 
ROA 
Model 5 
ROE 
Model 6 
Tobin’s Q 
Model 13 
ROA 
Model 14 
ROE 
Model 15 
Tobin’s Q 
Firm Size 0.0451** 0.0387** 0.0120** 0.0278** 0.0253* 0.0093** 
Board Size 0.1035* 0.0210 0.0392 0.0912 0.0197 0.0256 
Advisory Committee 0.0825 0.0782 -0.0403 0.0879 0.0580 -0.0428 
SOE -0.0142** -0.0094** -0.0557** -0.0144* -0.0011* -0.0526* 
Director Age 0.0285 0.0200 0.0168 0.0362 0.0204 0.0145 
Director Tenure 0.0611 -0.0290 -0.0619 0.0594 -0.0291 -0.0612 
Board Compensation  -0.0776* -0.0448 -0.0919** -0.0209 -0.0397 0.0604* 
Firm Strategy 0.0436 -0.0123 0.0647 0.0388 -0.0063 0.0455 
Factor Score 1 (H2) 
Heterogeneity 
-0.2711*** -0.1476* -0.1980** -0.2421* -0.1432* -0.1951* 
Factor Score 2 (H4) 
Connectedness 
0.0543**** 0.0307** 0.0478**** 0.0591** 0.0301 0.0396** 
Factor Score 3 (H5) 
Skewedness 
-0.1721**** -0.0876* -0.1454**** -0.2034* -0.0795 -0.0812** 
Factor Score 4 (H3) 
Multiplexity 
0.2292**** 0.1107* 0.1917**** 0.1055** 0.0965 0.1187** 
Factor Score 5 
Hierarchy 
0.0096 -0.0195 0.0278 0.0087 -0.0180 0.0245 
Firm Strategy * 
Heterogeneity 
   -0.0782*** -0.0077 -0.0309*** 
Firm Strategy * 
Connectedness 
   0.1138*** -0.0213 0.0845** 
Firm Strategy * 
Skewedness 
   -0.0307** -0.0384 -0.0279** 
Firm Strategy * 
Multiplexity 
   0.0647* 0.0536 0.0294* 
Firm Strategy *   
Hierarchy 
   0.0201 -0.0081 0.0364 
Constant 0.0267 0.0789 0.2775 0.0285 0.0578 0.1856 
Year, province, 
industry 
Controlled  Controlled  Controlled  Controlled  Controlled  Controlled  
Firm fixed effects Controlled  Controlled  Controlled  Controlled  Controlled  Controlled  
Observations 3,516 3,516 3,516 3,516 3,516 3,516 
R-squared 0.0789**** 0.0280* 0.0610*** 0.0937**** 0.0302 0.0790**** 
Change in R-squared 0.0448**** 0.0136* 0.0252*** 0.0148** 0.0022 0.0180** 
Notes: + p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001, **** p < 0.0001 
  
127 
 
References 
 
Adams, R. B., & Ferreira, D. 2009. Women in the boardroom and their impact on governance and 
performance. Journal of Financial Economics, 94(2): 291-309. 
Adams, R. B., Hermalin, B. E., & Weisbach, M. S. 2010. The role of boards of directors in corporate 
governance: A conceptual framework and survey. Journal of Economic Literature, 48: 58-
107. 
Aguilera, R. V., & Jackson, G. 2010. Comparative and international corporate governance. The 
Academy of Management Annals, 4(1): 485-556. 
Ahern, K. R., & Dittmar, A. K., 2012. The changing of the boards: The impact on firm valuation of 
mandated women board representation. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 127(1): 137-197. 
Ahuja, G. 2000. Collaboration networks, structural holes, and innovation: A longitudinal study. 
Administrative Science Quarterly, 45(3): 425-455. 
Allen, F., Qian, J., & Qian, M. 2005. Law, finance, and economic growth in China. Journal of 
Financial Economics, 77(1): 57-116. 
Anderson, R., Mansi, S., & Reeb, D. 2010. Executive behavior: a creditor perspective on 
managerial ownership. John Wiley & Sons, Hoboken, NJ. 
Ashforth, B. 1994. Petty tyranny in organizations. Human Relations, 47(7): 755-778. 
Baker, W. E., & Faulkner, R. 2002. Interorganizational Networks. In J. A. C. Baum (Ed.), 
Companion to Organizations: 521-540. Oxford, UK: Blackwell. 
Baltagi, B. H. 2008. Econometric Analysis of Panel Data (4th eds). Wiley: Chichester. 
Baum, J. A., Calabrese, T., & Silverman, B. S. 2000. Don't go it alone: Alliance network 
composition and startups' performance in Canadian biotechnology. Strategic Management 
Journal, 21(3): 267-294. 
  
128 
 
Baysinger, B. D., & Butler, H. N. 1985. Corporate governance and the board of directors: 
Performance effects of changes in board composition. Journal of Law, Economics, & 
Organization, 1(1): 101-124. 
Bazerman, M. H., & Schoorman, F. D. 1983. A Limited Rationality Model of Interlocking 
Directorates. Academy of Management Review, 8(2): 206-217. 
Bear, S., Rahman, N., & Post, C. 2010. The impact of board diversity and gender composition on 
corporate social responsibility and firm reputation. Journal of Business Ethics, 97(2): 207-
221. 
Bebchuk, L.A., Kraakman, R., and Triantis, G.G. 2000. Stock Pyramids, Cross Ownership and 
Dual Class Equity: The Mechanisms and Agency Costs of Separating Control from Cash 
Flow Rights. Concentrated Corporate Ownership. 295-315. Chicago University Press. 
Beckman, C. M., Haunschild, P. R., & Phillips, D. J. 2004. Friends or strangers? Firm-specific 
uncertainty, market uncertainty, and network partner selection. Organization Science, 15(3): 
259-275. 
Beckman, C. M., Schoonhoven, C. B., Rottner, R. M., & Kim, S. J. 2014. Relational pluralism in de 
novo organizations: boards of directors as bridges or barriers to diverse alliance portfolios? 
Academy of Management Journal, 57(2): 460-483. 
Bell, S. T., Villado, A. J., Lukasik, M. A., Belau, L., & Briggs, A. L. 2011. Getting specific about 
demographic diversity variable and team performance relationships: A meta-analysis. 
Journal of Management, 37: 709. 
Belliveau, M. A., O'Reilly, C. A., & Wade, J. B. 1996. Social capital at the top: Effects of social 
similarity and status on CEO compensation. Academy of Management Journal, 39(6): 
1568-1593. 
Ben-Amar, W. & Andre, P. 2006. Separation of ownership and control and acquiring firm 
performance: The case of family ownership in Canada. Journal of Business Finance & 
Accounting, 33(3 & 4): 517–543. 
  
129 
 
Bentley, K. A., Omer, T. C., & Sharp, N. Y. 2013. Business strategy, financial reporting 
irregularities, and audit effort. Contemporary Accounting Research, 30(2): 780-817. 
Berkman, H., Cole, R. A., & Fu, L. J. 2011. Political connections and minority-shareholder 
protection: Evidence from securities-market regulation in China. 1391-1417. 
Bhagat, S., & Bolton, B. 2014. Financial crisis and bank executive incentive compensation. Journal 
of Corporate Finance, 25, 313-341. 
Bhagat, S., Carey, D. C., & Elson, C. M. 1999. Director ownership, corporate performance, and 
management turnover. The Business Lawyer, 885-919. 
Bigley, G. A., & Wiersema, M. F. 2002. New CEOs and corporate strategic refocusing: How 
experience as heir apparent influences the use of power. Administrative Science Quarterly, 
47(4): 707-727. 
Bilimoria, D., & Piderit, S. K. 1994. Board committee membership: Effects of sex-based bias. 
Academy of Management Journal, 37(6): 1453-1477. 
Bizjak, J., Lemmon, M., & Whitby, R. 2009. Option backdating and board interlocks. Review of 
Financial Studies, 22(11): 4821-4847. 
Blackmore, K., & Nesbitt, K. 2013. Verifying the Miles and Snow strategy types in Australian small-
and medium-size enterprises. Australian Journal of Management, 38(1): 171-190. 
Blau, P. M. 1977. Inequality and heterogeneity. New York: Free Press. 
Blau, J. R., & Blau, P. M. 1982. The cost of inequality: Metropolitan structure and violent crime. 
American Sociological Review, 114-129. 
Boeker, W., & Wiltbank, R. 2005. New venture evolution and managerial capabilities. Organization 
Science, 16(2): 123-133. 
Bollen, K. A. 1989. A new incremental fit index for general structural equation models. Sociological 
Methods & Research, 17(3): 303-316. 
  
130 
 
Bonacich, P. 1987. Power and centrality: A family of measures. American Journal of Sociology, 
1170-1182. 
Borgatti, S. P., & Halgin, D. S. 2011. On network theory. Organization Science, 22(5): 1168-1181. 
Boubakri, N., Cosset, J. C., & Guedhami, O. 2009. From state to private ownership: Issues from 
strategic industries. Journal of Banking & Finance, 33(2): 367-379. 
Boulouta, I. 2013. Hidden connections: The link between board gender diversity and corporate social 
performance. Journal of Business Ethics, 113(2): 185-197. 
Boyd, B. 1990. Corporate linkages and organizational environment: A test of the resource 
dependence model. Strategic Management Journal, 11(6): 419-430. 
Boyd, B. K. 1995. CEO duality and firm performance: A contingency model. Strategic Management 
Journal, 16(4): 301-312. 
Brickley, J. A., Coles, J. L., & Jarrell, G. 1997. Leadership structure: Separating the CEO and 
chairman of the board. Journal of Corporate Finance, 3(3): 189-220. 
Briscoe, F., & Tsai, W. 2011. Overcoming relational inertia: How organizational members respond 
to acquisition events in a law firm. Administrative Science Quarterly, 56(3): 408-440. 
Buck, T., Liu, X., & Skovoroda, R. 2008. Top executive pay and firm performance in China. 
Journal of International Business Studies, 39(5): 833-850. 
Burgess, Z., & Tharenou, P. 2002. Women board directors: Characteristics of the few. Journal of 
Business Ethics, 37(1): 39-49. 
Burke, R. J., & Cooper, C. L. 2004. Leading in turbulent times: Managing in the new world of 
work. Blackwell Publishing. 
Burt, R. S. 1980. Models of network structure. Annual Review of Sociology, 79-141. 
Burt, R. S. 1997. A note on social capital and network content. Social Networks, 19(4): 355-373. 
Cadbury, S. A. 1992. The Code of Best Practice. Report of the Committee on the Financial Aspects 
of Corporate Governance, Gee and Co Ltd, 27. 
  
131 
 
Campbell, K., & Mínguez-Vera, A. 2008. Gender diversity in the boardroom and firm financial 
performance. Journal of Business Ethics, 83(3): 435-451. 
Cannella, A. A., & Hambrick, D. C. 1993. Effects of executive departures on the performance of 
acquired firms. Strategic Management Journal, 14(S1): 137-152. 
Cannella, A. A., Park, J. H., & Lee, H. U. 2008. Top management team functional background 
diversity and firm performance: Examining the roles of team member colocation and 
environmental uncertainty. Academy of Management Journal, 51(4): 768-784. 
Capon, N., Farley, J., & Hoenig, S. 1990. Determinants of Financial Performance: A Meta-Analysis. 
Management Science, 36(10): 1143-1159.  
Carmines, E. G., & Zeller, R. A. 1979. Reliability and validity assessment (Vol. 17). Sage 
publications. 
Carpenter, M. A., Geletkanycz, M. A., & Sanders, W. G. 2004. Upper echelons research revisited: 
Antecedents, elements, and consequences of top management team composition. Journal of 
management, 30(6): 749-778. 
Carpenter, M. A., Pollock, T. G., & Leary, M. M. 2003. Testing a model of reasoned risk‐taking: 
governance, the experience of principals and agents, and global strategy in high‐technology 
IPO firms. Strategic Management Journal, 24(9): 803-820. 
Carter, C. B., & Lorsch, J. W. 2004. Back to the drawing board. Designing Corporate Boards for a 
Complex World. Rank Xerox Research Centre, Cambridge Laboratory. 
Carter, D. A., Simkins, B. J., & Simpson, W. G. 2003. Corporate governance, board diversity, and 
firm value. Financial Review, 38(1): 33-53. 
Catalyst, & Catalyst, inc. 2004. The bottom line: Connecting corporate performance and gender 
diversity. Catalyst. 
CECC. 2011. Eighth Amendment to the Criminal Law of the People's Republic of China, 
Congressional Executive Commission on China, Issued: February 25, 2011. 
  
132 
 
Chen, Y. Y., & Young, M. N. 2009. Cross-border mergers and acquisitions by Chinese listed 
companies: A principal-principal perspective. Asia Pacific Journal of Management. 
doi:10.1007/s10490-009-9150-7. 
Chiu, P. C., Teoh, S. H., & Tian, F. 2013. Board interlocks and earnings management contagion. The 
Accounting Review, 88(3): 915-944. 
Chizema, A., Liu, X., Lu, J. and Gao, L. 2014, Politically connected directors and top executive 
compensation in Chinese firms, Strategic Management Journal, 36: 890-906. 
Chizema, A., & Shinozawa, Y. 2012. The “company with committees”: Change or continuity in 
Japanese corporate governance? Journal of Management Studies, 49(1): 77–101. 
Cho, T. S., & Hambrick, D. C. 2006. Attention as the mediator between top management team 
characteristics and strategic change: The case of airline deregulation. Organization Science, 
17(4): 453-469. 
Claessens, S., Djankov, S., Fan, J. P., & Lang, L. H. 2002. Disentangling the incentive and 
entrenchment effects of large shareholdings. The Journal of Finance, 57(6): 2741-2771. 
Claessens, S., Feijen, E., & Laeven, L. 2008. Political connections and preferential access to finance: 
The role of campaign contributions. Journal of Financial Economics, 88(3): 554-580. 
Clarke, T. 1998. Research on corporate governance. Corporate Governance: An International 
Review, 6(1): 57-66. 
Coase, R. H. 1937. The nature of the firm. Economica, 4(16): 386-405. 
Coffey, B. S., & Wang, J. 1998. Board diversity and managerial control as predictors of corporate 
social performance. Journal of Business Ethics, 17(14): 1595-1603. 
Coleman, J. S. 1988. Social capital in the creation of human capital. American Journal of Sociology, 
S95-S120. 
Comrey, A. L., & Lee, H. B. 1992. A ﬁrst course in factor analysis. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. 
  
133 
 
Conant, J. S., Mokwa, M. P., & Varadarajan, P. R. 1990. Strategic types, distinctive marketing 
competencies and organizational performance: a multiple measures‐based study. Strategic 
management journal, 11(5): 365-383. 
Conger, J. A., & Lawler, E. E. 2009. Sharing Leadership on Corporate Boards: A Critical 
Requirement for Teamwork at the Top. Organizational Dynamics, 38(3): 183-191. 
Cooper, M. J., Gulen, H., & Ovtchinnikov, A. V. 2010. Corporate political contributions and stock 
returns. The Journal of Finance, 65(2): 687-724. 
Cordeiro, J. J., He, L., Conyon, M., & Shaw, T. S. 2013. Informativeness of performance measures 
and Chinese executive compensation. Asia Pacific Journal of Management, 30(4): 1031-
1058. 
Core, J. E., Holthausen, R. W., & Larcker, D. F. 1999. Corporate governance, chief executive officer 
compensation, and firm performance. Journal of Financial Economics, 51(3): 371-406. 
Osborne, J. W., & Costello, A. B. (2009). Best practices in exploratory factor analysis: Four 
recommendations for getting the most from your analysis. Pan-Pacific Management 
Review, 12(2): 131-146.  
D'Aveni, R. A. 1990. Top managerial prestige and organizational bankruptcy. Organization Science, 
1(2): 121-142. 
Dahya, J., & McConnell, J. J. 2007. Board composition, corporate performance, and the Cadbury 
committee recommendation. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 42(03): 535-
564. 
Daily, C. M., & Dalton, D. R. 1994. Bankruptcy and corporate governance: The impact of board 
composition and structure. Academy of Management Journal, 37(6): 1603-1617. 
Daily, C. M., Dalton, D. R., & Cannella, A. A. 2003. Corporate governance: Decades of dialogue 
and data. Academy of Management Review, 28(3): 371-382. 
Daily, C. M., Johnson, J. L., Ellstrand, A. E., & Dalton, D. R. 1996. Institutional investor activism: 
follow the leaders? Available at SSRN 10299. 
  
134 
 
Dalton, D. R., Daily, C. M., Ellstrand, A. E., & Johnson, J. L. 1998. Meta-analytic reviews of board 
composition, leadership structure, and financial performance. Strategic Management 
Journal, 19(3): 269-290. 
Dalton, D. R., Daily, C. M., Johnson, J. L., & Ellstrand, A. E. 1999. Number of directors and 
financial performance: A meta-analysis. Academy of Management Journal, 42(6): 674-686. 
Dalton, D. R., & Dalton, C. M. 2011. Integration of micro and macro studies in governance research: 
CEO duality, board composition, and financial performance. Journal of Management, 
37(2): 404-411. 
Davis, F. G. 2005. New directions in corporate governance. Annual Review of Sociology, 31: 143–
162. 
Davis, G. F., Yoo, M., & Baker, W. E. 2003. The small world of the American corporate elite, 1982-
2001. Strategic Organization, 1(3): 301-326. 
Demsetz, H. 1983. The structure of ownership and the theory of the firm. The Journal of Law & 
Economics, 26(2): 375-390. 
Demsetz, H., & Villalonga, B. 2001. Ownership structure and corporate performance. Journal of 
Corporate Finance, 7(3): 209-233. 
Desarbo,W. S., Benedetto, C. A., Song, M. & Sinha, I. 2005. Revisiting the Miles and Snow 
Strategic Framework: Uncovering Interrelationships between Strategic Types, Capabilities, 
Environmental Uncertainty, and Firm Performance. Strategic Management Journal, 26: 47-
74. 
Dess, G. G., Lumpkin, G. T., & Covin, J. G. 1997. Entrepreneurial strategy making and firm 
performance: Tests of contingency and configurational models. Strategic Management 
Journal, 18(9): 677-695. 
Dharwadkar, B., George, G., & Brandes, P. 2000. Privatization in emerging economies: An agency 
theory perspective. Academy of Management Review, 25(3): 650-669. 
  
135 
 
Ding, Z., Sun, S. L., & Au, K. 2014. Angel investors’ selection criteria: A comparative institutional 
perspective.  Asia Pacific Journal of Management, 31: 705-731. 
DiStefano, C. 2002. The impact of categorization with confirmatory factor analysis. Structural 
Equation Modeling, 9(3): 327-346. 
Dobbin, F. 2004. The New Economic Sociology. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
Dobbin, F., & Jung, J. 2011. Corporate board gender diversity and stock performance: The 
competence gap or institutional investor bias? North Carolina Law Review, 89. 
Donaldson, L., & Davis, J. H. 1991. Stewardship theory or agency theory: CEO governance and 
shareholder returns. Australian Journal of Management, 16(1): 49-64. 
Donaldson, T., & Preston, L. E. 1995. The stakeholder theory of the corporation: Concepts, evidence, 
and implications. Academy of management Review, 20(1): 65-91. 
Donovan, T. 2014. China’s Crackdown on Corruption and Government Spending: A Timeline. 
China Business Review. 
Doty, D.H., Glick, W.H., & Huber, G.P. 1993. Fit, equifinality, and organizational effectiveness: A 
test of two configurational theories. Academy of Management Journal, 36(6):1196-1250. 
Duchin, R., Matsusaka, J. G., & Ozbas, O. 2010. When are outside directors effective? Journal of 
Financial Economics, 96(2): 195-214. 
Eagly, A. H., Karau, S. J., & Makhijani, M. G. 1995. Gender and the effectiveness of leaders: a meta-
analysis. Psychological Bulletin, 117(1): 125. 
Eisenhardt, K. M. 1989. Building theories from case study research. Academy of Management 
Review, 14(4): 532-550. 
Engelberg, J., Gao, P., & Parsons, C. A. 2012. Friends with money. Journal of Financial 
Economics, 103(1): 169-188. 
Erhardt, N. L., Werbel, J. D., & Shrader, C. B. 2003. Board of director diversity and firm financial 
performance. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 11(2): 102-111. 
  
136 
 
Ernst & Young Global IPO trends, 2012. Global IPO update (January – November). Ernst & Young. 
Retrieved from: http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/EY_Broschuere_-
_Working_Capital_Management/$FILE/2012%20Year%20End%20Global%20IPO%20upd
ate.pdf. 
Fabrigar, L. R., & Wegener, D. T. 2012. Understanding statistics: Exploratory factor analysis. New 
York, NY: Oxford University Press. 
Faccio, M. 2007. The characteristics of politically connected firms. Purdue CIBER Working 
Papers. Purdue University. 
Faccio, M. 2010. Differences between politically connected and nonconnected firms: A cross‐
country analysis. Financial Management, 39(3): 905-928. 
Faccio, M., & Lang, L. H. 2002. The ultimate ownership of Western European corporation. Journal 
of Financial Economics, 65:365-395. 
Faccio, M., Masulis, R. W., & McConnell, J. 2006. Political connections and corporate bailouts. The 
Journal of Finance, 61(6): 2597-2635. 
Fama, E. F., & Jensen, M. C. 1983. Separation of ownership and control. Journal of Law and 
Economics, 301-325. 
Fan, G., Wang, X. L. & Zhu, H. P. 2007. Marketization Index in China: The Regional Process 
Report of 2006. Beijing: Economic Science Press. 
Fan, J. P., Wong, T. J., & Zhang, T. 2013. Institutions and organizational structure: The case of state-
owned corporate pyramids. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 29(6): 1217-
1252. 
Fauzi, F., & Locke, S. 2012. Board structure, ownership structure and firm performance: A study of 
New Zealand listed-firms. Asian Academy of Management Journal of Accounting and 
Finance, 8(2): 43-67. 
Fei, X., Hamilton, G. G., & Wang, Z. 1992. From the soil, the foundations of Chinese society: a 
translation of Fei Xiaotong’s Xiangtu Zhongguo. University of California Press. 
  
137 
 
Fich, E. M., & Shivdasani, A. 2006. Are busy boards effective monitors? The Journal of Finance, 
61(2): 689-724. 
Finkelstein, S., & Hambrick, D. C. 1996. Strategic leadership: Top executives and their effects on 
organizations. South-Western Pub. 
Finkelstein, S., Hambrick, D. C., & Cannella, A. 1996. Strategic Leadership. St. Paul, Minn.: West. 
Finkelstein, S., Hambrick, D. C., & Cannella, A. A. 2009. Strategic leadership: Theory and 
research on executives, top management teams, and boards. Oxford University Press, USA. 
Finkelstein, S., & Mooney, A. C. 2003. Not the usual suspects: How to use board process to make 
boards better. The Academy of Management Executive, 17(2): 101-113. 
Fondas, N. 1997. Feminization unveiled: Management qualities in contemporary writings. Academy 
of Management Review, 22(1): 257-282. 
Forbes, D. P., & Milliken, F. J. 1999. Cognition and corporate governance: Understanding boards of 
directors as strategic decision-making groups. Academy of Management Review, 24(3): 489-
505. 
Freeman, L. C. 1977. A set of measures of centrality based on betweenness. Sociometry, 35-41. 
Gaertner, S. L., Dovidio, J. F., Banker, B. S., Houlette, M., Johnson, K. M., & McGlynn, E. A. 2000. 
Reducing intergroup conflict: From superordinate goals to decategorization, recategorization, 
and mutual differentiation. Group Dynamics: Theory, Research, and Practice, 4(1): 98. 
Gao, X., Wong, T.J., Xia, L. & Yu, G., 2014. Friends with close ties: asset or liability? Evidence 
from the investment decisions of mutual funds in China. 
George G. 2014. Rethinking management scholarship. Academy of Management Journal, 57(1): 1-
6. 
Gilley, W. F., & Uhlig, G. E. 1993. Factor analysis and ordinal data. Education, 114(2): 258-265. 
Golden, B. R., & Zajac, E. J. 2001. When will boards influence strategy? Inclination × power = 
strategic change. Strategic Management Journal, 22(12): 1087-1111. 
  
138 
 
Goldman, E., Rocholl, J., & So, J. 2009. Do politically connected boards affect firm value? Review 
of Financial Studies, 22(6): 2331-2360. 
Gomez, E. T., & Jomo, K. S. 1999. Malaysia’s Political Economy: Power, Profits, Patronage. 
Cambridge University. 
Gompers, P. A., Ishii, J. L., & Metrick, A. 2001. Corporate governance and equity prices. National 
bureau of economic research. No. w8449. 
Goodstein, J., Gautam, K., & Boeker, W. 1994. The effects of board size and diversity on strategic 
change. Strategic Management Journal, 15(3): 241-250. 
Gould, R. V. 2002. The origins of status hierarchies: A formal theory and empirical test. American 
Journal of Sociology, 107(5): 1143-1178. 
Granovetter, M. 1985. Economic action and social structure: The problem of embeddedness. 
American Journal of Sociology, 481-510. 
Greene, W. H. 2008. Econometric Analysis (6th Eds.), Prentice Hall, Upper Saddle River NJ. 
Gregoric, A., Oxelheim, L., Randøy, T., & Thomsen, S. 2013. Changing the Corporate Elite? Not so 
Easy: Female Directors’ Appointments onto Corporate Boards. Journal of Business Ethics 
(Forthcoming). 
Gulati, R., Kilduff, M., Li, S., Shipilov, A., & Tsai, W. 2011. Relational pluralism of individuals, 
teams and organizations. Academy of Management Journal. 
Gulati, R., & Sytch, M. 2007. Dependence asymmetry and joint dependence in interorganizational 
relationships: Effects of embeddedness on a manufacturer's performance in procurement 
relationships. Administrative Science Quarterly, 52(1): 32-69. 
Gulati, R., & Westphal, J. D. 1999. Cooperative or controlling? The effects of CEO-board relations 
and the content of interlocks on the formation of joint ventures. Administrative Science 
Quarterly, 44(3): 473-506. 
Hagel, J., Brown, J. S., & Davison, L. 2010. The best way to measure company performance. 
Harvard Business Review. Harvard Business School Publishing. 
  
139 
 
Hagel, J., Samoylova, T., & Lui, M. 2013. Success or struggle: ROA as a true measure of business 
performance. Report 3 of the 2013 Shift Index series. 
Hair Jr, J. F., Anderson, R. E., Tatham, R. L., & Black, W. C. 1995. Multiple discriminant analysis. 
Multivariate Data Analysis, 178-256. 
Haleblian, J., & Finkelstein, S. 1993. Top management team size, CEO dominance, and firm 
performance: The moderating roles of environmental turbulence and discretion. Academy of 
Management Journal, 36(4): 844-863. 
Hambrick, D. C. 1981. Environment, strategy, and power within top management teams. 
Administrative Science Quarterly, 26(2): 253-75. 
Hambrick, D. C. 1983. Some tests of the effectiveness and functional attributes of Miles and Snow’s 
strategic types. The Academy of Management Journal, 26(1): 5-26. 
Hambrick, D. C. 2003. On the staying power of defenders, analyzers, and prospectors. The Academy 
of Management Executive, 17(4): 115-118. 
Hambrick, D. C. 2005. Upper echelons theory: Origins, twists and turns, and lessons learned. Great 
minds in management: The process of theory development, 109-127. 
Hambrick, D. C., & Fukutomi, G. D. 1991. The seasons of a CEO's tenure. Academy of 
Management Review, 16(4): 719-742. 
Hambrick, D. C., & Mason, P. A. 1984. Upper echelons: The organization as a reflection of its top 
managers. Academy of Management Review, 9(2): 193-206. 
Harrison, D. A., & Klein, K. J. 2007. What's the difference? Diversity constructs as separation, 
variety, or disparity in organizations. Academy of Management Review, 32(4): 1199-1228. 
Hart, S. L. (1995). A natural-resource-based view of the firm. Academy of Management Review, 
20(4): 986-1014. 
Haunschild, P. R., & Beckman, C. M. 1998. When do interlocks matter?: Alternate sources of 
information and interlock influence. Administrative Science Quarterly, 815-844. 
  
140 
 
Hausman, J. A. 1978. Specification tests in econometrics. Econometrica. Journal of the 
Econometric Society, 1251-1271. 
He, J., & Huang, Z. 2011. Board informal hierarchy and firm financial performance: Exploring a 
tacit structure guiding boardroom interactions. Academy of Management Journal, 54(6): 
1119-1139. 
Hermalin, B. E., & Weisbach, M. S. 2001. Boards of directors as an endogenously determined 
institution: A survey of the economic literature. National Bureau of Economic Research. 
No. w8161. 
Heugens, P. P., Van Essen, M., & van Oosterhout, J. H. 2009. Meta-analyzing ownership 
concentration and firm performance in Asia: Towards a more fine-grained understanding. 
Asia Pacific Journal of Management, 26(3): 481-512. 
Hewlett, S. A., & Rashid, R. 2011. Winning the war for talent in emerging markets. Why women 
are the solution? Boston, MA: Harvard Business Review Press. 
Hill, C. W., & Snell, S. A. 1988. External control, corporate strategy, and firm performance in 
research‐intensive industries. Strategic Management Journal, 9(6): 577-590. 
Hillman, A. J. 2005. Politicians on the board of directors: Do connections affect the bottom line? 
Journal of Management, 31(3): 464-481. 
Hillman, A. J., Cannella, A. A., & Harris, I. C. 2002. Women and racial minorities in the boardroom: 
How do directors differ? Journal of Management, 28(6): 747-763. 
Hillman, A. J., Cannella, A. A., & Paetzold, R. L. 2000. The resource dependence role of corporate 
directors: Strategic adaptation of board composition in response to environmental change. 
Journal of Management Studies, 37(2): 235-256. 
Hillman, A. J., & Dalziel, T. 2003. Boards of directors and firm performance: Integrating agency and 
resource dependence perspectives. Academy of Management Review, 28(3): 383-396. 
Hillman, A. J., Withers, M. C., & Collins, B. J. 2009. Resource dependence theory: A 
review. Journal of Management, 35(6): 1404–1427. 
  
141 
 
Hoel, H., Einarsen, S., & Cooper, C. L. 2003. Organisational effects of bullying. Bullying and 
emotional abuse in the workplace, international perspectives in research and practice, 145-
161. 
Holgado–Tello, F. P., Chacón–Moscoso, S., Barbero–García, I., & Vila–Abad, E. (2010). Polychoric 
versus Pearson correlations in exploratory and confirmatory factor analysis of ordinal 
variables. Quality & Quantity, 44(1), 153-166. 
Huse, M., & Rindova, V. P. 2001. Stakeholders' expectations of board roles: The case of subsidiary 
boards. Journal of Management and Governance, 5(2): 153-178. 
Hwang, B. H., & Kim, S. 2012. Social ties and earnings management. Available at SSRN 1215962. 
Ibarra, H. 1993. Personal networks of women and minorities in management: A conceptual 
framework. Academy of management Review, 18(1): 56-87. 
Ittner, C. D., Larcker, D. F., & Rajan, M. V. 1997. The choice of performance measures in annual 
bonus contracts. Accounting Review, 231-255. 
Jensen, R. E. 1984. An alternative scaling method for priorities in hierarchical structures. Journal of 
Mathematical Psychology, 28(3): 317-332. 
Jensen, M. C. 1993. The modern industrial revolution, exit, and the failure of internal control 
systems. The Journal of Finance, 48(3): 831-880. 
Jensen, M. C., & Meckling, W. H. 1976. Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and 
ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics, 3(4): 305-360. 
Jensen, M., & Zajac, E. J. 2004. Corporate elites and corporate strategy: How demographic 
preferences and structural position shape the scope of the firm. Strategic Management 
Journal, 25(6): 507-524. 
Johnson, J. L., Daily, C. M., & Ellstrand, A. E. 1996. Boards of directors: A review and research 
agenda. Journal of Management, 22(3): 409-438. 
  
142 
 
Johnson, J. L., & O'Leary‐Kelly, A. M. 2003. The effects of psychological contract breach and 
organizational cynicism: Not all social exchange violations are created equal. Journal of 
Organizational Behavior, 24(5): 627-647. 
Johnson, S. G., Schnatterly, K., & Hill, A. D. 2012. Board composition beyond independence social 
capital, human capital, and demographics. Journal of Management, 39(1): 232-262. 
Jöreskog, K. G., & Sörbom, D. 1996. LISREL 8: User's reference guide. Scientific Software 
International. 
Kabanoff, B., & Brown, S. 2008. Knowledge structures of prospectors, analyzers, and defenders: 
Content, structure, stability, and performance. Strategic Management Journal, 29(2): 149-
171. 
Kaczmarek, S., Kimino, S., & Pye, A. 2012. Board Task‐related Faultlines and Firm Performance: A 
Decade of Evidence. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 20(4): 337-351. 
Kaiser, H. F. 1974. An index of factorial simplicity. Psychometrika, 39(1): 31-36. 
Kameda, T., Stasson, M. F., Davis, J. H., Parks, C. D., & Zimmerman, S. K. 1992. Social dilemmas, 
subgroups, and motivation loss in task-oriented groups: In search of an" optimal" team size in 
division of work. Social Psychology Quarterly, 47-56. 
Kang, H., Cheng, M., & Gray, S. J. 2007. Corporate governance and board composition: Diversity 
and independence of Australian boards. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 
15(2): 194-207. 
Kapopoulos, P., & Lazaretou, S. 2007. Corporate ownership structure and firm performance: 
evidence from Greek firms. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 15(2): 144-
158. 
Keashly, L., & Jagatic, K. 2011. North American perspectives on hostile behaviors and bullying at 
work. Bullying and harassment in the workplace: Developments in theory, research, and 
practice, 2, 41-71. 
  
143 
 
Kenis, P., & Knoke, D. 2002. How organizational field networks shape interorganizational tie-
formation rates. Academy of Management Review, 27(2): 275-293. 
Kennedy, S. 2005. China's porous protectionism: the changing political economy of trade policy. 
Political Science Quarterly, 120(3): 407-432. 
Kilduff, M., Crossland, C., Tsai, W., & Krackhardt, D. 2008. Organizational network perceptions 
versus reality: A small world after all?  Organizational Behavior and Human Decision 
Processes, 107(1): 15-28. 
Kim, K. H., & Rasheed, A. A. 2014. Board heterogeneity, corporate diversification and firm 
performance. Journal of Management Research, 14(2): 121. 
Kim, K. H., & Tsai, W. 2012. Social comparison among competing firms. Strategic Management 
Journal, 33(2): 115-136. 
Koka, B. R., & Prescott, J. E. 2002. Strategic alliances as social capital: A multidimensional view. 
Strategic Management Journal, 23(9): 795-816. 
Kor, Y. Y. 2006. Direct and interaction effects of top management team and board compositions on 
R&D investment strategy. Strategic Management Journal, 27(11): 1081-1099. 
Kor, Y. Y., & Misangyi, V. F. 2008. Outside directors' industry‐specific experience and firms' 
liability of newness. Strategic Management Journal, 29(12): 1345-1355. 
Krishnan, H. A., Miller, A., & Judge, W. Q. 1997. Diversification and top management team 
complementarity: Is performance improved by merging similar or dissimilar teams? Strategic 
Management Journal, 361-374. 
Lan, L. L., & Heracleous, L. 2010. Rethinking agency theory: The view from law. Academy of 
Management Review, 35(2): 294-314. 
Larcker, D. F., So, E. C., & Wang, C. C. 2010. Boardroom centrality and stock returns. Palo Alto: 
Graduate School of Business, Stanford University. 
Larcker, D. F., So, E. C., & Wang, C. C. 2013. Boardroom centrality and firm performance. Journal 
of Accounting and Economics, 55(2): 225-250. 
  
144 
 
Lau, D. C., & Murnighan, J. K. 2005. Interactions within groups and subgroups: The effects of 
demographic faultlines. Academy of Management Journal, 48(4): 645-659. 
Leblanc, R., & Gillies, J. 2005. Inside the Boadroom. John Wiley & Sons Canada, Ltd. 
Leutert, W. 2016. Challenges Ahead in China's Reform of State-Owned Enterprises. Asia Policy, 
21(1): 83-99. 
Li, P. 2016. Dropping Out: University Officials Leave Chinese Corporate Boards. The Wall Street 
Journal, China Real Time Report, Jan 4, 2016. 
Li, Y., Chen, H., Liu, Y., & Peng, M. W. 2014. Managerial ties, organizational learning, and 
opportunity capture: A social capital perspective. Asia Pacific Journal of Management, 
31(1): 271-291. 
Li, J., & Hambrick, D. C. 2005. Factional groups: A new vantage on demographic faultlines, conflict, 
and disintegration in work teams. Academy of Management Journal, 48(5): 794-813. 
Li, H., Meng, L., Wang, Q., & Zhou, L. A. 2008. Political connections, financing and firm 
performance: Evidence from Chinese private firms. Journal of Development Economics, 
87(2): 283-299. 
Li, J., & Qian, C. 2013. Principal‐principal conflicts under weak institutions: A study of corporate 
takeovers in China. Strategic Management Journal, 34(4): 498-508. 
Lin, C., Tsai, H. L., & Wu, J. C. 2014. Collaboration strategy decision-making using the Miles and 
Snow typology. Journal of Business Research, 67(9): 1979-1990. 
Lipton, M., & Lorsch, J. W. 1992. A modest proposal for improved corporate governance. The 
Business Lawyer, 59-77. 
Litov, L. P., Sepe, S. M., & Whitehead, C. K. 2014. Lawyers and Fools: Lawyer-Directors in Public 
Corporations. Georgetown Law Journal, 102, 13-63. 
Little, D. 2012. Explanatory autonomy and Coleman’s boat. Theoria, 27(2): 137-151. 
  
145 
 
Lomi, A., & Pattison, P. 2006. Manufacturing relations: An empirical study of the organization of 
production across multiple networks. Organization Science, 17(3): 313-332. 
Lorsch, J., & MacIver, E. 1989. Pawns or potentates: The reality of America’s corporate boards. 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard Business School Press. 
Lückerath-Rovers, M. 2013. Women on boards and firm performance. Journal of Management & 
Governance, 17(2): 491-509. 
Luo, X., & Chung, C. N. 2005. Keeping it all in the family: The role of particularistic relationships in 
business group performance during institutional transition. Administrative Science 
Quarterly, 50(3): 404-439. 
Lynall, M. D., Golden, B. R., & Hillman, A. J. 2003. Board composition from adolescence to 
maturity: A multi-theoretic view. Academy of Management Review, 28(3): 416-431. 
MacCallum, R. C., Widaman, K. F., Zhang, S., & Hong, S. 1999. Sample size in factor analysis. 
Psychological Methods, 4(1): 84. 
Mace, M. L. 1971. Directors: Myth and reality. Division of Research, Harvard University. 
Magee, J. C., & Galinsky, A. D. 2008. 8 Social Hierarchy: The Self‐Reinforcing Nature of Power 
and Status. The Academy of Management Annals, 2(1): 351-398. 
Markóczy, L., Li Sun, S., Peng, M. W., & Ren, B. 2013. Social network contingency, symbolic 
management, and boundary stretching. Strategic Management Journal, 34(11): 1367-1387. 
McDonald, M. L., Khanna, P., & Westphal, J. D. 2008. Getting them to think outside the circle: 
Corporate governance, CEOs' external advice networks, and firm performance. Academy of 
Management Journal, 51(3): 453-475. 
McDonald, M. L., & Westphal, J. D. 2010. A little help here? Board control, CEO identification with 
the corporate elite, and strategic help provided to CEOs at other firms. Academy of 
Management Journal, 53(2): 343-370. 
  
146 
 
Mehra, A., Kilduff, M., & Brass, D. J. 1998. At the margins: A distinctiveness approach to the social 
identity and social networks of underrepresented groups. Academy of Management Journal, 
41(4): 441-452. 
Miles, R. E., & Snow, C. C. 1978. Organizational strategy, structure and process. New York: 
McGraw-Hill Book Company. 
Miles, R. E., Snow, C. C., Meyer, A. D., & Coleman, H. J. 1978. Organizational strategy, structure, 
and process. Academy of Management Review, 3(3): 546-562. 
Miller, T., & del Carmen Triana, M. 2009. Demographic diversity in the boardroom: Mediators of 
the board diversity–firm performance relationship. Journal of Management Studies, 46(5): 
755-786. 
Milliken, F. J., & Martins, L. L. 1996. Searching for common threads: Understanding the multiple 
effects of diversity in organizational groups. Academy of Management Review, 21(2): 402-
433. 
Milton, L. P., & Westphal, J. D. 2005. Identity confirmation networks and cooperation in work 
groups. Academy of Management Journal, 48(2): 191-212. 
Mintzberg, H. 1983. The case for corporate social responsibility. Journal of Business Strategy, 4(2): 
3-15. 
Mizruchi, M. S. 1990. Cohesion, structural equivalence, and similarity of behavior: An approach to 
the study of corporate political power. Sociological Theory, 8(1): 16-32. 
Mol, M. J. 2001. Creating wealth through working with others: Interorganizational relationships. The 
Academy of Management Executive, 15(1): 150-152. 
Monks, R. A. G., & Minow, N. 2008. Corporate Governance. 4th Eds., John Wiley and Sons Ltd., 
Chichester, West Sussex, UK. 
Morck, R., & Yeung, B. 2003. Agency problems in large family business groups. Entrepreneurship 
Theory and Practice, 27(4): 367-382. 
  
147 
 
Muth, M. M., & Donaldson, L. 1998. Stewardship theory and board structure: A contingency 
approach. Corporate Governance, 6(1): 5-28. 
Nahapiet, J., & Ghoshal, S. 1998. Social capital, intellectual capital, and the organizational 
advantage. Academy of Management Review, 23(2): 242-266. 
Nicholson, G. J., Alexander, M., & Kiel, G. C. 2004. Defining the social capital of the board of 
directors: An exploratory study. Journal of Management & Organization, 10(01): 54-72. 
Niessen, A., & Ruenzi, S. 2010. Political connectedness and firm performance: Evidence from 
Germany. German Economic Review, 11(4): 441-464. 
OECD. 2011. Corporate Governance of Listed Companies in China: Self-Assessment by the China 
Securities Regulatory Commission, OECD Publishing. Retrieved on July 20, 2016 from 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264119208-en. 
Oh, H., Chung, M. H., & Labianca, G. 2004. Group social capital and group effectiveness: The role 
of informal socializing ties. Academy of Management Journal, 47(6): 860-875. 
Omer, T. C., Shelley, M. K., & Tice, F. M. 2014a. Do director networks matter for financial 
reporting quality? Evidence from restatements. 
Omer, T. C., Shelley, M. K., & Tice, F. M. 2014b. Do Well-Connected Directors Affect Firm Value? 
Journal of Applied Finance, 24(2): 17-32. 
Overbeck, J. R., Correll, J., & Park, B. 2005. Internal status sorting in groups: The problem of too 
many stars. Research on Managing Groups & Teams, 7: 169-199. 
Oviatt, B. M. 1988. Agency and transaction cost perspectives on the manager-shareholder 
relationship: Incentives for congruent interests. Academy of Management Review, 13(2): 
214-225. 
Ozcan, P., & Eisenhardt, K. M. 2009. Origin of alliance portfolios: Entrepreneurs, network strategies, 
and firm performance. Academy of Management Journal, 52(2): 246-279. 
Palmer, D., Friedland, R., & Singh, J. V. 1986. The ties that bind: Organizational and class bases of 
stability in a corporate interlock network. American Sociological Review, 781-796. 
  
148 
 
Pearce, J. A., & Zahra, S. A. 1992. Board composition from a strategic contingency 
perspective. Journal of Management Studies, 29(4): 411-438. 
Peng, M. W. 2004. Outside directors and firm performance during institutional transitions. Strategic 
Management Journal, 25(5): 453-471. 
Peng, M. W., Li, Y., Xie, E., & Su, Z. 2010. CEO duality, organizational slack, and firm 
performance in China. Asia Pacific Journal of Management, 27: 611-624. 
Peng, M. W., Sun, S. L., & Markóczy, L. 2015. Human capital and CEO compensation during 
institutional transitions. Journal of Management Studies. 52(1): 117-147. 
Peng, M. W., Tan, J., & Tong, T. W. 2004. Ownership types and strategic groups in an emerging 
economy. Journal of Management Studies, 41: 1105–1129. 
Peng, M. W., Zhang, S., & Li, X. 2007. CEO duality and firm performance during China’s 
institutional transitions. Management and Organization Review, 3: 205–225. 
Pennings, J. M. 1980. Interlocking Directorates. Jossey-Bass Inc Pub. 
Peres-Gonzalez, F. 2001. Does Inherited Control Hurt Firm Performance? Columbia University. 
Pettigrew, A. M. 1992. On studying managerial elites. Strategic Management Journal, 13(S2): 163-
182. 
Pfeffer, J. 1972. Size and composition of corporate boards of directors: The organization and its 
environment. Administrative Science Quarterly, 218-228. 
Pfeffer, J., & Salancik, G. R. 2003. The external control of organizations: A resource dependence 
perspective. Stanford University Press. 
Phelps, C., Heidl, R., & Wadhwa, A. 2012. Knowledge, networks, and knowledge networks a review 
and research agenda. Journal of Management, 38(4): 1115-1166. 
Porta, R., Lopez de Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. 1997. Legal determinants of external 
finance. The Journal of Finance, 52(3): 1131-1150. 
  
149 
 
Post, C., & Byron, K. 2015. Women on boards and firm financial performance: A meta-analysis. 
Academy of Management Journal, 58(5): 1546-1571. 
Pratt, M. G., & Rafaeli, A. 1997. Organizational dress as a symbol of multilayered social identities. 
Academy of Management Journal, 40(4): 862-898. 
Provan, K. G. 1980. Board power and organizational effectiveness among human service agencies. 
Academy of Management journal, 23(2): 221-236. 
Provan, K. G., & Sebastian, J. G. 1998. Networks within networks: Service link overlap, 
organizational cliques, and network effectiveness. Academy of Management Journal, 41(4): 
453-463. 
Qi, D., Wu, W., & Zhang, H. 2000. Shareholding structure and corporate performance of partially 
privatized firms: Evidence from listed Chinese companies. Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, 
8(5): 587-610. 
Raffaelli, R., & Glynn, M. A. 2014. Turnkey or tailored? Relational pluralism, institutional 
complexity, and the organizational adoption of more or less customized practices. Academy 
of Management Journal, 57(2): 541-562. 
Rajagopalan, N. 1997. Strategic orientations, incentive plan adoptions, and firm performance: 
Evidence from electric utility firms. Strategic Management Journal, 18(10): 761-785. 
Rajagopalan, N., & Finkelstein, S. 1992. Effects of strategic orientation and environmental change 
on senior management reward systems. Strategic Management Journal, 13(S1): 127-141. 
Ramaswamy, K., Li, M., & Veliyath, R. 2002. Variations in ownership behavior and propensity to 
diversify: A study of the Indian corporate context. Strategic Management Journal, 23(4): 
345-358. 
Ranganathan, R., & Rosenkopf, L. 2014. Do ties really bind? The effect of knowledge and 
commercialization networks on opposition to standards. Academy of Management 
Journal, 57(2): 515-540. 
  
150 
 
Rechner, P. L., & Dalton, D. R. 1991. CEO duality and organizational performance: A longitudinal 
analysis. Strategic Management Journal, 12(2): 155-160. 
Renders, A., & Gaeremynck, A. 2012. Corporate Governance, Principal‐Principal Agency Conflicts, 
and Firm Value in European Listed Companies. Corporate Governance: an International 
Review, 20(2): 125-143. 
Rhoades, D. L., Rechner, P. L., & Sundaramurthy, C. 2001. A Meta-analysis of Board Leadership 
Structure and Financial Performance: are two heads better than one? Corporate Governance: 
An International Review, 9(4): 311-319. 
Rindova, V. P. 1999. What corporate boards have to do with strategy: A cognitive perspective. 
Journal of Management Studies, 36(7): 953-975. 
Roberson, Q. M., & Colquitt, J. A. 2005. Shared and configural justice: A social network model of 
justice in teams. Academy of Management Review, 30(3): 595-607. 
Roberts, M., & Whited, T. 2011. Endogeneity in Empirical Corporate Finance. Working Paper, 
University of Pennsylvania, University of Rochester. 
Rogan, M. 2014. Executive departures without client losses: The role of multiplex ties in exchange 
partner retention. Academy of Management Journal, 57(2): 563-584. 
Saraç, M., Ertan, Y., & Yücel, E. 2014. How Do Business Strategies Predict Firm Performance? An 
Investigation On Borsa Istanbul 100 Index. The Journal of Accounting and Finance, 61, 
121-134. 
Sawyer, J. E., Houletter, M. A. & Yeagley, E. L. 2006. Decision performance and diversity structure: 
Comparing faultlines in convergent, crosscut, and racially homogenous groups. 
Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 99: 1-15. 
Schippers, M. C., den Hartog, D. N., Koopman, P. L., & Wienk, J. A. 2003. Diversity and team 
outcomes: The moderating effects of outcome interdependence and group longevity and the 
mediating effect of reflexivity. Journal of Organizational Behavior, 24(6): 779-802. 
  
151 
 
Schoorman, F. D., Bazerman, M. H., & Atkin, R. S. 1981. Interlocking directorates: A strategy for 
reducing environmental uncertainty. Academy of Management Review, 6(2): 243-251. 
Sheng, S., Zhou, K. Z., & Li, J. J. 2011. The effects of business and political ties on firm 
performance: Evidence from China. Journal of Marketing, 75(1): 1-15. 
Shi, W. S., Markóczy, L., & Stan, C. V. 2014. The continuing importance of political ties in China. 
The Academy of Management Perspectives, 28(1): 57-75. 
Shift Index. 2013. The Shift Index. Deloitte, retrieved from: www.deloitte.com/us/shiftindex. 
Shipilov, A. V., & Li, S. X. 2012. The missing link: The effect of customers on the formation of 
relationships among producers in the multiplex triads. Organization Science, 23(2): 472-491. 
Shivdasani, A., & Yermack, D. 1999. CEO involvement in the selection of new board members: An 
empirical analysis. The Journal of Finance, 54(5): 1829-1853. 
Shipilov, A., Gulati, R., Kilduff, M., Li, S., & Tsai, W. 2014. Relational pluralism within and 
between organizations. Academy of Management Journal, 57(2): 449-459. 
Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. 1997. A survey of corporate governance. The Journal of Finance, 
52(2): 737-783. 
Simmel, G. 1955. The web of group affiliations. Conflict and the web of group affiliations, 125-95. 
Simons, R. 1987. Accounting control systems and business strategy: An empirical analysis. 
Accounting, Organizations and Society, 12 (4): 357–74. 
Singh, J. V., Tucker, D. J., & House, R. J. 1986. Organizational legitimacy and the liability of 
newness. Administrative Science Quarterly, 171-193. 
Singh, V., & Vinnicombe, S. 2004. Why so few women directors in top UK boardrooms? Evidence 
and theoretical explanations. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 12(4): 479-
488. 
  
152 
 
Smith, N., Smith, V., & Verner, M. 2006. Do women in top management affect firm performance? A 
panel study of 2,500 Danish firms. International Journal of Productivity and Performance 
Management, 55(7): 569-593. 
Snow, C. C., & Hambrick, D. C. 1980. Measuring organizational strategies: Some theoretical and 
methodological problems. Academy of Management Review, 5(4): 527-538. 
Sollosy, M., Guidice, R. M., & Parboteeah, K. P. 2015. A Contemporary Examination of The Miles 
& Snow Strategic Typology Through The Lens Of Ambidexterity. In Academy of 
Management Proceedings (Vol. 2015, No. 1, p. 11213). Academy of Management. 
Soobaroyen, T., & Mahadeo, J. D. 2008. Selective compliance with the corporate governance code in 
Mauritius: Is legitimacy theory at work. Research in Accounting in Emerging Economies, 
8, 239-272. 
Srinidhi, B., Gul, F. A., & Tsui, J. 2011. Female directors and earnings quality. Contemporary 
Accounting Research, 28(5): 1610-1644. 
Stearns, L. B., & Mizruchi, M. S. 1993. Board composition and corporate financing: The impact of 
financial institution representation on borrowing. Academy of Management Journal, 36(3): 
603-618. 
Stock, J. H., & Watson, M. W. 2007. Instrumental variable regression. Introduction to 
econometrics (2nd eds.) Boston, MA: Pearson-Addison Wesley. 
Strandholm, K., Kumar, K., & Subramanian, R. 2004. Examining the interrelationships among 
perceived environmental change, strategic response, managerial characteristics, and 
organizational performance. Journal of Business Research, 57(1): 58-68. 
Stuart, T. E., & Yim, S. 2010. Board interlocks and the propensity to be targeted in private equity 
transactions. Journal of Financial Economics, 97(1): 174-189. 
Süssmuth-Dyckerhoff, C., Wang, J., & Chen J. 2012. Women matter: An Asian Perspective. Report 
by McKinzey. Asia. 
  
153 
 
Sytch, M., & Tatarynowicz, A. 2014. Exploring the locus of invention: The dynamics of network 
communities and firms' invention productivity. Academy of Management Journal, 57(1): 
249-279. 
Tabachnick, B. G., & Fidell, L. S. 2013. Using multivariate statistics (6th ed.). Boston: Allyn Bacon. 
Tajfel, H. 1979. Individuals and groups in social psychology. British Journal of Social and Clinical 
Psychology, 18(2): 183-190. 
Tajfel, H., & Turner, J. C. 1979. An integrative theory of intergroup conflict. The Social Psychology 
of Intergroup Relations, 33(47): 74. 
Thomas, A. S., Litchert, R. J., & Ramaswarmy, K. 1991. The performance impact of strategy-
manager coalignment: An empirical examination. Strategic Management Journal, 12: 509-
522. 
Thomas, A. S., & Ramaswamy, K. 1996. Matching managers to strategy: further tests of the Miles 
and Snow typology. British Journal of Management, 7(3): 247-261. 
Toegel, G., Kilduff, M., & Anand, N. 2013. Emotion helping by managers: An emergent 
understanding of discrepant role expectations and outcomes. Academy of management 
Journal, 56(2): 334-357. 
Torchia, M., Calabrò, A., & Huse, M. 2011. Women directors on corporate boards: From tokenism 
to critical mass. Journal of Business Ethics, 102(2): 299-317. 
Torres-Reyna, O. 2007. Panel data analysis fixed and random effects using Stata (v. 4.2). Data & 
Statistical Services, Princeton University. 
Tsai, W. 2001. Knowledge transfer in intraorganizational networks: Effects of network position and 
absorptive capacity on business unit innovation and performance. Academy of Management 
Journal, 44(5): 996-1004. 
Tsai, W. 2002. Social structure of “coopetition” within a multiunit organization: Coordination, 
competition, and intraorganizational knowledge sharing. Organization Science, 13(2): 179-
190. 
  
154 
 
Tsamenyi, M., & Uddin, S. 2008. Introduction to corporate governance in less developed and 
emerging economies. Research in Accounting in Emerging Economies, 8: 1-11. 
Van der Walt, N., Ingley, C., Shergill, G. S., & Townsend, A. 2006. Board configuration: are diverse 
boards better boards? Corporate Governance: The International Journal of Business in 
Society, 6(2): 129-147. 
Van Essen, M., Van Oosterhout, J. H., & Carney, M. 2012. Corporate boards and the performance of 
Asian firms: A meta-analysis. Asia Pacific Journal of Management, 29(4): 873-905. 
Walsh, J. P., & Seward, J. K. 1990. On the efficiency of internal and external corporate control 
mechanisms. Academy of Management Review, 15(3): 421-458. 
Wang, J. Y. 2014. Company Law in China: Regulation of Business Organizations in a Socialist 
Market Economy. Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, UK. 
Wang, C., Rodan, S., Fruin, M., & Xu, X. 2014. Knowledge networks, collaboration networks, and 
exploratory innovation. Academy of Management Journal, 57(2): 484-514. 
Wasserman, S., & Faust, K. 1994. Social network analysis: Methods and applications (Vol. 8). 
Cambridge university press. 
Weick, K. E. 1979. Cognitive processes in organizations. Research in Organizational Behavior, 
1(1): 41-74. 
Wernerfelt, B., & Montgomery, C. A. 1988. Tobin's q and the importance of focus in firm 
performance. The American Economic Review, 246-250. 
Westphal, J. D. 1999. Collaboration in the boardroom: Behavioral and performance consequences of 
CEO-board social ties. Academy of Management Journal, 42(1): 7-24. 
Westphal, J. D., & Bednar, M. K. 2005. Pluralistic ignorance in corporate boards and firms' strategic 
persistence in response to low firm performance. Administrative Science Quarterly, 50(2): 
262-298. 
Westphal, J. D., Boivie, S., Chng, M., & Han, D. 2006. The strategic impetus for social network ties: 
Reconstituting broken CEO friendship ties. Strategic Management Journal, 27(5): 425-445. 
  
155 
 
Westphal, J. D., & Milton, L. P. 2000. How experience and network ties affect the influence of 
demographic minorities on corporate boards. Administrative Science Quarterly, 45(2): 366-
398. 
Westphal, J. D., & Stern, I. 2006. The other pathway to the boardroom: Interpersonal influence 
behavior as a substitute for elite credentials and majority status in obtaining board 
appointments. Administrative Science Quarterly, 51(2): 169-204. 
Westphal, J. D., & Stern, I. 2007. Flattery will get you everywhere (especially if you are a male 
Caucasian): How ingratiation, boardroom behavior, and demographic minority status affect 
additional board appointments at US companies. Academy of Management Journal, 50(2): 
267-288. 
Westphal, J. D., & Zajac, E. J. 1995. Who shall govern? CEO/board power, demographic similarity, 
and new director selection. Administrative Science Quarterly, 60-83. 
Westphal, J. D., & Zajac, E. J. 2013. A behavioral theory of corporate governance: Explicating the 
mechanisms of socially situated and socially constituted agency. The Academy of 
Management Annual. 7(1): 607-61. 
Williams, B., Onsman, A., & Brown, T. 2010. Exploratory factor analysis: A five-step guide for 
novices. Australasian Journal of Paramedicine, 8(3). 
Williamson, O. E. 1981. The economics of organization: The transaction cost approach. American 
Journal of Sociology, 7(1): 607-661. 
Wiseman, R. M., Cuevas‐Rodríguez, G., & Gomez‐Mejia, L. R. 2012. Towards a social theory of 
agency. Journal of Management Studies, 49(1): 202-222. 
Wong, T. J. 2016. Corporate Governance Research on Listed Firms in China: Institutions, 
Governance and Accountability. Foundations and Trends in Accounting, 9(4): 259-326. 
Wooldridge, J. M. 2006. Introductory Econometrics: A Modern Approach (3rd eds). South-
Western College Publishing: Cincinnati, OH. 
  
156 
 
Wright, M., Filatotchev, I., Hoskisson, R. E., & Peng, M. W. 2005. Strategy research in emerging 
economies: Challenging the conventional wisdom. Journal of Management Studies, 42: 1–
33. 
Young, M. N., Peng, M. W., Ahlstrom, D., Bruton, G. D., & Jiang, Y. 2008. Corporate governance 
in emerging economies: A review of the principal–principal perspective. Journal of 
Management Studies, 45(1): 196-220. 
Zaheer, A., Gözübüyük, R., & Milanov, H. 2010. It's the connections: The network perspective in 
interorganizational research. The Academy of Management Perspectives, 24(1): 62-77. 
Zahra, S. A. 1996. Technology strategy and new venture performance: a study of corporate-
sponsored and independent biotechnology ventures. Journal of Business Venturing, 11(4): 
289-321. 
Zahra, S. A., & Pearce, J. A. 1989. Boards of directors and corporate financial performance: A 
review and integrative model. Journal of Management, 15(2): 291-334. 
Zahra, S. A., & Pearce, J. A. 1990. Determinants of board directors' strategic involvement. European 
Management Journal, 8(2): 164-173. 
Zajac, E. J., & Westphal, J. D. 1996. Director reputation, CEO/board power, and the dynamics of 
board interlocks. Academy of Management Proceedings, (1): 254-258.  
Zelechowski, D. D., & Bilimoria, D. 2004. Characteristics of women and men corporate inside 
directors in the US. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 12(3): 337-342. 
Zhu, D. H., Shen, W., & Hillman, A. J. 2014. Recategorization into the In-group: The Appointment 
of Demographically Different New Directors and Their Subsequent Positions on Corporate 
Boards. Administrative Science Quarterly, 59(2): 240-270. 
Zuckerman, E. W. 1999. The categorical imperative: Securities analysts and the illegitimacy 
discount. American Journal of Sociology, 104(5): 1398-1438. 
 
